City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

9-2021

Essays on Communication
Shawn M. Simpson
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4469
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATION

by

SHAWN M. SIMPSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2021

© 2021
SHAWN M. SIMPSON
All Rights Reserved

ii

Essays on Communication
by
Shawn M. Simpson

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

______________________

_______________________________________

Date

John Greenwood
Chair of Examining Committee

______________________

_______________________________________

Date

Nickolas Pappas
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Noël Carroll
Michael Devitt
Stephen Neale

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT

Essays on Communication
by
Shawn M. Simpson

Advisor: Professor Noël Carroll
One of the central issues of contemporary philosophy and biology is the nature of
communication. Early accounts of communication tended to focus on just one side of the
communicative divide – the speaker side or the receiver side – and took as their starting point the
case of human language. Animal communication, historically, was largely treated as a special
case. Now things are different. Now it appears we might have a model that makes sense of sign
use in both the human and animal realms and brings together both sides of the signaling divide.
It’s still to be seen, however, how much the model actually captures, especially the farther down
we go on the animal side, and it’s still to be seen how well the model captures the human cases,
especially those around the edges. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the foundations of the
sender-receiver model and to show that it can cover more than was previously imagined. Topics
discussed include the nature of communication and signaling, animal communication, the nature
of meaning or content, the communicative nature of objects such as works of art, blueprints, and
maps, and the possibility of communication between groups and collective agents.
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Introduction

The world is filled with many wonders, and one of those wonders is communication. It comes in
many forms. In the form of a greeting to a friend, “How are you, Michael?”; in the form of a
ring on a finger; in the form of a song or a painting; in the form of the roar of a lion.
One thing philosophers have hoped to do is understand communication: how it came
about; its limits; what counts as a sign or symbol; and what it is for something to have meaning
or content.
The history goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks. Both Plato (429–347 BCE)
and his student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) worried about meaning. In the Cratylus, Plato has the
philosopher Hermogenes suggest that “no name belongs to a particular thing by nature” (360
BCE/1997, xiii). In, On Interpretation, Aristotle similarly claims that words and sentences get
their meanings by “convention” (350 BCE/1941). Democritus (460-370 BCE) is thought to have
held a similar view (Barnes, 1982; Duvick, 2007). And Epicurus (341–270 BCE), who came
after all three, provided one of the first historical theories of language’s origin. According to
Epicurus, people first made certain primitive sounds in certain circumstances by a sort of instinct
and some of these pairings simply caught on and expanded (Verlinsky, 2005). How that process
worked, how things “caught on”, was largely left unexplained.
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Similar worries about language existed in the Eastern world. Around the 3rd century
BCE, we find Chinese philosopher Xun Zi (or Xun Kuang 荀況) (310-220 BCE) writing that
“Names have no predetermined appropriateness. One forms agreement in order to name things.”
(3rd c. BCE/2014, p. 239). In 6th and 7th century Tibet and India, Buddhist philosopher
Dharmakīrti (600-660 CE), argued that words and objects were associated via a form of
convention (Hugon, 2020). In the Islamic world, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (870–950 CE), in his work
Kitāb al-ḥurūf (or Book of letters) suggests words signify what they do via community assent
(Mahdi, 1990).
In the Middle Ages and Renaissance there were philosophers who wrote about signs too.
St. Augustine (354-430 BCE) was one of them.1 During the Enlightenment, English philosopher
John Locke (1632-1704) wrote about meaning in his 1689 An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. And in 1781, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), in his
work Discourse on Inequality, wrote about gestural communication and whether meaning really
could come about by agreement: “… a unanimous agreement would need to be proposed,” he
writes, “which means that speech seems to have been absolutely necessary to establish the use of
speech” (p. 94).
It wasn’t really until the 1800s, with the development of fields such as biology and
archeology, that questions about communication really took off and in a way that people today
would probably feel comfortable calling scientific. In 1871, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) made
a note about communication in his book The Descent of Man, writing that perhaps “the survival
of certain favored words in the struggle for existence is natural selection” (p. 91). Not much
1

See St. Augustine’s Confessions (397 and 400 CE) and de Magistro (389 CE) for examples of his writing on
language.

2

later, the semiology of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and the semiotics of
American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914) started to gain traction. Saussure and
Pierce both had aspirations for a general theory of signs. Pierce’s model is still employed in
some corners of science, and bits and pieces of his theory are now part of the special lexicon of
philosophers, but otherwise, in present day, his model has largely been abandoned. The story
has been much the same for Saussure, though his work is still used in some areas of research in
Europe, especially by researchers in France.2 A bit later on, German philosopher and
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) tried to pick up where Darwin left off. Wundt’s
Völkerpsychologie (1900-1920) discussed both human and animal communication,
hypothesizing that human language evolved from animal gesture.
Just before the First World War, philosophers began to take a different approach to
questions about communication. Some turned to logic and formalization to try to understand
meaning. The work of British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and the early work of
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) fits this description.3 Other
philosophers turned their focus to everyday speech. The works of English philosophers H. Paul
Grice (1913-1988) and J. L. Austin (1911-1960) are examples here.4 Either way, the move
seemed to be one away from looking for a general theory of communication – one that handled
the so-called formal and informal aspects of language – and instead one toward different

2

See Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1916/2011), for an introduction to his ideas on signs. Original
French title: cours de linguistique générale. The work is a collection of notes by Charles Bally and Albert
Sechehaye on lectures given by Saussure at the University of Geneva between 1906 and 1911.
3
Russell’s 1905 essay “On Denoting” is a good example.
4
See Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1962), for a contrast to Grice.

3

programs headed in somewhat different directions. Animal communication was largely treated
as a special side topic, something that could be handled with a different theory and on its own.
In the 1960s, things started to change. In 1969, American philosopher David Lewis
(1941-2001) published his book Convention and presented the beginnings of a model that,
although formal, seemed to make room for explaining the informal aspects of communication
emphasized by Grice and others. Still, Lewis didn’t have much to say about non-human
communication, and since his story relied on things such as intentions and beliefs, it’s not clear
what he would have said in all cases, especially apparent non-human ones. Later on, and sort of
off to the side, in 1984, American philosopher Ruth Millikan’s book Language, Thought and
Other Biological Categories came out. There Millikan articulated a natural selection inspired
“bio-semantics”, bringing about a way of thinking about communication that was somewhat in
line with the Lewis model but that at the same time made room for the non-human side of the
problem. By the late 90s and early 2000s, American philosopher Brian Skyrms, in his books
Evolution of the Social Contract (1996) and Signals (2010), and other researchers had expanded
the Lewis framework in part by incorporating some of Millikan’s insights. It was shown that
now, among other things, Lewis’s model could potentially be applied to both the human and
non-human realms.
And yet, this new way of understanding communication – what has come to be known as
the “Lewis-Skyrms model” or the “sender-receiver model” - still has plenty to be worked out.5
Many of the foundational questions have yet to be answered. Do all the parts matter – sender,

5

Many people use the title “sender-receiver model” to apply to other similar but less fleshed out models of
communication that are out there. I’ll be using the term here to talk not about those models but about the LewisSkyrms model and my extended version of it.

4

receiver, signal? How do mental representations or intentions fit in – are these things essential to
true communication? Can the model really be applied to animals and other non-human agents?
What is the meaning or content of a sign according to the model? And how does the new model
compare to those of, say, Peirce and Grice – perhaps the two most beloved and relied on models
around? I’ll discuss these issues and others in Chapter 1 of the thesis.
Another thing a good model of communication should be able to do is capture the cases
on the periphery, the cases of communication outside the standard examples. A good question is
how far the sender-receiver model goes. I discuss some off cases of signaling that test the
boundaries of the model in Chapter 1, but the rest of the thesis tackles this question in detail. In
Chapter 2, I look at the question of group communication. We talk about people and animals
communicating all the time. Australian philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith in a recent paper
(Godfrey-Smith, 2014a) argues that signaling occurs even at the level of cells. And yet, just as
people talk about signaling occurring at this sort of lower level, between the parts of a body, or at
the (for lack of better words) base level, the level of the agents made up of those parts, people
also often talk about communication going on at a higher level, at the level of groups of agents or
collections of organisms or animals. One might wonder: is it ever actually fair to say, for
example, that China (not Xi Jinping) sent a message to Russia (and not Putin), or perhaps that it
was the group of magpies cawing and crowing together that warned me of that Grizzly bear? I’ll
discuss the possibility of group or collective communication in Chapter 2.
One of the problems with some of the older accounts of communication was their narrow
focus on human speech or writing or abstract formalizations of it. American philosopher John
Dewey once seemed to express this worry. In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), Dewey

5

writes about such theorizing, “…unless carefully interpreted it narrows unduly the scope of
symbols and language, since it is not customary to treat gestures and diagrams (maps, blueprints,
etc.) as words or sentences” (p. 284). What are we to make on these formal models, he seems to
have wondered, of things such as works of art or maps, things which also seem to have meaning
in some sense but in a way different from human languages such as Lakȟótiyapi (Lakota) or
Spanish? In Chapter 3, I’ll look at the communicative nature of art in a number of its various
forms. Is art a form of communication in the fullest sense? If so, what is expressed by a work of
art – by some song, or statue, or film? Is art something only created by humans or do nonhuman agents engage in communicative artistic behaviors? In this chapter, I’ll also take a look
at how groups and evolution might be involved.
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 4, looks at maps, blueprints, and other
communicative devices. Maps are somewhat similar to certain works of art in that they seem to
have a depicting function – that is, they seem to show how things are. And yet, maps also
usually seem to be primarily oriented toward use in navigation – to show how to get somewhere.
Blueprints and models similarly seem to have some other primary communicative purpose to
them aside from depiction – instruction perhaps. How does all this work from the point of view
of the sender-receiver model? Are things like maps, blueprints, and other devices really
communicative in some way, do they really fit here?
These are the topic explored in this dissertation – the nature of communication, its
foundations and its boundaries, how it works and how it gets started, its many uses and its many
forms.

6

Chapter 1. Signs, Signals, and Meaning
In this chapter, I lay out the basic details of the sender-receiver model. In Section 1, I look at
how the model works, how it has been developed so far, and then I make a few suggestions for
improvement of my own. I ask questions about the model’s details – do all the parts matter? Is
there always a clear separation between the parts? How does communication come about? In
Section 2, I compare the model to other popular theories of communication. Does it cover the
phenomena they cover? Does it do a better job? What does it say about some of the problems
raised by those other models? Does it solve them or dissolve them? In Section 3, I take a look at
some cases that stretch the boundaries of the model. Are these cases of communication too?
What are we to make of cases that seem to fit the basic set-up but don’t clearly involve
communication? For example, how is handing you a note different than handing you a glass of
water? In Section 5, I look at the issue of meaning. What counts as meaning from the
perspective of the sender-receiver model? Do any of the old theories of meaning fit in? Are
there any other lessons to be learned from thinking about meaning from the perspective of the
model? There is also a coda section appended to the end of the chapter that follows up on some
lines of thought regarding meaning that are a bit to the side of the main discussion but still worth
pondering. What are we to say of sender-receiver systems that carve up the world in different
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ways? If a lion could speak, could we understand it? And where does truth fit into this broader
discussion?

1.1 The Sender-Receiver Model
The setting is Washington DC, 1972. Investigative journalist for the Washington Post Bob
Woodward needs to meet with his informant, codenamed “Deep Throat”, to discuss his latest
findings on the Watergate break-in. To communicate this to his informant, Bob moves a certain
potted plant from one side of his apartment’s balcony to the other. Deep Throat drives by, sees
that the plant has been moved, and so then heads to a pre-specified location where he meets
Woodward to discuss his findings - in the actual case, at parking space D32, beneath the Oakhill
Office Building in Rosslyn, Virginia.
What we have here is a simple case of communication. What has to be going on for this
sort of thing to work? In his dissertation, later 1969 book Convention, American philosopher
David Lewis presented a model meant to answer this question. As Lewis saw it, there had to be
a sender (in our case, Woodward) and a receiver (here, Deep Throat). There had to be
something being used as a sign (the potted plant). There had to be states of the world (here,
Woodward needing to meet or not) that the sender can observe and that matter in some sense to
both individuals. And the receiver had to be able to observe signals from the sender and in turn
perform some act that has consequences for them both (in the real-world case, meeting
Woodward at the garage or going home).

8

Lewis showed that if a sender and receiver have complete common interest – that is, they
agree on what the receiver should do in each state of the world - and they both know this, and
they know that they both know this, and so on6, then if they’re rational, certain combinations of
strategies of sending and reacting to signals will be a Nash equilibrium – in other words, will be
such that neither sender nor receiver could do any better by doing something different on their
own.7 Lewis called these strategy combinations “signaling systems” and he called the situations
they arise in “signaling games” – a throwback to Wittgenstein’s very similar concept of a
“language game”.8
In the Woodward-Deep Throat case, the signaling system there is the combination of
Woodward moving the plant only when he needs to meet and Deep Throat heading to the garage
only when he sees the plant has been moved. Notice, though, that Woodward could have chosen
either side of the balcony as where he should place the potted plant if wanted to call a meet up.
What we get with signaling systems then is also a sort of conventionality. There is a sense in
which the potted plant signaling system could have worked either way, a sense in which Aristotle
and Hermogenes seem to be right.

6

This sort of iterated knowledge is often known as “common knowledge”.
In game theory, a Nash Equilibrium – named after American mathematician John Forbes Nash, Jr. - is a set of
strategies for the players in a game, one for each player, such that no player has a good enough reason to change
their strategy given their preferences and given that the other players are sticking to their strategies. See Nash
(1950, 1951), for the original introductions to the idea of a Nash equilibrium.
8
In his 1953 book Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes a language game involving builders:
“The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with
building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs
them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them
out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive
language.” (Part 1, paragraph 2).
The ideas are very close. The main difference is that the sender-receiver model fills in the details. Wittgenstein
doesn’t talk explicitly about the role of payoffs and by what mechanisms communication might come about –
although, he does mention that a receiver has “learnt” to do what it does. It might not be too far off to think of the
sender-receiver model as roughly a more refined version of Wittgenstein’s project.
7
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Figure 1.1. A basic signaling system lattice. Let S1 be Woodward needing to
meet, S2 be Woodward not needing to meet, Sig1 be potted plant on the left, Sig2 be
potted plant on the right, A1 be head to the garage, and A2 be keep driving. The
black and dashed arrows then represent the two possible signaling systems in the
Deep Throat Case.

Describing Lewis’s model more formally, signaling games include a set of possible states
of the world, a set of possible signals, and a set of possible receiver actions. The key is the two
rules followed by the sender and receiver: a sender rule we might call fs that maps states to signs
and a receiver rule fr that maps signs to acts. Sender rules can be things like: send signal X in
every state of the world, or signal randomly; however, a sender may also follow a rule specifying
a certain signal for each state. A similar story applies to the receiver side. Receiver rules can be
things such as: perform act X for every signal, or act randomly; but, again, receivers may also
follow a rule to perform specific acts for each signal. The combination of any sender and
receiver rule gives us a mapping from states to acts. Here’s one way to illustrate an abstract
mapping of this sort, this time with sender and receiver in the picture.
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Figure 1.2. A basic sender-receiver configuration. fs is a sender rule, mapping states of
the world to signs. fr is a receiver rule, mapping signs to acts. F is the resulting mapping
from states to acts. The pink dashed line represents reinforcement from the interaction.910

In the 1996 and 2010 books Evolution of the Social Contract and Signals, Brian Skyrms showed
that conventional signaling like Lewis’s can arise and be maintained in a number of ways beyond
rational choice, including reinforcement learning, natural selection, and even some forms of
copying and imitation.11 What’s important is that the actions of the receiver in some way
“feedback” and influence subsequent signaling acts of the sender, and likewise in the other
direction.12 The actions of one must have consequences for the other. Now, signaling of the
Lewis sort can be seen to occur in less complex organisms – apparently possibly even in things
like fireflies, plants, and cells. I’ll discuss these cases in more detail in just a moment.

9

Does ignoring the signal count as an act? In some games it will be impossible – given the set up – for a signal to
be ignored. In other games, there will be room for this sort of option to be built into the model. I hope this will
become clearer as I go on.
10
Figures 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 are inspired by and adapted from figures appearing in Shen (2020) and GodfreySmith (2013b, 2014b).
11
Wittgenstein writes in his notes from 1937: “The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction;
only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning
was the dead’” (1980, p. 31). The last quote is a reference to Goethe’s Faust, Part 1 (In the Study). Wittgenstein’s
thoughts here, though vague, seem to be heading in the sort of direction suggest by Skyrms.
12
Must this always be the case – are there never one-off exchanges? This will be explained in just a moment.
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Roughly, twenty years before Lewis, American scientist Claude Shannon (1916-2001)
was interested in communication but approached it from a different direction. Shannon’s work
was on statistical theories of information flow in mechanical systems, such as telephone circuits,
which in the early days were likened to the goings on in the brain.

Figure 1.3. Shannon’s schematic diagram of a general communication system. Adapted
from "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" by C. E. Shannon, 1948, Bell Systems
Technical Journal, 27(3), p. 380.

A signal, says Shannon, carries information whenever the state of the sign reduces uncertainty
about the state of the source – in our case, the state of the world. When the value of one variable
is predictive of another, he says, they are linked by what he calls mutual information. This sort
of information is everywhere. A mountain lion track in the sand is a good predictor of the recent
presence of a mountain lion. Smoke carries information about fire. To use some of Skyrms’s
examples, even fossils carry information about past life, and cosmic background radiation
information about the early stages of the universe. Shannon’s insight fits well into the general
Lewis set-up. A sender or receiver can even in a sense create mutual information simply by
following the sender or receiver rule they follow. If a sender, for example, always sends a
certain signal in certain states - Julie always yells “Car!” when she sees there is a car about to hit
someone - then that signal now carries information about the state of the world the sender has
observed – you now can predict what Julie has seen when she yells “Car!” Similarly, if Julie
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always looks around quickly when someone yells “Car!” and only when someone does so, now
you can predict reliably what signals Julie has received when you observe her quickly looking
around.
As I said, Lewis assumed complete common interest in his picture. Of course, there’s a
whole spectrum of interest, including complete conflict of interest, where agents have completely
opposing preferences. For a while it was thought that in stronger cases of conflict, informative
signaling could not get off the ground. A recent paper by Spanish philosopher Manolo Martínez
and Peter Godfrey-Smith, however, presents a counter-example (Martínez & Godfrey-Smith,
2016). Most cases of signaling in nature will be instances of partial common interest that lie
somewhere between the two extremes. For a real-world example, consider the vervet monkeys
(Chlorocebus pygerythrus) of the Amboseli forest in Kenya who have developed a signal that
seems to mean roughly “Leopard!”. A sender vervet can sit up in a tree and observe whether a
leopard is approaching. If a leopard is approaching, it is best for him and his partners if the
sender sends the “Leopard!” signal since then his partners can run up a tree and out onto a thin
branch the leopard can’t get to, allowing the vervets to survive and so the whole group to live
happily ever after (or at least for some time). But suppose that there are more than the two
possible states we’ve just assumed – leopard approaching and no leopard approaching. Suppose
that sometimes there is no leopard approaching but there is also a rival male vervet approaching,
one who wants to challenge the sender vervet for his place in the social hierarchy. It could be the
case that the sender is aware of this and that he would rather he keeps his place in the hierarchy
than possibly lose it. And it could be that the rival would prefer to have a chance to challenge
the sender vervet than miss such an opportunity. Now suppose that a rival vervet coming to
challenge a sender vervet is not too common an occurrence or that the threat of a leopard is
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extremely weighty. It could now come to be that a sender vervet uses the “Leopard!” call to get
his friends and the rival to stop what they are doing and run up a tree even when there is no
leopard so that he (the sender vervet) can prevent the rival vervet from carrying out his social
hierarchy disrupting deeds. Here we could have a case of signaling that is maintained despite a
lack of complete common interest. It is maintained because either the deceptive use of the alarm
call is not frequent enough to make receivers ignore it or because the consequence of not
listening to it and possibly getting killed by a leopard outweighs the benefit of sticking to one’s
social hierarchy disrupting plans despite one’s preference otherwise to challenge the dominant
male. This sort of signal use was observed in a vervet named Kitui, by American anthropologists
Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert Seyfarth (1990). They believe Kitui’s signaling this way was
intentional since Kitui did it repeatedly and it benefited him.
If a receiver doesn’t get anything out of a signal or is deceived too much, however – think
of the boy who cried wolf - and the cost or risk of not listening to the signal is low enough for the
receiver, then the receiver will simply stop paying attention (if it can), in which case the sender
will then have no reason to keep sending signals the way it does, the result being that
communication breaks down. Cheney and Seyfarth (1988, 1990) observe this too. Vervets learn
to ignore unreliable senders of their own species and others. In general, the less common interest
between the agents, the less stable their communication.13
Just how broadly does Lewis’s model apply? Does the model capture all of our pretheoretic intuitions about signaling? On Lewis and Skyrms’s views, senders observe states of the
world. But consider the case of the rowboat and the coxswain. This case is apparently due to
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For another analysis of games with partial common interest, see Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Godfrey-Smith
(2013a). See Sterelny (2003), for a similar point.
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American philosopher Kevin Zollman but discussed in print by Godfrey-Smith (2014a, 2014b).
The coxswain calls out the stroke, and the two rowers use that call to coordinate their rowing.
Does this case fit the model? Supposing that the cox is not sensitive to feedback from the rowers
and has no private information about states of the world (that is, that there are no states the cox is
observing), this case does not seem to fit the Lewis model. The cox is more like a weird natural
sign. Receivers can make this odd sign a cue of each other’s actions too in virtue of how they
respond to it – for example, if a receiver always rows when the cox yells “Stroke!”, then the
signal “Stroke!” can become a sign carrying mutual information in the Shannon sense of the
receivers’ actions, and this can be helpful to their partner. But this is still getting away from the
classic sender-receiver setup and arguably not a signal, an instance of communication. GodfreySmith (2014b) points out that we approach something like the Lewis model if we imagine
instead that one of the rowers calls the stroke. In this case, it might be argued that the state the
sender is observing is something like their own intention to row. But, as Godfrey-Smith notes,
another way to describe this case could be to say that agents are coordinating acts with acts
rather than states (even internal states) with acts, where here the only difference between an
“act” and a “state” is that a state is something not chosen by one of the agents whose choices are
being modeled. The use of signs to achieve act-to-act, as opposed to state-to-act, coordination
might be drawn something like this:
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Figure 1.4. A sender-receiver system with act-to-act coordination. fs: sender’s rule,
mapping acts to signs. fr: receiver’s rule, mapping signs to other acts. F: the resulting
mapping from acts to acts.

Although Lewis didn’t intend his model to cover such cases, I’ll follow Godfrey-Smith in using
the term “signaling system” to describe act-to-act cases like these as well.14 Is there any
rendering under which the original cox case, where the cox calls the stroke, could be considered
a signaling system? This one is trickier. Godfrey-Smith (2014a) likens this case to a central
pattern generator in the brain and seems to accept that we can call the sign in this example a
signal despite the sign not apparently standing for or being about anything, and so not fitting the
old Lewis-Skyrms version of the model (p. 5). I can vaguely see how a part could evolve in a
larger system to “keep a beat” for other parts which then use that beat to work in tandem to
perform actions benefitting the system as a whole. In that case, I’m inclined, as Godfrey-Smith
seems to be, to apply the term signaling system – again, despite the sign not clearly having
anything that it is about. But notice in this rendering there seems to be some sort of sensitivity
on the sender side to feedback, albeit perhaps indirectly, and some assumption of sensitivity, as
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See Robson (1990), for another example of this sort of set-up and use.
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in the standard cases, on the receiver side. It’s not just a cue case – there is some back and forth
of some sort bringing about and maintaining the interaction. Godfrey-Smith seems to take a
similar line in the cox case in (2014b) but without reference to the central pattern generator or a
similar example. As I’ve argued, however, without sensitivity to feedback of some sort, this
would appear to be more aptly described as just another weird cue situation, so it’s not obvious
what he has in mind here.
Godfrey-Smith (2014b) takes the cox case as a prompt to argue that probably the
conception of signs as always representing or standing for something is a way of thinking that
we need to move beyond, and I agree with him on that, though, I’ll admit it’s not obvious to me
that the central pattern version of the cox case does not at the end of the day in some way involve
a signal that has some sort of aboutness to it – I’m still on the fence about that. Even still, I think
the general idea is right. If the cox signal is about anything at all, it’s not obvious. Signals
evolve over time and have unstable uses and meanings. Communication surprises us over and
over again. Others might not feel so comfortable with such a move, think “aboutness” really
matters. That’s fine. Another way to look at cases like these might simply be to say that these
things create states via their “tics” and “tocs” – a “tic” state and a “toc” state, where rowing, for
example, might be appropriate for the “tic” and not rowing (or preparing to row again) preferable
for the “toc”, given the interests of agents using the sign and perhaps how they’ve interacted
during those “states” in the past. Following Godfrey-Smith, my preferred way of handling cases
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like these is to accept that in the real world the model will not always apply so neatly. Is it a
signal? Sometimes the answer will just be “Well, sort of.”15

Figure 1.5. The coxswain system. The case involving the metronome-like cox might be
represented like this. The click and silence of the metronome are the “signals”. There is
no state being observed by the metronome, but the clicking and silence of the metronome
creates two arbitrary states and these arbitrary states and their corresponding signals can
be used by receivers to coordinate action. Feedback in this case is indicated by a red
dashed line. The green dashed line represents the additional line of feedback that could
occur in a more complicated case.

I’ve been talking about cues. This is a word that biologists use. These are signs similar to the
Lewis model but not quite like the paradigm cases. These include what Grice called “natural
signs” – things like the mountain lion track or the smoke in the sky. Signs like these carry
mutual information, whether or not they confer some benefit to a receiver attending to them.
There is a connection of sorts between states or acts and signals here as well, but in these cases,
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Someone might object: but isn’t the difference here between the coxswain and the metronome case that calling the
stroke is a command and the metronome doesn’t involve anything like that? Focusing on the case where the cox
“observes” no internal or external states, I want to say “No”, yet the answer is a little more complicated. Yelling
“Stroke!” may become a command. But like the tics and tocs of the metronome, it is not a command (if any kind of
signal in the Lewis-Skyrms sense) unless the pattern of behavior has come about and is being maintained via a
feedback story of the sort I’ve been talking about.
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there is no feedback to the sender-side, no matter what the receiver does. A version of the first
rower case fits in here, as I said, to some extent – though, in that case, there seems to be no clear
information naturally connected to the sender side as in most cues. In any case, configurations
such as these are, for lack of better words, incomplete examples of the set-ups in Figures 1.2 and
1.4.

Figure 1.6. A cue configuration. A case in which the receiver’s actions have no effect
on the future production of signs.

Again, although it may seem as though there is a sharp difference between all these cases, I think
it’s best to see them as only a matter of degree. Some cues can be co-opted to some extent. For
example, when fencing became popular among upper-class German university students in the
early 20th century, some young men would self-inflict dueling scars on their faces in an attempt
to cash in on what those scars had come to represent in cue form: social class and bravery. There
are other ways the general model can come in degrees. The sender might have more signals they
can send than the receiver has actions they can perform. Skyrms (2010) and others note this
often. Godfrey-Smith (2014b) talks about receivers being more capable of changing their
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signaling behavior than the sender or vice versa. One side might be more subject to error, or less
reliable. The list goes on.
In the standard cases, separate objects play the roles of sender, sign, and receiver. But
there may be cases where a line cannot be drawn so neatly or where one object can play more
than one of the roles. An example of a case like this seems to be that of memory, where the
receiver might be the sender but at a later time – for example if you write a note to yourself.16
Godfrey Smith (2014b) provides the example of cells in our bodies. A genome, he argues, can
be viewed as holding a memory of the structure of useful protein molecules, a memory that is for
the cell at the cellular level and not for the greater organism of which the cell is a part – that is,
the cell is the receiver and not the larger body. The cells read their genes and then produce a
protein molecule or an RNA molecule serving another function in the cell. Cells carry on, read
their genes, and divide and produce more cells which in turn contain these memories and do the
same – the big picture result being the creation of a larger organism, but, again, the larger
organism is not the one reading the genome. Who is the sender? I suggest looking at GodfreySmith’s paper for a fuller explanation, but the rough idea is that there is no real sender. The
genomes are really just highly complex cues, altered overtime by natural selection.
Replication itself is more closely related to persistence; it is not analogous to
inscription in the sense of the sender-receiver model. In DNA replication, a
sequence is preserved, with slight modifications. DNA replication is not the
creation of a sequence from some other source. Recombination has a special role,
because it does give rise to sequences which did not exist before. But there is no
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A good example of this is the film Memento (2000).

20

writing step in the sense of the model; there is no mechanism which executes a
mapping from states to signs (fS, from section 2), or a similar process whereby a
DNA sequence is produced from something else by the operation of an evolved
mechanism. Genetic material is shaped, but this occurs by means of mutation and
selection, a process in which some sequences are retained and others are lost, and
those that are retained are subject to mutation and recombination. The retention of
genetic information, especially across cell division, is an adapted process, as is its
use by a reader; its inscription is not.
In short, DNA's evolutionary embedding makes it an unsent sign, something
worth reading without having being written, even though it is very complex.
Rather than a write-read memory system, genetic memory systems comprise an
evolve-read system. (Godfrey-Smith, 2013, pp. 875-876)
Again, the way to think about the model is to realize that not all instances of signaling will fit so
nicely into the diagram in Figure 1.2 but instead that most communicative situations will lie
somewhere on a sort of continuum between the standard cases of the model and those less
amenable to being fit into the scaffolding the model centers around.
Finally, whether syntax can be made sense of by the sender-receiver model is a debate
that has been going on too. Arguably any general model of communication should be able to say
something about this.
A number of researchers have made progress on this question. American philosopher
Jeffrey Barrett at the University of California, Riverside (2007, 2009) models very basic
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signaling games with signals composed of parts and where the order of parts can matter.
American Shane Steinert-Threlkeld (2016, 2019) and German researcher Michael Franke (2014)
offer more nuanced models. What’s difficult is to get a game where not only are there parts and
the order of parts matters, but where the individual parts have a corresponding meaning in some
sense and where this result isn’t somehow “baked into” the game.17 Suppose we have a signal
AB. We can have a game where AB ends up serving the same function as the signal BA. But
we can also have a game where the order matters and so AB and BA mean different things. But
it seems what we really want is something else. We want a game where the parts map to
different meanings in a more complex way, a game where A means something like “Lion” and B
means something like “Big”, that way we can get signals like AB meaning “Big Lion” and AC
meaning “Big Snake”. More will have to be done before we get a model that accomplishes
something like this. But it seems fair to say that a signaling system like this is more like what we
have in mind when we are talking about whether a signaling system can have a syntax.
A recent attempt at an explication is due to American philosopher Ronald Planer (2019)
and Planer and Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming). They suggest that what is important when we
consider the question of syntax in signaling systems is a pair of three-way distinctions. They
distinguish between nominal, organized, and encoding signals and signals that are atomic,
composite, and combinatorial. Atomic signals are simply solo signals. So, consider the signals
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This is a complaint sometimes levied against Barrett’s models. Suppose we have a game with two senders and
one receiver. Suppose one sender can see if there is a leopard or a snake and send A or B. The other sender can see
whether it is big or small and send C or D. If different actions are required for different combinations (big snake vs.
small snake vs. big leopard vs. small leopard) then a system can get off the ground where A is sent whenever there is
a leopard and B whenever there is a snake and C whenever the entity is small and D whenever the entity is big. It
might seem we have the sort of correspondence to meaning we are looking for (despite order of the signals not
mattering), but the correspondence here is in a way forced by the set-up of the game instead of developing
organically. What we want is for one sender to learn to send these sorts of signals on their own, to learn to combine
signals and use particular atomic signals to stand for particular things.
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in the Deep Throat case. There are no parts to them. It is not the case that, say, the color of the
pot combined with the pot’s location determines the meaning – it’s just the location of the pot.
Composite signals are signals that have more than one part. So, for example, the AB signal as
opposed to an A signal; the plant location plus the plant color as opposed to just the location of
the plant. A combinatorial signal is one where, according to Planer and Godfrey-Smith the
“order”, “sequence properties”, or some other sort of relationship matters – so, for example, the
order of AB mattering and resulting in a different meaning than the signal BA. Nominal signals
are ones where there is no role for the relationships the parts of the signal might have to each
other – so consider the case where AB and BA mean the same thing; or where whether the potted
plant is yellow or red doesn’t matter, just its location. An organized system is one where the
relationship matters – so BA and AB mean different things. What an encoded system is is harder
to pin down. Planer and Godfrey-Smith write: “When combinatorial signs have their meaning
specified by an encoding principle that gives a semantic role to the sequence properties of signs,
we have syntax” (p. 11). But this limits syntax to only cases of signals where there is a sort of
sequence, and they are not clear on what they mean by that. Elsewhere in their paper they write
that what matters is the “relation-between-relations” but this too is left unclarified. The two
examples they give are of binary code and animal alarm calls. In the binary case, the sequence
that matters seems to be the order in a list of 1s and 0s. In the alarm call case, the sequence
seems to be the decibel level of the call. What matters in both is the mapping of the order in the
list and the decibel level of the call systematically to some other relationship – so in the case of
the animal call, the distance from the predator: the louder the call, the closer the predator. In
Planer’s paper, he also says that what matters is a “pattern” in the way states are mapped to
signs, and that where the mapping is “completely haphazard” there is no encoding.
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I have a number of worries about this analysis. First, it’s not clear why “completely” in
“completely haphazard” is important here – how haphazard can a mapping be and still count
according to their analysis? I don’t know and they don’t say. Second, as I said, they don’t really
spell out exactly what they mean by “sequence” here and their analysis doesn’t make clear why a
“sequence” or “pattern” is really necessary. Consider the Woodward case again. Suppose
Woodward made it so that not only did the plant’s location tell Deep Throat that he wanted to
meet but that the color of the potted plant corresponded to how soon Woodward needed to meet.
Then there is a sequence in how soon Woodward needs to meet – from sooner to later – but there
is no corresponding sequence in the colors – compare this to the alarm call case where there is a
sequence in the call – decibel level – and the world – the distance of the predator. There would
be a sequence in the Woodward signal if it were the hue of some color or the size of the plant
that corresponded to the urgency of needing to meet, then we have a sequence that can be useful
for receivers when it comes to predicting what, say, a potted plant of size N in location y means,
or hue H of red means, but it’s not.18 Consider also the case where Woodward uses the color of
the plant to indicate something other than some sort of “scalable” property, where by a scalable
property I mean something that comes on a scale or spectrum – things like distance, time,
weight. Suppose he uses the color of the plant to mean he wants to meet at the garage of that
color. Here there doesn’t seem to be a sequence in the nature of the signs – the size of the signs,
their decibel volume, their hue - but there is still some sort of systematic mapping – from color to
color.19 We can even imagine Woodward using the yellow flower to mean the red garage (which
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To my knowledge, Godfrey-Smith, in his course on Pragmatism at the Graduate Center, CUNY made the first
suggestion that this might be a reason sequence mapping is helpful – that it allows for prediction of the meaning of
not yet encountered signals.
19
Cases such as these too could be helpful for predicting the meaning not yet encountered signals in a way similar to
the sequence mapping cases.
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in the real world might be a good thing for someone engaging in this sort of covert activity to
do). I would suggest expanding encoding to include cases such as these also.
Another problem seems to be the case of the composite-encoded signal. Why must order
or sequence matter for something to count as a case of syntax? This case has a systematic
mapping of signal parts to other properties, has a “relation-between-relations” – A means “Lion”
and 1 means “1 foot away” and so A1 means “Lion one foot away” but it is also such that 1A
means the same thing. It’s not obvious why a language that operated this way should not also be
considered having a syntax. Some analyses of Latin, suggest that it works this way, that order
doesn’t matter – though, others disagree.20 But it doesn’t seem impossible to imagine a human
language that would work this way. And it seems somewhat arbitrary to set these cases aside as
cases of language without syntax.
There’s more. Planer points out that in the case of binary the order matters but there are
not unique atomic signals being mapped to unique things in the world. 1s and 0s are all there is
in a binary stream and they are reused. So, compare 100010110 having a different meaning from
101111110 and the order mattering and ABCDEFGHIJ having a different meaning than
ABCJIHGFE, where in the letter example the individual atomic parts are not being reused – A
and B only appear once. Both kinds of signals can have mappings from parts to meanings, but
one reuses signals and determines their meaning in some particular instance in part also by their
place in the sequence and one doesn’t do that. Planer points out that something similar but
slightly different happens in natural language too. The word ‘he’ has a certain meaning in
“Spencer told Kevin he went to the store” and that meaning is different when used in the
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See for example Devine & Stephens (2006) and Spevak (2010).
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sentence “Kevin told Spencer he went to the store”. Of course, there is also something that is
somewhat the same in the meaning of ‘he’ in both cases – it has the sense of being about a man,
or refers to the person whose name comes before it.21 But what is important is that what seems
to be going on is that the order of the parts can sometimes play a role in determining the meaning
of the parts as well. Compare this to the sentence “Connor likes the blues” where the order
doesn’t seem to play a role in specifying the meaning of the parts. Planer suggests we extend
compositional encoded signals to fit these cases where order can have a role in determining
individual part meanings too. I’ll add another slightly different case that I think we should
include as well. Consider the sentence “I went to the store”. Here word order matters and the
parts map to specific meanings but the meaning of ‘I’ changes (in the sense of its referent)
depending not on what other words appear before it, its place in the order, as in the Spencer and
Kevin case or the binary case, but on who sends the signal. Probably there are other examples
out there that stretch the boundaries and expand the category, but I won’t try to mention them all
here.
I’ll consider one more reason I think the reliance on “order” and “sequence” is
problematic. I’ll expand on this idea in Chapters 3 and 4 when I talk about art and maps.
Consider something like a grid system. A simple example is a 2x2 grid. As we saw, a signal
such as ABCD can be encoded and compositional. The order can matter and it can be that each
atomic part has a certain meaning it maps to in a systematic way. But a grid system can do
something similar.
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Planer does not mention this aspect of the example, that words like ‘he’ still seem to maintain some part of their
meaning despite the difference in what words come before them. Rather he simply says that the meaning changes.
I’m not sure if he’d disagree with me here, but I consider this subtly worth pointing out.
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a.

b.

c.

Figure 1.7. Encoded combinatorial grids.

The grid from Figure 1.7a can have a meaning different than the grid from Figure 1.7b and it can
be that the meaning is not just a matter of combination but also composition yet where in this
case composition is extended to mean the “arrangement” (for lack of better words) of the parts in
a two-dimensional sense, not just in a one-dimensional sense – that is, in the sense of from left to
right, in the sense of a place in a sequence like the 1s and the 0s. “Order” just seems like the
wrong word to use in the grid case. And we can further imagine that the hue of the squares
matters too. It might be that the hues map in a systematic way to certain meanings, in which
case the grid from Figure 1.7a will have a content different than that from Figure 1.7c despite
having the same colors in the same arrangement. I can even imagine this sort of situation being
expanded further to include three-dimensional examples and possibly more.
To me, this makes syntax seem like a tricky category with many possible variations. My
take on all this is that maybe it’s just better to drop the talk of syntax. Maybe it’s just better to
say a signal is “nominal and combinatorial” or “composite and organized” and makes use of
sequence or not or some other systematic mapping or has this odd feature or that, and leave it at
that, rather than spend our time trying to define a term like syntax that is so unclear and so
historically mired in debate. Some won’t like this, but it seems to me that everything that needs
to be said is said when we describe things in terms of “encoded and combinatorial” or whatever
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anyway, and sometimes the job of philosophy is to show that old ways of thinking, old concepts,
aren’t always reducible or worth keeping.
Some have hoped to use syntax as a way to argue that only humans use “true language” –
whatever that is. This observation instead reorients us to asking whether animals use “encoded
combinatorial” signals or “encoded organized” signals or whatever instead. Planer and GodfreySmith don’t include anything other than human language sentences and genes in the box on their
chart listed under “encoded combinatorial”, so presumably they think animals don’t. I don’t
know whether any animals do have encoded combinatorial language, but even if they don’t it
doesn’t mean animals don’t communicate. That they do in the sender-receiver sense is clear.
But if one decides to call combinatorial encoded signals and only those “true language” and so
conclude that animals don’t use language, that’s their choice, though I don’t see a motivation for
it.
How might a story of the development of some of these more complicated signals go,
signals with a sort of sequence or other features? Planer and Godfrey-Smith provide a couple
examples. In the case of a signal involving a sequence, they suggest the following. An animal is
able to distinguish whether a certain predator is around, and it develops a particular signal for
this. This is just like a basic signaling game. But suppose that perhaps the closer the predator is
the louder the sender animal just happens to send its alarm. It could be that it just does this out
of panic, not because it’s trying to communicate anything by the decibel level. But if receivers
start to notice this correspondence between decibel level and distance and take advantage of this
fact, then there can be a back and forth such that eventually you get a signal that maps to a
particular animal and that also has a mapping from decibel level to predator distance.
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A story like the one above could get even more complicated. Suppose that instead of the
decibel volume of a call mapping to distance it maps to size of the predator. The louder the
bigger. If size matters to receivers, something like this could get off the ground in the same way
as earlier. But suppose distance mattered too and senders for whatever reason had a tendency to
send the signal more times in a row the closer the predator. Then we could get a signal with two
systematic mappings. Numbers of repetitions of the call mapping to distance and decibel level of
the call mapping to size.
How about a call with sensitivity to order in its parts? This case is more imaginative, but
it still tells a how possibly story.22 Suppose there are multiple kinds of predators and that those
predators can come in a variety of colors. Suppose further that receivers can do well by
responding to the presence of certain types of predators with certain actions and certain color
predators with other actions but that if they could distinguish the color and type of predator, that
there is an action for that combination that is even better than doing one of the color or predator
type actions, that is, that there is an ideal color-predator action. It could be that one sender is
able to observe the color of the predator and another is able to distinguish the type. Perhaps
originally only one sender is around at a time, and so a system develops with unique signals for
unique predator types and another system develops with unique signals for unique colors. But
then suppose both senders are sometimes around. A receiver could become sensitive to the
combination of information it is now receiving and learn that combining the signals allows it to
pick out the more ideal action. Perhaps it’s even the case that one type of sender tends to send its
information first (maybe color is easier to distinguish from a distance than type of animal or vice
versa). Then we can get receivers who might end up becoming sensitive to combination and
22

This story is adapted from Planer (2019).
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order. Over time, it could be that we get a sender who is in a position to be able to observe both
color and type. Now we can get a system going where a sender sends a certain ordered pair of
signals distinguishing a particular color and type of predator and a receiver uses that ordered
information to act appropriately. And this can go yet even further. Suppose also that senders
tend, as in the earlier story, to make louder calls the closer the predator is but that they do so not
with one of the unique signals for the predator types and colors but with a grunt at the end of
their calls that they just for some reason tend to append to the end of their signals. We can
imagine that the grunt was always there but that it never carried any information in the previous
games and so was never used by receivers to inform their actions. Now we get a signal with
order and a systematic mapping. The signals can say something like “Red lion 5 feet away”. I
know there are no red lions – hence the game being imaginative – but it still shows us how in a
simply way something like this might evolve. What we get is that it is possible for
compositional encoded signaling to evolve within the sender-receiver model. Granted this is a
very basic sort of compositional encoded signal. But more sophisticated signalers will be able to
arrive at compositional and encoded signals in more interesting ways.
That’s it for my introduction to the sender-receiver model. What’s essential is the focus
on both sides of the signaling equation – the sender side and the receiver side – and the coevolution of sender and receiver rules. As I said, the model is a fairly new one, and it’s still
being developed. It’s come a long way since Lewis. But I think now with at least this much in
our background we can go on and start answering some more interesting questions.
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1.2 Comparisons
There are two views of communication that I would like to compare the sender-receiver view to:
the general Gricean view and the Peircean view. The selection isn’t random. I choose Peirce
because of his continued use in other disciplines, especially scientific disciplines, and his model
being another attempt at a general theory of signs. I choose Grice because of the wide
acceptance of his take or some version of it by many in the philosophical community today. One
version of the Gricean view I will look at in particular is the so-called ostensive-inferential
model, put forward by American anthropologist Thom Scott-Phillips in his recent book Speaking
Our Minds (2014). The views are also worth looking at because of their differing approaches to
handling questions of meaning. As we’ll see, Pierce tends to focus on the receiver side of
signaling and Grice on the sender side.

1.2.1 C. S. Peirce
Let’s start with the semiotic theory of American philosopher and pragmatist Charles Sanders
Peirce. Peirce revised his theory of signs a number of times over his career, but the main idea
remained basically the same. Roughly, to be a sign is to be used as one. “A sign,” writes Peirce,
“is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (1931-1958,
vol. 2, p. 228). He calls what a sign stands for its “object”, where this is, well, an object – a book
or a chair, for example. The “somebody” a sign stands to Peirce calls its “interpretant”, where
this is something like a receiver or reader, someone who (or something that) “uses” a sign.23 The
thing playing the role of a sign, what some people call the “sign-vehicle”, Peirce calls the

23

Peirce also frequently uses this word to talk about interpretations or the process of interpretation.
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“representamen”. He sometimes calls these “signs” too, but strictly speaking, a sign is more than
just a sign-vehicle – it’s an entire representamen-object-interpretant triad, and each part is
essential. We might represent Peirce’s model this way:

Figure 1.8. Peirce’s semiotic model.

For Peirce, signs come in three kinds: icons, indexes, and symbols. Icons signify their objects in
virtue of similarity or resemblance and according to Peirce are the easiest signs to use,
resemblance being something that is simply just very simple for us to recognize. Peirce’s classic
example of an icon is a realistic painting or drawing functioning as an icon of its object, but the
resemblance involved in an icon doesn’t always have to be visual – I could say “meow” anytime
I wanted to signal the presence of a cat, there could be a phonetic resemblance (Peirce 1868, ss.
11-14). Indexes signify their objects in virtue of spacio-temporal correlation and are thought to
be slightly more difficult to recognize due to the receiver having to notice and learn the
correlation. A common example given of an index is smoke as an index of fire. In this
particular case, the correlation supporting the relationship is the result of physics and chemistry –
in Peirce’s terms, there is a “real connection” between smoke and fire. And yet, the correlation
grounding an index doesn’t always have to be so strong. Peirce seems to admit of arbitrary
indexes, indexes not “really connected” to their objects. An example of this sort of index might
be the alarm of a smoked detector indicating smoke and fire. Indexes “really connected” to their
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objects Peirce calls “natural signs”, where these include, he says, things such as genuine crying
and laughter and other “physical symptoms” (Peirce, 1885, p. 181).
Symbols, according to Peirce, signify their objects in virtue of “convention” or an agreed
upon “habit of use” and are the most difficult signs to use.24 Unlike icons and (most) indexes,
symbols are connected to their objects arbitrarily, which is to say they are connected neither by
some similarity to their objects nor some physical connection to them. Symbols are also
sometimes referentially displaced. In other words, unlike indexes, symbols might be present in
the absence of their objects (for example, I might talk about my cat even when he’s not around).
As I said, according to Peirce (and many modern interpretations of his model), symbols
are the most complex of the three kinds of signs. One common idea is that the three kinds of
signs are related hierarchically – indeed Peirce thought this. Symbols, so the thought goes, are
constructed upon indexes, and indexes upon icons. You’ve got to be able to use the less complex
sign forms before you can use the more complex ones. And so, the development of sign use
follows a certain pattern or sequence, one in which you start off with icons and - in the human
case - end up with symbols. Later researchers have accepted this hierarchy (Hovers et al., 2003)
and (Rossano, 2010) and other have seen it – and the supposed fact that only humans use
symbols – as evidence that symbol use requires an advanced level of cognitive sophistication,
perhaps involving things like intentions, mind-reading, or common knowledge. American
anthropologist Terrence Deacon adopts a position of this sort in his book 1997 book The
Symbolic Species.
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Sometimes written “general effective rule”, “disposition”, or “law”.
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So how does the theory compare with the Lewis-Skyrms model? Let’s start with the
basic structure. Right away there are some fairly obvious differences between the two views.
Peirce’s view is basically a theory of the receiver side of the configuration in Figure 1.2. Unlike
Lewis and Skyrms, Peirce isn’t concerned with the relationship between sign production and sign
use. He’s more concerned with interpretation, with how the receiver gets a grip on the meaning
of signals. The work of Donald Davidson in the 60s and 70s shares some similarities to this
approach. A further difference can be seen in what is on the left-hand side of the signs in two
configurations – states of the world vs. objects.
Consider again the rowboat case. The coxswain calls out the stroke, and the two rowers
use that call to coordinate their rowing but there is nothing internally or externally the coxswain
is observing. Again, there doesn’t seem to be a state of the world being referred to, at least in the
Lewis sense. And I don’t see how you could construe the case to be about an object either. Is
there an object in the Peircian sense in this modified case that the signal is about? Not
obviously. Saying that the signal refers to the caller’s intention to stroke (is that an object?) or to
the boat or oar seems a stretch, and I don’t see any other plausible candidate.
How about icons, indexes, and symbols? Are there analogs in the sender-receiver view?
Indexes are like the cues or natural signs in Figure 1.6. However, cues or natural signs won’t
always have senders unless we count the world or some part of it as the sender – and yet even
then the right process of co-evolution and feedback won’t be there. It’s also not the case that
these signs must refer to a Peircian object. The color of the leaves might be a good indicator of
the weather or the time of year (who is the sender here?), and these – the weather, the time of
year - are not obviously objects in the Peircean sense and in fact seem to be better characterized
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as states of the world or something else altogether.25 Many Peircian objects will be like this –
this is not something specific to the case of the autumn leaves. And, again, although it might
seem that there is a sharp difference between paradigm and partial cases of signaling systems as
Peirce’s framework makes it appear, really it is only a matter of degree. We saw this in our
discussion earlier about things like genomes and memory.
Is there a place for icons and symbols in the Lewis model as well? Here is what I take to
be a plausible account of icons. A sender might be able to create or happen to have on hand
signals that resemble particular things or states of the word he observes. He might notice that
receivers are prone to certain reactions when something resembles something else. Noticing
resemblances of certain sorts is plausibly evolutionarily beneficial, so this is not out of the realm
of possibility. Once it is the case that individuals are using resemblance as indicators of a sort it
becomes a useful and exploitable fact, such that on the production side you become sensitive to
this. You take advantage of this tendency and hijack the already trained up reaction. Now you
get something like a classic sender-receiver system. You get people using certain signals
because they know they will be reacted to in a certain way. Of course, this is going to be a
matter of degree. And it could go both ways. It could be that senders are for whatever reason
inclined to send signals that resemble the state of the world – to initially say “meow” for the
presence of a cat - and receivers simply have to learn this.
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One might worry that I’m taking the notion of an “object” to literally here. Isn’t lightening an index of thunder?
Unfortunately, it’s just not clear how literal one should take Peirce to be on this matter. He wasn’t very clear in his
own writing on this.
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Now symbols. This case is easy. I take it as obvious that signals in the sender-receiver
sense are good analogues of Peirce’s symbols. Just like symbols, they are conventional, and they
seem to be capable of displacement.
What does all this say about the famous Peircian hierarchy? Are symbols really a good
sign of cognitive sophistication and require things like intentions? And what does this say about
the idea of a sequence where the more complicated signs depend on the less complicated ones?
I hope it is clear from what’s already been said in this chapter that symbols are not good
indicators of cognitive sophistication. The sender-receiver model shows us that signals
(symbols) arise in even the simplest signaling systems, even in cells. I said I’d discuss fireflies
and plants too. Consider the Photinus genus of firefly. It’s been observed that females of certain
Photinus species send off a particular flash when they are sexually receptive. Males of the
species notice this flash and fly over to the females to reproduce. Successful interactions in these
games keeps the signaling system going (Stanger‐Hall & Lloyd, 2015). The mating signal of the
Photinus firefly is a symbol in the Peircean sense. It’s conventional (a different flash pattern
could be used). And yet, I think most would agree that fireflies do not have the kind of cognitive
sophistication researchers suggest is necessary when they talk about symbols.
For a case involving plants, consider the beautiful colors observed on the leaves of many
trees in autumn. In 2001, English evolutionary biologist W. D. Hamilton proposed that these
might serve some sort of signaling function. Recent studies have suggested that for at least some
species this might be true. Biologist Marco Archetti ran a study revealing that aphids (Dysaphis
plantaginea) avoided apple trees (Malus pumila) with red leaves in autumn and that the fitness of
the aphids in spring was lower on trees with red leaves than green ones (Archetti, 2009). The
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same study also found that trees with red leaves tended to be lower quality hosts and tended to be
more susceptible to fire blight, a disease caused by Erwinia amylovora, a bacterium transmitted
by aphids and other insects. There seems to be room for a plausible co-evolutionary story here
too. Trees that developed red leaves had a better chance of avoiding infection and therefore
surviving. Aphids that avoided trees with red leaves had a better chance of successful
reproduction. Have that game play through enough generations, and you get colored leaves
functioning as a signal.26 Again, the signal is a symbol in the Peircean sense. It seems to be
conventional (presumably some other color or sort of signal could have evolved). And, again, I
take it most researchers would probably agree that trees do not have the kind of cognitive
sophistication many have suggested is necessary for sign use. What we get is that the cognitive
sophistication hypothesis of symbols just doesn’t bear out.
Are symbols built upon a foundation of icons and indexes? That was another hypothesis
we were considering in this section. Godfrey-Smith (2014b) argues that they are not, that
symbols are not built upon a foundation of icons and indexes. I think he is right in one sense but
wrong in another. His argument is that symbols (signals) simply arise ready-to-go as a product
of the sender-receiver process; they don’t get there by senders and receivers first going through
some sort of Pierce-like transition story of sign use. He takes it for granted that if we’ve
understood the sender-receiver model, then we will see this too. Consider again the fireflies.
Pairings of receptive females who send a flash and males who fly over to investigate propagate
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Fungi might even exhibit signaling. Some researchers have suggested, for example, that some bioluminescent
fungi might use their glow to attract insects who then get the fungi’s spores on them and disperse the spores when
they leave (Oliveira et al., 2015).
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the species and the signaling behavior. Fireflies didn’t have to first recognize some sort of icon
and then also some sort of indexical relationship.
Godfrey-Smith does go on to say, however, that a transition of the sort described by
Peirce isn’t totally implausible, sometimes. A sender and receiver might come to see that a sign
has a specific indexical content and then recruit that index for symbolic purposes. When this
happens, he says, there is a sort of transition. But a move from supposedly lesser to more
complex forms of signs use isn’t always necessary. For an example, consider a tribe making
clothing out of the materials available in their area. Another tribe might come to notice that
anyone visiting them wearing that sort of clothing is a member of that tribe. The first tribe might
notice this and so, despite other materials being available for making clothing, continue to make
clothing in that style so as to signify their tribal membership.
I think the transition story Godfrey-Smith tells is plausible. However, I think that in
assuming a certain understanding of Peirce he missed a version of the hierarchy view that
appears to hold some weight. It is a version that Deacon endorses in The Symbolic Species
(1997) – though, with a bit more cognitive machinery added.
The reading goes like this. For a sender or receiver in even a paradigm model to get
signaling off the ground, they have to be able to recognize a sign as being a kind of sign, as a
token of a type. If the game involves a red flag and a blue flag, the sender and receiver have to
be able to tell that a red flag is a red flag (and not a blue flag) and a blue flag is a blue flag (and
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not a red flag). This is one kind of iconic relationships signs have on the Peircian model, and
this is the interpretation Deacon takes of them in his book:27
…as human children become more competent and more experienced with written
words, they gradually replace their iconic interpretations of these marks as just
more writing with indexical interpretations supported by a recognition of certain
regular correspondences to pictures and spoken sounds, and eventually use these
as support for learning to interpret their symbolic meanings. In this way they trace
a path somewhat like the archeologist learning to decipher an ancient script.
(1997, p. 74)
On this reading, icons have a sort of dual iconicity. That is, for Peirce not only is a drawing of a
cat an icon of that cat, if identical drawings were made, they would be icons of that cat and of
each other (the drawings) as well.28 What matters is simply that there is some abstract
resemblance - that they are this shape, or blue, and so on.
Now take a look at indexes again. On this new understanding, to use a mountain lion
track as an index of a mountain lion, you must first be able to tell that what you are seeing is a
mountain lion track, that it is a token of a type of sign, that it is a mountain lion track and not a
bear track. And so, being able to use indexes requires first being able to “recognize” in some
sense one sort of “iconic” relationship.
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One might object: “But a red flag doesn’t stand for a red flag. It’s not an iconic sign of a red flag.” Perhaps, but
this is one use of the term ‘iconic’ that Peirce and Deacon use. Whether they should use it that way is a different
matter.
28
Again, one might disagree with this way of understanding iconic relationships, but it is the one Peirce and Deacon
take.
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Now symbols again. To use, say, one flag as a signal for one state and another flag as a
signal for another, agents must build and learn something like an indexical relationship, they
must notice a correlation between the world, the sign, and various actions – though, not
necessarily a strong spacio-temporal correlation. And, again, to do any of that we would need
icon use of the sort already mentioned.29
So, it seems there is plausibly some motivation for a Peircean sequence or hierarchy – at
least, if we take what appears to be Peirce and Deacon’s interpretation. But is it also true that
each level of the sequence requires more cognitive sophistication? As I said, signals (or Peirce’s
symbols) can arise apparently even at the level of cells, even in fireflies. In that case, it seems
doubtful that signal (symbol) use is a mark of some significant new level of cognitive
sophistication found only in humans. But some philosophers think things like “intentions”
matter when it comes to communication. Fireflies, they will argue, cannot intend that something
– in their case, some flash they emit - mean something, whereas humans can, and this is
important. Let’s look now at some views that take a position like this.

1.2.2 H. Paul Grice
English philosopher Hebert Paul Grice is famous for his work on language, most notably his
1957 essay “Meaning” and 1967 lecture “Logic and Conversation”. Grice approached questions
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I say not necessarily a strong correlation mainly because of things like cases where it’s beneficial to have a high
false-alarm rate. Here the correlation might be stronger between the sign and something that causes false positives
than the thing the sign is really about.
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of language from an “ordinary language” point of view, looking at how people actually use
language and how they talk about it.
In the essay “Meaning”, Grice looked at the way people use the verb ‘to mean’, and he
noticed that people, at least in the West, tend to use it in roughly two ways. In the first case,
people used it to talk about what he called “natural meaning” (or “meaningN”). They do this
when they say something like “Those clouds mean rain” or “That shed snakeskin means there’s
probably a rattler around”. There’s supposed to be a sort of “natural” connection – hence the
name - between the sign and whatever it is about. This kind of meaning is contrasted with “nonnatural meaning” (or “meaningNN”), which we see talked about when we say things such as
‘Green’ means “go” or The word ‘Hola’ means “hello”
This sort of meaning is conventional, and, as most Griceans see it, occurring only at the human
level.
Are there analogues to natural and non-natural meaning in the sender-receiver model? I
think it’s fair to say that natural meaning maps fairly well onto the sort of setup in Figure 1.6, the
sender-receiver model involving just the ride-hand side. These are the cues involving mutual
information such as the mountain lion track. They are similar to Peirce’s indexes. One
difference here, however, between the sender-receiver view and the general Gricean view, is that
on the sender-receiver view, things like Grice’s natural signs will come in degrees – natural signs
and non-natural signs will be on a sort of continuum.
Why do Griceans tend toward thinking the continuum view is wrong, that there is some
significant difference between so-called natural meaning and non-natural meaning? And how
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does this aspect of Grice’s view square with the sender-receiver model? One reason motivating
a distinction is the involvement of intentions – the intentions of senders and receivers. We talk
about people intending to say this or that or about someone recognizing my intention to
communicate something. But we don’t talk about fire intending that the smoke it emits mean
“Fire”. And people disagree about whether to use the language of intentions to describe the
behavior of animals and other non-human creatures. Grice and other philosophers debated what
sort of intentions were important here. I don’t want to wade into that debate right now. But
Grice and those who adopt a view like his seem to more or less universally agree that at least
some sort of intentions are important, and I don’t think that it is crucial for the point I want to
make in just a moment, that we takes sides on the issue right now.
So how does the basic idea that intentions are important square with the sender-receiver
model? Recall that Lewis’s early version of the model relied on intentions. Intentions, then, at
least cleanly fit the basic model at the human level. In Signals, however, Brian Skyrms extended
the basic Lewis model and argued that, intentions or not, if the model applied via other
mechanisms – reinforcement learning, imitation, evolution - then what you had was a signal and
so also counted as communication.30 What should a Gricean think or someone who thinks
intentions are important but who is also interested in using the sender-receiver model? Recall
again that the model apparently even applies to fireflies, plants, and cells. How can a Gricean
handle these cases? I see four options. One option is to accept the sender-receiver view and to
hold onto intention-based semantics, the result being accepting that beliefs and intentions of
some sort – perhaps increasingly less sophisticated sorts - go all the way down. Another option
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I will not deal here with the issue of whether these extensions are defensible. I think the arguments and models
provided by Skyrms and colleagues are good and convincing. For those interested in following up on the issue, I
recommend Skyrms’s book Signals (2010).
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is to accept the two views but reject the analysis of the cases - and yet many of the non-human
cases seem fairly good. A third option is to say that both human and non-human signaling
involves communication of some sort but that the two cases are still in some way fundamentally
different, perhaps because the human cases involve intentions (or more complicated intentions)
and non-human cases don’t. But then notice that the two cases – the human case and the nonhuman case - would still both count as communication, it’s just that human communication is on
this view special because of the (kind of) intentions involved, where why intentions themselves
are special here is yet to be spelled out – we could call the human case communicationNN and the
non-human case communicationN if we really wanted to. Finally, one could reject the senderreceiver view in order to maintain that only humans really communicate, perhaps because one
already accepts that we’re the only ones with beliefs and intentions and that those are essential
for communication. But then this last option seems question begging.
Another way to look at it might be to wonder if this is all just the wrong way of thinking
about things. Perhaps it’s not a question of when there are or aren’t intentions behind a signal or
mental life in the communicators because communication and mental life - as Dewey seemed to
think – go together. I can see the beginnings of a sort of deflationary view, though I won’t try to
develop the view here. Beliefs are cashed out in terms of input and output rules and the
dispositions of agents given previous inputs and outputs. Having an intention is roughly to be in
the right input condition and have the right disposition. Chinese philosopher Jian Shen has
developed a formal model of a view very similar to this which also possibly makes room for a
distinction between indicative and imperative signals, signals that say how things are vs signals
that say what to do (Shen, 2020). Other attempts to distinguish indicatives from imperatives
have been made by Huttegger (2007) and Zollman (2011). One way forward might be to think
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about imperative signals as signals that have just one output and go straight from signal reception
to reaction. Imperative signals are signals that when received with other signals lead to a
different action than they would when received alone. It could be that the imperative and
indicative nature of a signal comes in degrees – the more signals that can be received before
taking action, the more indicative. But it seems more work needs to be done in this area.
Grice is also famous for his cooperative principle and a distinction between what he
called utterance meaning and timeless meaning. The basic idea behind the cooperative principle
is that for communication to work, speakers (senders) must typically observe four particular
maxims of conversation. The first maxim is quality, according to which one is supposed to say
only what is true and backed by evidence. The second is quantity, where the aim is be as
informative as required and no more or less. The third is the maxim of relation, which amounts
mostly to making sure what you say is as relevant as possible. And the fourth is the maxim of
manner, which amounts to being as clear and brief as possible.
The distinction between utterance meaning and timeless meaning has to do with what a
speaker means by a signal in some particular instance and what the signal means conventionally.
Timeless meaning is supposedly built from utterance meaning. After using a signal a certain
way enough (utterance meanings), it develops a conventional meaning (the timeless meaning).
Once there’s a conventional meaning, speakers can notice this and then use it to their advantage for example, to lie or to make a joke.
How does all this look from the point of view of the sender-receiver model? The model
doesn’t have anything explicit to say about these maxims, but I can see how they might fit in. In
the standard cases, it seems fair to say that these maxims are followed (or at least not violated).
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The agents tend to learn to send the signal that is true or for which they have evidence (maxim of
quality), the signal that is most informative (quality), the signal that is most relevant (maxim of
relation), and they do so in a straightforward manner (maxim of manner). Of course, again, these
are stripped down models. With elaboration, exceptions will emerge. An example here is a
recent paper by Martínez (2015) showing signaling arising and being maintained despite what
appears to be continual deception. And in fact, Grice himself noted that these maxims were not
meant to be followed perfectly in all cases.
How about the utterance and timeless meaning distinction? This seems to fit into the
model to some extent too. Signals will have a conventional sort of use – a maintained pairing of
inputs, signals, and outputs - and this use will be determined in part by past and continued uses.
Once a conventional use is in place, senders might be able to exploit this in creative ways, using
a signal to mean in some other context something other than what it means conventionally. The
timeless meaning of a signal will roughly be the conventional pairing of sender and receiver
strategies for that signal. Utterance meaning of some particular use of a signal will roughly be
the pairing of whichever sender strategy is at play in that instance with whichever receiver
strategy would give the “right” payoff given that strategy. I’ll elaborate on these ideas a bit more
in a slightly different form in the next few sections.
There’s much more that could be said about meaning here and about the details of
Grice’s program. But I’d like avoid going into the very nitty gritty details and tangential debates
and stick to the more general picture since that is what I am most interested in examining here,
and we don’t need to go into all the analyses out there of the minor details to do that. What I’d
like to do now is set meaning and related issues aside for just a moment and focus briefly on
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what is the most recent comprehensive re-imagining of Grice’s framework, and one that offers
up an interesting twist.

1.2.3 The Ostensive-inferential Account
In his 2014 book Speaking our Minds, Thom Scott-Phillips articulates a new version of the
Gricean model, and one that he at one point explicitly sets up against the sender-receiver view.
I’ll follow Scott-Phillips in calling his model the ostensive-inferential model of communication.
I know the general Gricean view is sometimes referred to this way, but I will use the term from
here on to refer only to Scott-Phillips’s particular version of it.
On the face of it, it might seem the ostensive-inferential view is similar to the senderreceiver view. Here is Scott-Phillips’ basic account of communication:
…what makes an interaction communicative is that it involves two behaviors, a
signal and a response, which both possess two particular qualities. The first is
interdependence: as I have emphasized, signals require responses, and responses
require signals. The second is design: the two behaviors must be designed to
interact with one another. In sum, then, communication is a matter of designed
(or functional) interdependence. This quality is the essence of communication…
(2014, p. 33)
Yet in the same book, Scott-Phillips goes on to criticize the sender-receiver model as being an
instance of what he calls the code model of communication, a model that he says differs from the
ostensive-inferential model and cannot account for important features of human language.
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Ostensive-inferential communication works like this. Two intentions in particular are
important: (1) an intention that my audience recognize I am trying to communicate something to
them (this is called a “communicative intention”), and (2) an intention that they recognize what I
am trying to communicate to them (this is called an “informative intention”). An example goes
as follows: Josh and Max order burgers at a restaurant and Josh receives his burger first. Josh
smells his burger and it smells odd to him. He wants to communicate this to Max, and so Josh
takes a sniff of the burger in a rather exaggerated way, perhaps scrunching his nose following the
sniff. This does two things for Max: (1) it shows Max that Josh thinks the burger smells odd (the
informative intention), and (2) that Josh wants to communicate this to Max (the communicative
intention). This example is based on one involving berries due to French cognitive scientist Dan
Sperber and British cognitive scientist Deirdre Wilson who together presented the first version of
this rendering of Grice in their 1986 book Relevance: Communication and Cognition. This sort
of communication is supposedly important because it allows for more creative on-the-fly
communication such as the burger case - using an exaggerated sniff and scrunching one’s nose to
mean roughly, “This food smells weird” rather than just saying it (in, say, English). It’s called
ostensive-inferential because senders try to communicate in part through ostension - showing,
pointing out, exhibiting, providing some form of evidence for what they mean – and receivers try
to understand senders via reasoning about what senders did and the context in which it was done.
For Sperber and Wilson a principle of relevance and two sub-principles of
communication and cognition replaced Grice’s cooperative principle. According to the
communicative principle, senders tend to say something only if it is relevant, and they say what
is most relevant. So if I ask you if there is a gas station down the road, and there happen to be
two (Cressman’s and Shaver Lake Gas) but only one is open (Cressman’s) and you know this,
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you reply with “Yep, just a quarter mile down is Cressman’s” rather than telling me “Yep,
Cressman’s and Shaver Lake” or just “Yep, Shaver Lake”. According to the cognitive principle,
receivers tend to pay attention to what is most relevant and interpret signals in the most plausibly
relevant way. So, when you say “Yep, Cressman’s”, I interpret this as meaning that there is a
gas station down the road and that it is open. I won’t spend much time on this idea, but these
principles seem to fit into the sender-receiver view too. In cooperative signaling games, agents
who develop successful languages seem to be sending the relevant signals given the state of the
world and the receivers seem to be interpreting signals in the most relevant way, performing the
relevant action. Agents in a sender-receiver model could even have cognitive machinery added
that pushes them in these directions to greater or lesser extents. But whether some sophisticated
cognitive capacity such as an innate version of the principle of relevance is needed just to get any
form of communication off the ground at all, given the evidence of cases like that of the fireflies
and other simple models, seems doubtful.
In contrast to the ostensive-inferential model, the code model does not have intentions at
its core but instead involves a system of overlapping fixed rules of sending behavior for senders
and receiving behavior for receivers. 31 What matters is the association of inputs, signs, and
outputs, and it doesn’t matter how those associations got there – learning, natural selection, or
rational choice.
Communication of this sort depends upon mechanisms of association. In
signalers, certain states of the world are associated with the production of
particular signals; and in receivers, the reception of those same signals is

31

Scott-Phillips notes that the name “code model” appears to originate from Sperber and Wilson (1986).
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associated with particular behaviors. In fact, this associativity is the defining
feature of the code model. If communication is made possible by associations, it
is, by definition, an instance of the code model of communication. (p. 5)
Scott-Phillips thinks the sender-receiver model is a clear instance of this sort of set-up, the code
model, and I am tempted to mostly agree with him. I will say that I think it should be obvious
that there are differences between the sender-receiver model and the rough sketch of the code
model that has been put forward, and more differences should become obvious as we go along.
But for the sake of argument I’ll go ahead with the idea that the sender-receiver model is roughly
an instance of the code model, and I hope readers will see that the similarities are relevant
enough and the differences small enough that my argument goes through.
So, why is it a problem that the sender-receiver model is a version of the code model?
One reason, Scott-Phillips says, is that the code model seems unable to handle instances of
communication that are seemingly inexplicable in associative terms. Consider a case he presents
in his book:
…suppose that a couple have had a number of conversations about, say, a
particular TV show, which many people think is brilliant, but which they both
agree is terrible. Now suppose that they head to a party one evening, and a friend
of theirs starts telling them how great he thinks the show is. The friend then
leaves the conversation. One half of the couple wants to acknowledge to the other
half that this is just the sort of thing they had been talking about. To do this, she
can improvise and use an indefinite variety of behaviors: a raised eyebrow; puffed
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cheeks; a glance over her shoulder; sticking her tongue out; and many others...
(p. 7)
Why is a case like this supposedly a problem for the sender-receiver model? The next line of the
quote gives us our answer:
…There is no code in operation here: none of these behaviors is conventionally
associated with her intended meaning, even probabilistically. (p. 7)
The idea is that the puffed cheeks cannot possibly be a code since they are not associated with
inputs and outputs as signals in a sender-receiver system are. I think Scott-Phillips is somewhat
right and somewhat wrong on this one. The cheeks certainly are not associated with perhaps a
very precise meaning such as “Oh, my gosh, Hugo thinks Games of Thrones is great, we were
just talking about this!” But it does seem to be the sort of thing that could be associated in
certain contexts with a broader, less precise meaning perhaps such as “Did you hear that?!”
Consider again the burger example. There are many other things I can imagine Josh doing other
than scrunching his nose when he emphatically smells his burger that would work well in getting
the same idea across to Max. He could pretend to gag; roll his eyes back; pretend to hold back
vomit; stick his tongue out. The list goes on. But notice that these actions do tend to be used to
communicate these sorts of things in similar contexts – that’s partly why it’s easy for me to
imagine him using them for this purpose. If you doubt it, just watch some old cartoons. It’s hard
to understand Tom and Jerry if you don’t understand associations between certain acts of socalled body language and certain contexts, inputs, and outputs. Movies with little or no dialogue
take advantage of the same body language associations. If Josh sniffed his burger then smiled
wide, or blinked his eyes five times, then it would be much less likely, I suspect, that Max would
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think Josh was complaining about his burger. They may be subtle, but associations are there.
When they are not, then communication is sometimes unsuccessful, especially in one-off or first
try circumstances. But when a first try or one-off attempt is successful despite no previous
associations – imagine Josh doing the five blinks and it working - then perhaps we can think of
this as a lucky meeting of sender and receiver rules that senders and receivers in that game might
or might not go on to reinforce in future interactions (if there are any). I say lucky because it
seems fairly miraculous to me that Josh would get “This food smells weird” out of an emphatic
sniff and five blinks or a wide smile.
Another objection Scott-Phillips raises to the code model is that it fails to deal with
underdeterminacy. Underdeterminacy is the idea that even given a seemingly straightforward
utterance such as “It’s sunny outside”, there are an infinite number of things that utterance could
mean (in the speaker meaning sense) other than what that utterance seems to mean literally. For
example, I might say “It’s sunny outside” in response to someone asking me “Should I bring my
sunglasses?” Here the speaker meaning of “It’s sunny outside” might actually be “Yes” – since
that is basically what I’m trying to tell them “Yes, you should bring your sunglasses” and yet that
is obviously not the literal meaning of that English sentence I uttered. So why is this supposedly
a problem for the code model, for the sender-receiver version in particular? I will quote ScottPhillips again:
One consequence of this fact is that the linguistic code cannot make linguistic
communication possible. The existence and ubiquity of underdeterminacy means
that the meaning that a speaker intends when they produce an utterance cannot
ever be determined by analysis of the literal meaning of the utterance alone. In
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short, linguistic utterances are, on their own, unable to specify speaker meaning,
and hence they logically cannot make any sort of communication possible
[emphasis added]. (p. 17)
What Scott-Phillips is getting at here is that communication cannot get off the ground if receivers
cannot determine what the speaker is trying to communicate. And he is arguing that the literal
meanings of signals alone, due to underdeterminacy, don’t allow a receiver to figure out what a
speaker means and so engage in successful communication. My response to this is the
following. Consider the simplest sender-receiver game. I think we can think of this game as one
sort of stripped bare and idealized. One of the things it is stripped bare of is things like shifting
contexts.32 In the simplest game, we don’t have to worry – as with the sunshine example - about
whether a certain type of signal is being sent in a different context. All that needs to be paid
attention to by receivers is the literal (or in this case: conventional) meaning of the signals – and
in fact, that’s all there is for them to pay attention to in these cases. And here, in this simple
game, communication of a sort does get off the ground and can do so in a number of ways
described earlier this chapter. So, it seems it can’t be that linguistic utterances “logically cannot
make any sort of communication possible” – at least not if we count the meaning of a signal in a
sender-receiver system like this as an instance of a linguistic code. Of course, as we saw earlier
in this chapter, conventional meaning evolves along with a signaling system – systems don’t start
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In a sender-receiver game, we can think of contexts as different states. Suppose I have two signals available (A
and B). And there are 4 possible states of the world. I might send A in states 1 and 2 and B in states 3 and 4. It
might be that in state 1 the action a receiver should perform is different than the action they should perform in state
2. And so, what A means in the “context” of state 1 will be different than what it means when sent in state 2.
Perhaps this is easier to see if it turns out that states 1 and 3 are almost always the states encountered and states 2
and 4 are very rare – I’ll say more about this idea later in this chapter. It could also be that there was originally only
a 2 state signaling game, the signaling system developed along with the meanings of the signals and then two new
states were added and the signals – with their conventional meaning – now had to be used to coordinate interaction
in these new states (i.e. contexts). There are many ways the idea of contexts might be modeled with the senderreceiver model.
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with signals with conventional meanings - so I can see how if we interpret things this way,
perhaps there is another sense in which conventional meaning cannot make communication
possible, namely that that sort of meaning is a product of the system coming into equilibrium
rather than something that was around before equilibrium that helped bring the system into it. In
that case, Scott-Phillips would be right but not for the reasons he has given.
Another thing the simplest model is stripped of is the ability of senders to do things such
as use sarcasm. Suppose we add that to the model. Now when a signal is sent it might have a
combinatorial nature: one part original signal (some part of English, say), one part added
sarcasm. From the point of view of the sender-receiver model, this combinatorial signal could be
considered a single larger signal in a larger (or meta) language (or signaling system) that
combines the literal meaning of English utterances with the presence or not of sarcasm, and it
could have associations (likely probabilistic and dependent upon circumstances) to inputs and
outputs just as signals do in other sender-receiver set-ups. If we look at the signal that way, then
it’s not true that the literal meaning of the larger (meta) signal cannot pin down meaning in a
signaling game. But it will still apparently be true that in these sorts of games with these extra
features added that the literal meaning of component signals, where one of those component
signals might be some part of English or some other spoken or written language, won’t pin down
speaker meaning on their own. Whether sarcasm evolved along with literal meaning or whether
there was simple linguistic code first and sarcasm was added on later is an interesting question
but unfortunately one I will not address here.33
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For one example of a model dealing with complex combined signals see Barrett (2009). My suggestion here is
that there might be a sort of “code” for sarcasm.
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Perhaps it comes as no surprise given what Scott-Phillips thinks about the code model
and underdeterminacy that he also argues there must have been a sort of transition involved in
human language use. As he sees it, since a code model of communication suffering from
underdeterminacy could not get human language off the ground, it must be that ostensiveinferential communication came first, then using ostensive-inferential communication we
constructed languages, conventional codes, which were then added to the already existing
framework of ostensive-inferential communication, the result being what is essentially ostensiveinferential communication augmented by a linguistic code. On page 46, Scott-Phillips puts it
rather simply:
“…ostension and inference are logically prior to the linguistic code.”
On page 19, he writes:
“…a language is the rich, structured collection of conventional codes that
augment ostensive-inferential communication within a given community.”
This is a fairly radical image of the nature of human language. Language is still a code on this
model, a signaling system, but one that is used as a sort of complex additional tool by agents who
primarily rely on a prior existing system of ostension and inference. Scott-Phillips thinks
animals and smaller creatures have codes too in the signaling system sense, but that the
difference here is that unlike humans, other creatures do not operate on an already existing
framework of ostension and inference – this is part of the explanation for why they cannot use
their code in a creative way – say, for example, using an existing code in a new way in order to
make an implication or to express sarcasm.
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I think Scott-Phillips’s general picture of the nature of language is rather attractive but
ultimately off the mark, and I think the error stems from a misunderstanding at the very start of
things. I already tried to show this to some extent when, while responding to his criticism about
underdeterminacy, I pointed out that at least primitive signaling systems still evolve despite only
having basic conventional meaning and no ostensive-inferential use seemingly going on – and
remember: these models have been applied to even things like fireflies and cells. I suspect ScottPhillips wouldn’t be satisfied by this response, though I admit that at the moment I cannot think
of what sort of reply he might make. So instead I will try to give another response.
We can look at the same problem from another angle. Consider what Scott-Phillips
accepts as instances of ostensive-inferential communication:
“Tilting your coffee cup is ostensive but not linguistic, since the tilt does not
(really) have a conventionalized meaning.” (p. 20)
“…languages differ to other, simpler cases of ostensive-inferential
communication, such as points, non-linguistic vocalizations, nods of the head, and
so on [emphasis added].” (p. 20)
Earlier the puffed cheek example also mentioned “eyebrow raises”. These things – pointing,
head nods, tilts of glasses, raised eyebrows – are said to count as parts of the “already existing
system of ostensive-inferential communication” (p. 18). But what if it turned out these were
actually instances of the code model too? What if the best examples of non-linguistic ostensiveinferential communication turn out to be instances of sender-receiver communication? Consider
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pointing.34 We might take it as a more or less obvious axiom that humans understand intuitively
or at some “deep” level what pointing means, but why do that? It seems that pointing is
something that should also have to go through some process of back and forth as described in the
sender-receiver model for us to understand what it means. How am I to know what you mean by
pointing at something if I’ve never seen someone point at something before or if there isn’t some
evolved response nudging me in that direction? The same goes with head nods or eyebrow raises
or fixing your gaze in a certain direction. Just to be clear: what I am imagining here is a
reconceptualization of apparent primitive instances of ostensive-inferential communication as
themselves instances of sender-receiver communication. But this sort of move is not without
precedent as others have noted worries about pointing, especially in regards to its use in the
theory of language developed by American philosopher Willard Van Orman in his book Word
and Object (1960). To get someone to understand that I mean “cat” when I say “oogboog” I
might point at a cat each time I say it and only say when a cat is around. But for my pointing at
the cat to be a helpful clue to a receiver, they need to already understand what it means when
someone points under those circumstances, and so there is a sort of signaling game problem here
as well. A similar story could apply to raising one’s eye brows or using a fixed gaze to call
attention to something. These sorts of transitions could also have occurred in the time of our not
so distant ancestors but distant enough that there were no intentions involved in making them.
This problem goes all the way to the start of communication. Even the most
“intentionally overt” communication faces this problem. For me to recognize a communicative
intention in you there must be something clueing me in to it. If it is a certain kind of gaze, or
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One might think the best examples are really the more improvisatory ones. If that’s the case, I would suggest
looking back to what I said about the case involving Josh and the burger.
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eyebrow raise, or tone of voice, or even a mix of things, I’m still going to have to have learned
that. There will have to be a back and forth before we have a real back and forth. I’m going to
have to learn your signal for “I’m trying to communicate”.
Scott-Phillips might try to defend his general view by pressing on the claim that humans
in fact do have the sort of complicated intentions his theory calls for and that non-humans don’t,
and so there must be some fundamental difference between human language and animal
communication. But if the sender-receiver view can cover both the animal and human cases and
the complicated intentions he mentions don’t seem to call for a difference from the point of view
of sender-receiver model, it’s hard for me to see the call for a difference as anything but question
begging. Again, we might decide to say that there is some difference – that in the case of
humans there are often more complicated intentions (if we want to use that language) in the
background of the goings on – but to say that because of this our communication counts as real
language or communication and non-human communication is of some fundamentally different
kind, seems wrong.35

1.3 Robinson Crusoe and the Wine
I’d now like to look at some of the finer details of the sender-receiver model, some of the
foundational issues. Peirce’s model didn’t obviously involve two agents – a sender and a
receiver – but Grice’s view and the ostensive-inferential formulation of it seemed to. The
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But what if it is merely claimed that the difference is distinctively human? That is a different question and one
that would require more research into the communication of other animals to see if it really is a difference that
applies only to humans. But even if it does turn out to be a difference unique to humans, it would still not mean that
human language is real communication and other animal communication not.

57

sender-receiver model assumes it takes two to tango, but does it? First, let me say that we are
not asking whether information can be carried by things other than signals, for example, by cues
– that it can is clear.36 We are also not asking whether receivers on their own can pick up
information from things like cues. We are asking whether communication requires two. I think
the answer is simpler than most want to believe. Yes, it requires two. That’s just what
communication is – it’s sort of analytic, true by definition. It’s a thing done between two or
more people or organisms (or agents of some nature).
But a way to approach the same question that also has a chance of persuading skeptics is
to think about the hard cases, the cases somewhere on the borderline. Consider what’s known in
the literature on Grice as the soliloquy objection – originally due to American artist and
philosopher Paul Ziff (1967). What do we say about the lone speaker (sender) who seems to say
something when no-one else is around? Do we call it communication?
I find it hard to think about cases like these in the abstract. So, let’s add just a few details
to the picture. Suppose our speaker is a Robinson Crusoe type. He was raised in English society
but after a series of tragedies at sea has been stranded on an island and is now in some sense
alone (although people are still out there somewhere across the ocean). He writes a note, puts it
in a bottle, and drops it in the ocean. Is this a case of communication? My inclination is to agree
in the case that Crusoe intended as his audience someone across the ocean and there is some
chance receivers could receive and react to his signal. But suppose now that unknown to Crusoe
everyone has died – he’s the last man on earth, even in existence. Is this communication? I take
it some Griceans will still want to say yes given the sender’s intention, they will say that it has
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I discussed the difference between signals and cues earlier. Roughly, cues are signs that carry information about
states but involve no sensitivity to feedback (and so, no adaptation of sender rules) on the sender side of the model.
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speaker meaning. I’m somewhat inclined to agree that it might be fair to describe it as having
meaning still in some sense since in our example the speaker is also trained up in a language
already. Yet it’s much like plucking the receivers out of a game in which a signaling system has
already evolved and in which the sender has already settled on rules. Is his signal an instance of
communication out of that old context? I’m not sure. It’s an attempt perhaps, but not a
successful one. It takes two to tango and there aren’t two anymore.
A famous real-world example of this sort of situation is found in the case of the Kauaʻi
ʻōʻō bird (Moho braccatus), a native species of the Hawaiian island of Kauaʻi. An American
ornithologist, H. Douglas Pratt, Jr., captured what is thought to be the mating call of the last
living Kauaʻi ʻōʻō bird, a male, who died in 1987 (Steensen, 2018). This bird’s mating call was
the swan song of its entire species. The Kauaʻi ʻōʻō bird’s call is the result of a mix of back and
forth on the evolutionary level and on the learning level, as is the case in most bird species. The
last Kauaʻi ʻōʻō was trained up in the signaling system of its kind. And yet, there were no
receivers left to hear his cries. Were his signals actually signals? Actually communication?
Was he communicating anything? Again, I’m not sure. He sure seems to be trying, and he was
trained up. But as I said, it seems to take two to tango. It doesn’t seem right to say that he
communicated successfully.37
Go back to the island. Now imagine there has been no previous signal use by the sender
– perhaps he grew up alone somehow on the island or is a “swamp-Crusoe” (he’s a perfect exact
copy of Crusoe that just magically popped into existence).38 The man goes to do what appears to
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To hear Pratt’s recording of the Kauaʻi ʻōʻō, see Pratt (1975).
This is a reference to Donald Davidson’s Swampman character introduced in his 1987 paper “Knowing One’s
Own Mind.”
38
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be the same thing as before: he makes marks on paper, puts it in a bottle, and drops it into the
sea. Maybe the marks on the note in the bottle even look like the English sentence “Is anybody
out there?” Perhaps there is an audience or not but he intends that someone receive it. Is that
communication? I don’t know. Is that scenario even possible? I have a hard time with abstract
thought experiments such as these. Would such a man even know what he is doing? Could he
intend to communicate if he has no idea whether he’s the only one around and has no evidence of
anyone else, has never seen anyone communicate before, etc.? My stance is that these cases
carry some of the components of the standard cases and that some are closer to, some farther
from, the standard examples than others. I think the everyday concept of communication is
probably not as clear as some philosophers would like it to be and that it probably didn’t come
about originally with handling these sorts of cases in mind. Further, communication evolves
over time. We should expect that in most cases there will be in-between stages, especially during
the move to stabilization and that even seemingly stabilized systems may change someday.
Peirce seems to have thought this sort of thing too (Short, 1996). There is a sense in which often
meaning isn’t fixed rigidly.
What about the cases where Crusoe talks to himself or doesn’t intend an audience? The
first case, I think, we can at least sometimes see as communication. I might play the role of both
sender and receiver – as in the case of memory. For example, I might write a note to myself.
Cases where I’m not intending to talk to myself or anyone else – where I don’t even think there
is possibly some god or alien species out there who might hear me - I think are best simply not
described as communication. Though, what’s really going on in those non-communicative cases
I’m not sure – an odd tick, relieving stress, trying out a new behavior. All this is to say that the
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answer to the question of whether it takes two to tango is basically yes, but with a few
qualifications.
Here’s a final consideration before we move on to deeper waters. How far does the
borderline go? Just about anything can be used as a signal. I could use a glass of wine that I
hand you as a signal.39 Suppose we have a game where I can either hand you a glass of wine or a
glass of water. You drink whatever I hand you. If I hand you wine in one situation, it’s great for
both of us – perhaps because the more you drink, the more entertaining you are to me and me to
you. If I hand it to you in the other, it’s bad for both – perhaps because now we want to have a
serious sober conversation. The converse story applies to the water. We get a system going and
it perpetuates, I giving you wine in one state and water in another. Is this signaling? I want to
say no, and this is because the physical effect (the causal consequence) of the so-called signal on
the receiver (drunkenness, soberness) and our enjoyment or not of the effect is what is really
doing the maintaining work of the system, not what is done with the information the object
contains. In fact, the receiver doesn’t do anything with the information the wine contains - he
drinks just the same. A similar case, but one that counts as signaling, involves me throwing
either a red or blue ball to you and you placing it in the right bucket for a payoff. There,
although you are also physically using the signal (putting it in some bucket or other) you are first
using the information you receive from it (via color) to decide what you do next (which bucket to
put it in). As with other cases, I say the same with these. There will probably be cases
somewhere on the borderline, shades of grey. Most cases won’t be clear-cut and paradigmatic.
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Thank you to Cosim Sayid for this question. Godfrey-Smith (2014b) brings up a similar worry and offers a brief
sketch in this direction.
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1.4 Meaning
We’ve covered just about everything that can be covered as far as the basics of the senderreceiver way of looking at things goes. But one thing we have yet to discuss at length is the
meaning or content of signs. We talk about meaning all the time: the meaning of words; the
meaning of sentences; the meaning of a wink; even the meaning of the flash of a firefly. What
counts as the meaning of a signal?
One way to approach the problem is to look at the information in a signal. Fred Dreske’s
(1932-2013) Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981) is a classic example of this
approach.40 The most recent version of this idea, however, is due to Brian Skyrms. On
Skyrms’s account, the informational content of a signal is captured by how the signal changes
both the probabilities of the states of the world and the receiver’s actions. On this view, you can
think of the content of a signal as a sort of list of all the changes to the probabilities of the states
of the world and actions of the receiver given the signal.
<[Psig(state 1)/P(state 1)], [Psig(state 2)/P(state 2)], [Psig(state 3)/P(state 3)]>
Figure 1.9. An example of an informational content vector for a simple
game with three states and three signals (receiver actions are not
included here). Psig is the probability of the state conditional on getting
the signal.41
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I will not look at Dretske’s view as it is well known there are many problems with it.
Skyrms actually prefers adding a logarithm of base 2 to his equation, making his preferred representation of
informational content look like this: log [Psig(state 1)/P(state 1)]. Doing this allows for measuring information in
bits.
41
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Godfrey-Smith (2012) points out a couple potential flaws with this view, but just consider a
simple case of deception. Hunters sometimes use fake elk bugles to lure in large bucks.
Intuitively we want to say that the bugle sent by the hunter is false, is a case of deception, and yet
it appears that Skyrms’s account doesn’t allow for this. The change in probabilities of the hunter
having been the one who sent the signal will be part of the list, and so, the signal will be true and
have the same content when sent by either sender (the hunter or the elk). Let E1 represent the
state where there is an elk present and let H2 be the state where there isn’t an elk present but
rather a hunter and you get this informational content vector:
<[Psig(E1)/P(E1)], [Psig(H2)/P(H2)]>
Figure 1.10. The elk bugle vector.

Whether the signal is sent by the elk or the hunter, the vector is the same, the content is the same.
The point is somewhat easier to see with a similar formulation that faces the same
problem. Suppose the content of the signal is simply a list of the probabilities of the various
states of the world given the signal.
[Psig(state 1), Psig(state 2)]
Figure 1.11. Simple probability vector.

Then what both the hunter and the elk “say” when they send that signal, again, will be the same.
Suppose that 10% of the time a hunter is the one who sends the bugle. Then the informational
content of that signal will be something like “Hunter 10%, Elk 90%”. Sent by either type of
sender – hunter or elk - a signal with that content will not strictly speaking be a lie.
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Another way philosophers have approached the question of meaning is to look at the
success conditions of signals – roughly, when they work or have utility. American pragmatist
William James (1842-1910) sometimes seemed to pursue such a view.42 Later, Ruth Millikan
developed an evolutionary version of this general idea, where the content of a signal is
determined by natural selection. Millikan’s view is very similar to the sender-receiver view.
There is a sender (a producer) who observes the world and sends a signal and a receiver
(consumer) who receives the signal and performs an action. According to Millikan, roughly, the
content of a signal is determined by the “normal” combination of states and actions that led to
the preservation or proliferation of that particular signaling strategy, where what “normal” meant
was somewhat unclear and often debated. The most recent version of this way of characterizing
content is due to Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Rosa Cao (2017). Here, the same
idea applies but more broadly. Content is produced by various processes – learning, copying not just natural selection. What matters is which states figure in the explanation of the
stabilization of sender and receiver strategies.43 So, whereas with Millikan, if the combination of
a sexually receptive female firefly being around and a male firefly going in to mate preserved
and proliferated via natural selection that signaling strategy, then the content of the signal
involves just those states and acts, on the Shea, Godfrey-Smith, Cao view, this sort of analysis
also applies to cases like that of the vervet monkey signaling system or even human signaling
where the signaling strategies are preserved and proliferated via feedback mechanisms such as
reinforcement learning, copying, and other processes.
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Pragmatism (1907) and The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897) are the most popular
examples of James’s work in this tradition.
43
See Martínez (2015), for a formalization of the notions maintaining and non-maintaining.

64

The Shea, Godfrey-Smith, Cao version of the theory does a nice job of generalizing
Millikan’s key insight and showing that a theory of this sort can cover more cases of
communication than previously thought. However, consider another case involving the elk.44
The elk eventually learn to recognize the smell of wolves and develop a signaling system for
warning the others of a wolf’s presence. Now if an elk smells a wolf, it will send an alarm for
the others. The functional content seems to be something like “Wolf!” But now suppose a
hunter wearing his new wolf pelt and looking for a new buck for dinner comes along. An elk
smells it, sends the alarm, and the herd escapes. This seems to be a maintaining use of the signal
in some sense. If the signal were used this way more often, it’s not the case the signaling system
would break down – this use would get reinforced. And yet, intuitively the hunter doesn’t seem
to be part of the signal’s content.
It’s not clear what move to make from here. Does one reconstruct the content somehow
so that it covers both the wolf and the hunter wearing wolf pelt? Does the history matter – was
perhaps the first use in the hunter case a happy yet false accident but such that if it became more
common it would later become part of the meaning? Should we try to rely on some notion of
“normal”? But what counts as normal? What if it just happened to be that the hunter wearing a
wolf pelt was the first threat the elk encountered and then wolves became the norm after that?
Part of the answer, I think, is to go back to what was said by Peirce about meaning evolving over
time. But I think there’s more to it than that.
In Convention, David Lewis handles the question of meaning in a different way. There
he writes while summarizing the Revere case:

44

This is adapted from a story in Harms (2010).
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I have now described the character of a case of signaling without mentioning the
meaning of the signals: that two lanterns meant that the redcoats were coming by
sea, or whatever. But nothing important seems to have been left unsaid. So what
has been said must somehow imply that the signals have their meanings. (pp. 124125)
Lewis seems to be saying, “Look, we’ve now got an account of communication, and since
meaning is a part of communication, it must somehow fit in here. And yet, the notion of
meaning doesn’t seem to fit in so nicely, and somehow that doesn’t seem to be a problem, that
we can still just as well talk about things in terms of the model, no meaning talk necessary”. It’s
a very deflationary sort of view. I want to take a similar line, but slightly different. The
common, everyday notion of meaning – the one we use in everyday speech - is handed down,
imprecise, and unclear. It seems likely not to have originated with handing all the possible
bizarre and borderline cases in mind. This doesn’t mean using the old ordinary way of speaking
about things having meaning won’t still sometimes be helpful or easier in certain contexts, just
that it might be less useful in more rigorous scientific ones. It also doesn’t mean that the old way
of speaking about things - saying something means X or Y - is wrong or false. These are just
two different ways of talking about the same phenomenon.
Some might think perhaps we can reduce one way of speaking to the other. I don’t think
we should expect to be able to do that, to find a perfect or even nearly perfect reduction of the
old everyday on-the-streets notion of meaning to something going on or some property of signals
in the new more scientific sender-receiver framework, a reduction of one way of speaking about
things to the other. In Thought in a Hostile World (2003), Australian philosopher Kim Sterelny
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articulates basically the same view in different terms. Sterelny talks about what he calls the
Simple Coordination Hypothesis. On the Simple Coordination Hypothesis, the notion of
meaning is supposed to be reduced to some specific connection property of the wiring and
connection facts in a communicative system. Like Sterelny I don’t think such a property –
success, function, etc. - is to be found. My stance is a sort of “levels of explanation view” like
that expressed by American philosopher Daniel Dennett in his 1978 book Brain Storms, but not
quite the same thing. The handed down way of speaking and the new sender-receiver framework
are two different ways or levels of talking about the same topic – communication and meaning.
Neither way of speaking is right or wrong in itself, just more or less useful in one context rather
than another – the handed down way in normal everyday conversation and the sender-receiver
way in more rigorous precision-requiring scientific ones. They are just two different signaling
systems. Whereas others hold out hope that the handed down way of speaking will eventually be
fully captured and explained by a new way of understanding things, and others that it will
eventually be explained away (see perhaps Churchland 1986), I have my doubts.45

1.5 Coda: If a Lion Could Speak…
Wittgenstein famously stated that if a lion could speak, we could not understand it (1953, Book
2, line 327). In his book the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), he writes “The limits of my
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In a forthcoming paper, Godfrey-Smith and Ronald Planer come to a somewhat similar deflationary conclusion,
though apparently for different reasons. Their main motivation for taking a deflationary stance toward meaning
seems to be the observation that functional and informational content don’t always align and that different kinds of
“involvement” a sign has with the world might be important or not at certain times.
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language mean the limits of my world” (Proposition 5.6). Is there anything to the basic idea
expressed in these remarks? I think there is.
Recent modelling work by Jeffrey Barrett at the University of California, Riverside
(2007, 2010) offers some insight into the different kinds of incommensurability or nontranslatability possible between different signaling languages. I won’t go into the details of all
the cases Barrett covers. But suffice to say that even languages with the same resources – the
same number of signals, atomic states, actions, senders and receivers, the same preferences over
states, and even the same mechanisms of reinforcement - can end up carving out the world in
incommensurable ways, in ways such that there is no perfect translation of all the atomic or
compound parts of one signaling system into another. When there are differences in any of these
things – preferences, which states agents can observe, how they learn to signal, how adaptive
they are, and so on - incommensurability of some sort is not uncommon.
And yet, as Barrett points out, there can still be truth within respective signaling systems,
which are still going on in the same world, on the same planet, despite what is true for the sender
and receivers, even what exists according to their systems, being different. One system might
distinguish between blue and green, one might not (might lump them into one category:
“Bluish”). One population of agents might be able to see and so communicate about ultra-violet
light, and another group might not – or might be able to see ultra-violet but just not care about it
and so lump it together with something else. An agent can still say something true in their
system when they say, for example, that some object is “Bluish”, even if bluish or blue or green
aren’t things that an agent in a different signaling system even acknowledges.
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This is a sort of internal-external distinction type take that Barrett is going with here.
That distinction was introduced by German philosopher Rudolf Carnap in his 1950 paper
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”. The basic idea is that there is a difference between
making claims within a language using the ontology of that language – so saying, for example,
“There’s a lion over there!” – as compared to instead talking about that language and its
ontology, the way it carves things up – so saying, “Are lions a thing? Should we use a language
that treats them as real?”. Barrett seems to be suggesting we just not worry about the external
questions, not worry about if our ontology is the correct one or true one with a capital T. He
seems to think the more practical thing to do is worry about whether our language satisfies our
needs or not or does so better than some other language.
Barrett’s argument for this is pretty simple. One might think the success of a signaling
language is a good indication of its being a true description of things. And yet, different
signaling populations can have languages that carve up the world differently and still be
successful for their respective agents. The same population can even use different languages,
with different ontologies, over time – just think of the history of science. As Barrett (2007)
points out, it seems that the only way we’d have a good reason for thinking our particular
language (and not some other one) got the deeper ontology of the world right is if we knew that
the kind of success in communication and coordination we currently enjoyed thanks to our
language was possible only if our language actually carved reality at its joints. And yet, like
Barrett, I don’t see how this is something we could actually check. We can’t step outside our
respective languages (signaling systems) to see if the way they describe the world is true and
matches up with reality – our signaling systems in a way are our reality. The states in them and
the way the agents carve them up are the only states our agents can see and talk about. For our
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agents to look “outside” the game would be to now be able to see new states and so now be in a
new game, have new things to talk about, a new ontology.
There are other considerations against the view that the success of some signaling system
is a good guide to reality. As Barrett (2007) points out, it seems to be part of the nature of
scientific and philosophical inquiry to always search for improvement. It’s hard to see there
being a point when we’d feel safe saying things have finally settled, that our language is as full
and successful as it gets and that there will never again come a day when we might possibly
improve upon our description of things.46
A little caveat is appropriate at this point. The way I’ve been talking about truth here has
been a bit unusual. It probably will come as no surprise that I think the notion of truth in
signaling systems is going to have to be a bit deflationary. We saw that there are many kinds of
“content” or “meaning” people have looked to in signaling systems. In the previous section of
this chapter, I took the stance that there probably isn’t a single ground for our handed-down
everyday notion of meaning to be found in the new model. That, I take it, would also rule out a
traditional account of truth. A signal would have to have a meaning to be true or not on
traditional accounts. No real meaning, no real truth (or falsity). This issue aside, consider also
that signaling systems cover not just simple signals about states of the world. There are also
cases of signals that are more imperative in content than indicative, have more of a “command”
function to them than a descriptive one. When I yell “Run!” at the wrong time I’m not saying
something false. Similarly, when I say it at the right time, I’m not saying something true.

46

There is also the possibility of something like Peirce’s notion of truth “in the limit” fitting in here. See Peirce
(1878), for an introduction. Looking into this would take us onto a bit a detour, however, so I’ll save that
investigation for another project.
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Signals can still be, for lack of better words, “appropriate” or not – just as they can be “true” or
“false” when sent in certain states of a game. Some signals might be somewhere between,
containing a mixed content that is both indicative and imperative and so is true and appropriate at
the same time, or perhaps even has some other content mixed in. Some signals might be more
aptly described as more or less “accurate”, not just true or false – calls encoding predator
distance for example.47 Either way, truth, as philosophers usually talk about it, like meaning,
won’t survive in this model looking exactly the usual way.
OK, but what does all this tell us about the lion? I think it’s fair to say that the lion will
have different actions attached to the receiver side of their signals than us – for example, running
for lions involves four legs not two, they can extend and retract their claws, move their tails,
accomplish different tasks. Lions can distinguish different states than we can – they can see
better at night, for example. There is a difference in the signals used and available - a lion can
roar and we cannot. We can say “Hello, how are you?” in English and a lion cannot. How a lion
learns to signal and how adaptive it is in its signaling behavior likely differs from us. And then,
we just care about different things. Lions don’t seem to care about the Yankees winning over the
Mets, but they do seem to care quite a bit about what water buffalo are up to. There is so much
more. There is likely some overlap between us and the lion of course – in our preferences, what
we can do, see, signal. But although the lion lives in literally the same world, on Earth, just as
we do, I can see that perhaps there is a way, given everything mentioned above, in which its
“world” likely is different than ours and its language plays a significant role in that. And yet,
notice that even before communicating with others, a lion would still have different actions it can
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More on the idea of accuracy in Chapters 3 and 4.
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perform and states it can possibly distinguish – this is true of a lion that has never communicated
with anyone. So, it seems language (at least, of a public sort) might not be all there is to the idea.
Still, even if we seem to live, in a way, in different worlds, if a lion could speak, could we
understand it? I think if it’s fair to interpret things the way I have, then, no, unfortunately,
probably we cannot say that if a lion could speak, we really could understand it, at least, not
fully. As I said, I think there is likely some overlap but also some incommensurability. We
could not fully understand the lion in the wild as another lion living the same life, playing the
same game could, constrained by roughly the same dispositions, and using the same signaling
system. But this is not so limiting. We can still observe from a sort of bird’s-eye view the
system being used by the lions - just as field biologists do - and we can understand to some
extent, in a different sort of way, from the outside, what is going on. This might be similar to a
knowing how vs. knowing that distinction (Stanley 2011). The lions know how to use the
signaling game, how to appropriately respond, and they can physically do it. We can know (or
more precisely: believe with a high probability) that the lions respond this way and that to such
and such circumstances and that their signals carry such and such information or play such and
such a communicative role in their lives, but we cannot engage in their signaling games in the
wild ourselves – we just aren’t the right kind of beings, the right senders and receivers for that
game. We aren’t lions. If we did, however, get our hands dirty and engage in some sort of
signaling game with the lions – as I do with my family’s cat when I open the kitchen door for
him after he meows outside it; or with my horse when I tap my foot on his side to get him to go
right - then we could, within this new, very limited signaling system that we’ve just developed,
actually understand a lion in a much fuller way when it speaks. But notice this would still be a
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different system from the one that lions have developed on their own in the wild. Lions on the
African savanna typically aren’t trying to get people to open doors for them.
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Chapter 2. Communication Between Groups
2.1 From Russia With Love
People often talk about groups, in particular about groups communicating with other groups or
other individuals. A recent article in Time magazine, for example, talks about Russia “signaling”
its interest in joining NATO (Roache, 2019). In a 2014 article from CNN titled “Analysis: U.S.
and Russia Playing Chess or Blood Sport?” we get the following description of events:
Frustrated with Moscow's failure to enact any compromises from the Syrian
regime at U.S.-Russian sponsored peace talks in Geneva, the United States has
now signaled [emphasis added] it is examining its policy options in Syria, where
the bombing by al-Assad's forces against civilians has intensified. (Labott, 2014,
para. 16)
An article in The Guardian reads simply: “Stock markets in Asia fell heavily after China
signalled [emphasis added] it would retaliate against US tariffs.” (Monaghan & Farrer,
2018, para. 1)
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This sort of talk is also common in academic, history, and policy texts. An essay in the
journal Comparative Strategy has the following passage:
While the first round of the six-party talks in August 2003 allowed some
breathing space in an increasingly tense situation, North Korea
signaled [emphasis added] its determination to ratchet the pressure up further by
announcing in early October that it was using plutonium… (Ayson & Taylor,
2004, p. 268)
What are we to make of this sort of talk? Should it be taken literally, even sometimes - can and
do groups such as nation-states really issue and receive messages? Or is there perhaps some
better way to describe such situations – say, as just cases of using shorthand or loose talk?
Nations, however, are arguably not the only groups out there that people talk about
communicating or doing things that involve signs and meaning. What are we to make of things
such as musical groups or bands? Songs are often attributed to the whole group. For a minimal
case of a group, involving just two individuals, think about co-authoring a paper – is there one
joint author here or are there two separate ones? And yet, humans plausibly aren’t the only
animals that form groups either. Might it ever make sense to say that a group of animals, say, a
wolf pack, is trying to communicate something?

2.2 Three Debunking Views
As I said, one might wonder if talk about groups communicating is better understood in some
way other than literally. Some might think this is likely the simplest explanation for what is
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going on. I think that in many cases this will be right. But are there really no cases where a
group might reasonably be considered a sender or receiver in its own right? To follow up on this
idea, let’s consider three possible “debunking” explanations for talk about group communication.
These three views are adapted from a parallel argument by Irish philosopher Phillip Pettit (2014)
regarding the possibility of group agents generally.

2.2.1 Metaphor
The first view I’ll consider is that talk of group communication is just metaphor and not a way of
talking that should be taken literally. The idea is that when I say something like “Russia sent a
message to Syria”, I’m really saying something as abstract and not to be taken literally as when I
say something such as “Russia just delivered a slap to the face of the US”. It’s a way of talking
that’s helpful for getting an idea across. But whereas with expressions in science – for example,
in biology: “Black bears hibernate in winter” or in physics: “Cesium has an atomic number of 55
and boils at 28.5 °C” – where we take the objects, properties, forces, and actions posited by our
best theories to exist and really be out there, on this view, in the case of expressions such as
“Russia sent a message to Syria” – where this would mean positing that Russia and Syria are
senders and receivers and Russia can actually send messages - we do not.48 This isn’t to say that
on this view Russia and Syria aren’t real. Just that Russia and Syria aren’t really group senders
or receivers and cannot actually send and receive messages. On this view, what explains some
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Of course, there are scientists and philosophers who do not take a realist view of scientific claims or who do take a
realist sort of view but one of a very particular kind. My subtle take on this issue should become somewhat clear
throughout the book. Though, I will be more explicit about my take this issue later on in the final chapter.
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purported case of group communication involving something like Russia and Syria would have
to be something else.
Why hold such a view? One reason might be that it’s thought the material out of which
group senders and receivers must be constructed - humans or other organisms standing in various
relations to each other - is just not suitable for realizing something capable of functioning as a
real sender or receiver. Perhaps because it’s thought that signaling behavior requires being a
living being, a biological entity or individual – such as a dog or a horse - not just something
made up of living entities in the way that a software company or Syria is.
What is being said is basically this: (1) Only biological entities/living things can be
senders or receivers, (2) group agents are not biological entities/living things. Therefore, there
are no cases of group communication.
To the first premise, I say that it is not true that the sender-receiver model requires
senders and receivers be living things – at least, not obviously. Nowhere have I seen it written or
argued convincingly in the literature that this is required, and other options at least seem possible
within the logical constraints of the framework. The thing to remember is that the senderreceiver model is simply a formal model. Anything can be a sender or receiver as long as it
meets the basic requirements of the model, of being able to perform acts, observe states of the
world, send or receive signals, and revise its patterns of sending or receiving by some process of
feedback and selection. Senders and receivers must have interests in some sense - that’s true.
They must “prefer” some outcomes to others. But interest here don’t have to be understood in
the strong sense of biological interest. A robot, for example, that has certain interests
programmed into it and that revises its signaling behavior by reinforcement learning would still
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count as a sender or receiver on the basic view. Biology is just one possible realizer among
many of the model’s formal properties.
Could it be, however, that the constraints of the model happen to entail that the only
things able to meet those constraints are things that also meet the conditions for life? I’ll admit
this scenario seems hazily possible. It seems, though, that we would have to have a good agreed
upon definition of life to give the idea a proper looking at, and at the moment, we don’t seem to
have such a theory.49 Moreover, if robot cases like the one I mentioned just a moment ago fit the
model, then unless we want to start revisiting our definition of what it is to be a living thing, I
think we should consider the idea that being a sender or receiver requires being a biological
entity, a living thing, suspect.
Of course, others might push the other way. Some might say, well, no, it is still true that
being a living being is a requirement; it is just that the analyses of the cases I provide later on in
this chapter and my understanding of the robot cases are wrong. In this case, I am open to
criticism and interested in hearing it. Others still might accept some of my cases yet continue to
argue that being a living thing is a requirement, accepting that life extends to some of these cases
too. That is an interesting option but one in need of more looking into. Another option is to take
a stance to the scientific notion of life that is somewhat deflationary, perhaps similar to the view
expressed in Chapter 1 regarding things like meaning. In this case, this particular debate about
whether a sender or receiver must be a biological entity and whether groups or other agents are
living things might become a moot point.

49

See Bruce Weber’s article in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy titled “Life” (2011), for a good
introduction to the topic.

78

My way of handling this is to say that if it turns out that something must be a living thing
to be a sender or receiver or that some group counts as a living biological entity in their own
right, that’s very interesting news! However, I don’t think I need to answer this question about
life here to make my larger point. If it turns out that the cases of group communication I’m
going to look at later in this chapter fit the sender-receiver model and yet the groups involved
don’t seem to be living things by first glance or common use of the term, then so be it – they are
still senders or receivers according to the model. As I said, one option might be to revise our
understanding of what counts as a living thing. But there are other options.

2.2.2 Hobbes
Another possible debunking view is that talk about group communication is really just talk about
group leaders. The basis for this sort of view can be found in English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes’s (1588- 1679) book Leviathan (1651). There, Hobbes argues against the idea that group
agents are as real as the individuals that comprise them. The group mind and the group voice, as
he sees it, are wholly parasitic on the voice and mind of the group’s leader. Going forward, I’ll
call this the sovereign view of group communication.
Hobbes’s reason for preferring this view is fairly simple. He first points out that every
person speaks for himself or herself in the sense of expressing his or her beliefs and intentions
and in the making of promises. Indeed, for Hobbes, this is what it is to be a person – to represent
or ‘personate’ one’s self to others. He then goes on to argue that in some sense group agents do
the same thing, using instead a leader to decide and speak for the group, and with the expectation
that the other members will act in accordance with what the leader says.

79

In the case of group senders and receivers, for a sort of sovereign view to be right, it must
apply to both cases of groups led by one individual or groups led by multiple individuals, a
committee for example, whether that committee is composed of some members of the group or
all members. In the first case, however, the case of groups led by one leader, it seems more
appropriate to describe things differently than to say that what we have are true groups. Rather
than group agents, we can talk of individual agents (the leaders) whose reach and power have
been extended and amplified by the other members of the “group”. In this case, what the leader
says goes, and the people follow his or her commands. An extreme case would be zombies or
enslaved people following the orders of a master. This will probably come in degrees in most
cases, with some people more inclined to go along or more resistant than others. At the other
end of the spectrum there might be a leader elected by a group for a time and whose behavior is
still very responsive to the group’s preferences.
Now let’s look at the case of groups led by committees – for example, university
departments, some companies, and some countries. Is the situation similar? There are a few
things we need to put on the table here before we can settle this question. First, when Hobbes
talked of committees, he talked of committees the voice of which was determined by majority
vote. Pettit (2014) gives an argument against the view that a group led by such a committee
could count as an agent. The argument applies to senders and receivers as well.
According to Pettit, to count as an agent, one must satisfy basic rational constraints such
as consistency. To some this is a common sense requirement, to others a controversial one. I go
with Pettit on agreeing that agents should satisfy a constraint of consistency to some extent but
acknowledge that this might have to allow of degrees given that many of us do in fact seem to
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sometimes hold inconsistent beliefs. In any case, a sender who doesn’t keep their beliefs
consistent could end up sending contradictory signals (for example, if I believe both that I see a
tiger and that I don’t’ see a tiger, I might send signals saying “I see a tiger” and “I don’t see a
tiger”). A receiver who doesn’t keep their beliefs consistent could be led to behavioral
stalemates, to attempting to perform mutually incompatible actions at once (for example, if I
believe there is a tiger and not a tiger, I might try to both run away and not run away). Do this
enough, and signaling will not get off the ground or be maintained. The problem with majority
voting is that even if each member of the group holds perfectly consistent beliefs, their
majoritarian voice might still endorse inconsistent signaling behaviors, again the sending of
contradictory signals or the performance of incompatible actions.
Take for example the discursive dilemma due to Pettit and his colleague British
philosopher Christian List (List, 2006; Pettit, 2001). Suppose that three people – A, B, and C decide to form a group, and to commit themselves to the results of majority voting. Now
suppose that at some point they must vote on three logically connected issues: say, whether p,
whether q, and whether p&q. As List and Pettit point out, in any case like this, perfectly
consistent individuals might end up voting in such a way that the group ends up committed to an
inconsistent – and so, irrational – set of propositions. So, for example, take the case where A and
B vote for p and C for ~p; B and C vote for q and A for ~q; and so, B votes for p&q and A and C
for not(p&q). This has the result that the group endorses the inconsistent set of propositions p, q,
and not(p&q). The group is then faced with a dilemma: go with majority opinion, and in effect
break the constraint of consistency and act in a way that brings the group farther away from
behaving like an ideal agent; or choose to remain closer to the ideal of an agent, and find some
way to endorse a consistent set, say, p, q, and p&q, rejecting decision by majority opinion.
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One way to continue acting as a group agent would be to adopt the so-called “straw-vote”
procedure (List and Pettit 2011), which prescribes the following steps:
-

Take a majority vote on each issue as it comes up;

-

Check whether there is an inconsistency with any existing view;

-

If there is not, endorse the vote; and

-

If there is, isolate the minimal inconsistent set and

-

Decide as a group on which proposition to reject.

Must a group adopt the straw-vote procedure in order to count as acting as an agent (or a sender
or receiver)? No. Plenty of other procedures work too. The requirement of a procedure is
simply that it not force the group to aggregate proposition-wise on their individual judgments,
which, as we’ve seen (thanks to the discursive dilemma), can lead them to hold and stand by
inconsistent beliefs. In any case, let us suppose that a group were to adopt this new strategy for
determining the voice of that group. Would this continue to support the view that talk about
groups is really talk about leaders? No. This is because whereas in the case of a group
represented by an individual (especially the extreme cases), an existing voice is being co-opted
by members or forced upon members in order to provide them with direction as a group; in the
case of a committee that operates by the straw-vote procedure, the direction is reversed: the
members construct a voice because they satisfy the conditions of group agency. Of course, a
bunch of people could co-opt or be picked up by a committee. In that case, you’d have a sort of
mix of group agent and hangers on. But either way, the leader view – which might be an
accurate description of things on the ground in some cases – need not be what’s going on in all
cases.
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2.2.3 Shorthand
The final debunking explanation I’ll consider is that talk about group communication is best
thought of as a sort of pragmatic shorthand for the more complicated goings on at the level of
individuals. Why prefer this view? One reason perhaps is the thought that the only reason we
talk about group agents is that it’s more convenient to do so than to get caught up in the intricate
details. In other words, that our using the language of group agents is more proof of linguistic
laziness or our limited ability to reason about all the fine details or talk about them efficiently
than it is that group agents exist, or that groups send and receive signals.
Similar thoughts have been expressed about the goings on at the human level. Individual
humans are composed of cells, in turn composed of molecules, in turn composed of atoms, and
so on. Isn’t talk of humans sending and receiving signals, then, really just shorthand for talk
about the movement of these smaller parts going on at these more fine-grained levels? It’s not.
Why?
I think the simple answer is that sending and receiving behavior cannot be reduced in the
classic philosopher’s sense to things like the movement of the atoms or what is going on at one
of these lower levels. In the human case, if you look lower – at neurons or others cells or atoms then you miss why the signaling behavior came about at the higher level of the individual
human. If there was an all-knowing being who could see how, say, every atom was arranged and
where it would go next or every neuron fired and how it would fire next, then this being could
see why a certain signaling behavior was performed, that is, they could see, given how the atoms
of the world were arranged before or how the neurons fired, why at that time those atoms moved
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in such and such ways or into such and such place or why such and such neurons behaved in
such and such ways. But when I say they could “see why” those atoms moved in that way or
those neurons fired, what I mean is that they understand it from the point of view of the level of
atoms and fundamental physics or neurons and neuroscience. What they don’t understand is
why that signaling behavior came about from the point of view of the level of the sender-receiver
model, from the level of reinforcement learning, intentions, copying, or natural selection. That
cannot be seen at the level of things like atoms or neurons – despite what a radical reductionist or
perhaps an eliminativist such as American philosophers Paul or Patricia Churchland might
hope.50 This is another argument along the lines of American philosopher and cognitive scientist
Daniel Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance. Sending and receiving at the individual level
involves real patterns, patterns explained only by looking at things from the level of the
intentional stance, that is, by treating senders and receivers as senders and receivers, as agents
who represent the world and whose representational behavior is determined by things like
reinforcement learning, copying, intentions, and natural selection, real patters that are missed and
that cannot be adequately explained when we look at the world purely from the standpoint of
what is posited by fundamental physics or neuroscience.
Now take the case of groups. Why think a similar moral applies? Consider a simple
group sender or receiver from earlier, one that uses the straw-vote procedure. The straw-vote
procedure is a non-mechanical process. This means that simply knowing how each individual
member of the group voted, or even how the majority of members voted, will not let us pin down
the resulting behavior at the level of the group. The same way individuals vote may lead at some
other time to different rules being realized, and the same rule might be realized by different ways
50

For an introduction to eliminative materialism, see P. S. Churchland (1986) and P. M. Churchland (1988).
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the individuals vote. Even the majority voting against some proposition at the individual level
might result in that proposition being endorsed at the level of the group. To understand the
group’s behavior, then it’s better to look at it as an agent, one that tries to maintain consistent
beliefs and actions and whose signaling behavior is influenced by the consequences of the
signaling behavior it’s engaged in. Why does the group respond with action A when it receives
signal S? Because in the past when signal S has been received and the group performed action A
it had a good result for the group as a whole and that behavior was reinforced. Or if that
behavior has not been reinforced or has even been negatively reinforced, it was performed
because the action helps the group maintain its representational and behavioral consistency,
helps it not act in a contradictory way, which is presumably a success enhancing quality – recall
our discussion earlier about groups finding some way to endorse a consistent set, say, p, q, and
p&q rather than the inconsistent set p, q, and not(p&q).51
One might still, however, worry about my analysis of the straw-vote group agent case for
another reason. Suppose that we could see how every member voted and we knew that they used
the straw-vote procedure to settle inconsistencies. Now it would seem that maybe we could
understand why the group sender behaved the way it did simply by looking at the lower level
plus the straw-vote decision procedure – that is, by looking at things from a sort of middle or

51

Suppose we have a case of majority rule. Won’t the signal just be determined by what the majority votes for?
Won’t sending and receiving behavior of the “group” really just be reducible to the sending and receiving behavior
of the individual members? I think it will, because all one needs to do in that case is look at the behavior of the
individual members to predict what will happen – there’s no need to understand how things work at the higher level,
how things like reinforcement learning or natural selection influence that behavior at the group level, only at the
individual level. I think this gives even more reason to think that the simple majority rule case is not a good
example of a group sender or receiver. As I’ll explain in more detail in the next section, however, I also see this
status – group agent status - as coming in degrees. So, I wouldn’t want to say it’s a completely non-group case - just
one somewhere to the left of a paradigm group agent if we were to put it on a sliding scale ranging from non-group
agents to paradigm group agents.
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intermediary level.52 Should this worry us when it comes to considering certain groups agents in
their own right? I think not. Consider that each of us as individuals follows some sort of
decision procedure in our own lives - sometimes more consciously or reflectively, sometimes
not. Perhaps in some cases, that decision procedure has been selected for by some sort of
reinforcement learning or by natural selection and we aren’t very aware of it; perhaps sometimes
we consciously decide to follow one. Does this make us something other than actual agents? As
something other than worthy of the intentional stance? It does not. We don’t say, “Daniel isn’t
an agent because from a step back we can see that he implements decision procedure X and his
implementing that is a result of his parts in some way bringing that about, “agreeing” to it, or
settling on it, consciously or not”. We don’t. And the same moral, I think, applies to groups. In
fact, I think that in some groups - say, very early human groups, one-off groups, or groups where
there is some impediment to straight forward communication through language – the decision
procedure will have been adopted in a less explicit way, through some sort of back and forth,
whether that be some form of reinforcement learning, copying, or natural selection. If there isn’t
a problem with this in the human case, it’s hard to see why there should be one at the group
level.53
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A worry along these lines is also brought up by Roth (2017)
I think another reason to reject this way of looking at things, of looking at the votes plus the decision procedure, is
that we can keep pushing and end up in a regress. For example, one might worry, “How did the group come to settle
on the straw-vote? Did they use a straw-vote procedure to take a vote on using the straw-vote procedure? And then
what of that procedure?” But then notice that the same sort of question can be asked of Daniel: “Well, Daniel uses
decision procedure X, how did he get to settling on that? Did he use decision procedure Y? And then how did he
settle on Y? Did he use Z?” And so on. A worry somewhat like this is pointed out by Resnik (1987).
53
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2.3 Real-world Cases
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the state – as in a nation-state - is often thought of or
talked about as a group engaging in communicative behavior. This isn’t an uncommon view, nor
is it unmotivated. The state is an entity that deals across changes of government with its own
members and other states. In international politics, states are routinely held to expectations of
consistency in legal and other forums (McLean, 2003). And, as a matter of fact, in international
relations theory there is a whole research tradition – the “realist” tradition – based on modeling
states as agents (Waltz, 1979), which was instrumental in devising political and military
strategies during the Cold War.
So, is there a good example of signaling in the case of states? Are there in fact real-world
examples of group communication in this area? I think there are some cases worth looking at.
Some will turn out to count as instances of group communication, some not. Due to their
complexity and the amount of space it takes to properly examine them, I’ll only discuss a few
here. Why look at cases that end up not counting as group communication? I look at a couple of
these simply because they are cases that are often talked about as instances of group
communication in everyday talk and more conversation and because they are such interesting
and seemingly conspicuous examples.
The first case I’ll look at is that of declaring war. In the United States, officially, it is the
Congress, acting as a committee similar to the sort discussed earlier, that makes the decision to
go to war – the responsibility has been offloaded onto them. Here, interests are “tied together”.
What is decided by the state is decided by the representatives, who are in turn chosen by and
sensitive to the preferences of voters. One might worry that the procedure is fairly mechanical.
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But again, as with the straw vote case, the same way individuals vote may lead at some other
time to a declaration being made or not, and a declaration being made or not might be realized by
different ways the individuals vote. In the case of ties, the Vice-president even has the power to
break the stalemate. Feedback occurs in a sort of trickle up way. Leaders (the president and
Congress) are sensitive to voters. At the most basic level, if the consequence of sending the
signal is bad, voters might not re-elect the leaders. If the consequence is good, they might reelect them and so reinforce that way of communicating.
Perhaps a distinction should be made here. There’s a difference between the formal
process involved in deciding to go to war and the way that decision is conveyed to receivers.
Which of these is the signal? I don’t want to say that the performance of the formal decisionmaking process (the act of voting in Congress) is the signal in the case of states for the same
reasons I don’t want to say that the performance of the internal decision-making process
resulting in my deciding to fight or not fight someone (the goings on in my brain) is a signal –
these might offer us some natural sign like information, but there is no conventionality here, no
back and forth. This is just a case of looking at the inner workings of the machine and using the
information gathered from that to then perform some action. Looking at the process that
produces the signal rather than the signal produced.
But let’s go back to the traditional sense of a declaration of war, how receiver-states learn
that a sender-state is going to engage in violent action. This I take to be an obvious candidate for
a potential signal, though apparently one where the purpose is to coordinate acts-with-acts. The
sender-state is telling the aggressor-state that it is preparing for and going to war, and eventually
going to attack or defend using violence – it is not just telling them how some external state of
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the world is. Of course, not all wars come with declarations, but many do. And in the past,
declarations of war came in many forms - the form of formal documents or letters, sometimes
telegraphs, and even public speeches. That there is a variety of ways declarations have been
made in the past, tells us already that there is a degree of conventionality here. If states really
wanted to, they could even declare war simply by sending a certain playing card, say, the ace of
spades, in the mail to the head of state of a receiver-state.
At this point, one might reasonably ask “But why make declarations of war?” This needs
to be answered – there needs to be a reason for sending a signal and maintaining a convention.
One suggestion is that abiding by this convention brings about a sort of mutually beneficial
stability. Without it, it’s extremely difficult to tell when another group is going to attack. This
would mean that states would need to be on high alert at all times, arguably expending more
resources on defense that instead could be saved or directed to other issues or programs in need
of attention.54 With the declaration convention in place, however, resources can be dedicated
elsewhere – to the construction of roads and schools – and troops can be put on reserve. Of
course, this does not mean that it won’t sometimes be beneficial for a state to break the
convention in the form of a sneak attack. But if sneak attacks become too common, the
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Someone might say, “Well, the US does this already even though no one has declared war on them since 1941” –
that is, dedicate a significant amount of resources to the military that might be saved or directed elsewhere. My
response is that this is true but my point is that if the convention weren’t in place, then the US would be, and would
have been, dedicating even more resources to defense.
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convention will break down, eventually making even the benefits from occasional sneak attacks
unavailable.55 56
Another suggestion some have made for the purpose of declaring war is that doing so was
in line with principles of chivalry. 18th century Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek (16731743) writes "nations and princes endowed with some pride are not generally willing to wage
war without a previous declaration, for they wish by an open attack to render victory more
honourable and glorious." (Bynkershoek, 1737/1930, Bk. 1, Ch. 2, p. 8). This sort of thing was
written about even in ancient Greece and Rome. Ancient Greek historian and general
Thucydides writes in his History of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE) that when Plataea was
attacked by Thebes by surprise that the Plataeans considered it “impious” (Bk. 2, v). Roman
statesman Cicero writes in his De Officiis, “No war is just unless… it has been formally
announced and declared beforehand.” (44 BCE/1887, Book 1, para. 11). This seems somewhat
plausible as at least maybe a partial explanation for some cases, and it seems it would fit the
sender-receiver model too. If those who send a warning before an attack are subsequently more,
say, highly esteemed by other nations, and so, treated better by other nations or more likely to be
helped by them, then there is an incentive for that kind of sending behavior to get off the ground
(never mind why that sort of behavior is esteemed in the first place – perhaps it’s more
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This at least appeared to be the convention for a while (especially around the WWI-WWII timeframe). Evidence
for this would be the historical regular use of declarations around this time. Other evidence includes the agreements
at the Second Hague Convention (III) of 1907. Of course, since the Korean War, how “wars” (if we can call them
those rather than “policing actions” or “military operations”) have been conducted has radically changed.
56
Someone might reply: but there are also ways of detecting threat in the absence of a declaration of war – e.g. when
troops are being amassed on your border. To this, I say this is also true. However, I think it is plausible there are
cases where the benefit of having a declaration convention might outweigh the strategy of simply relying on
detection. For example, in some cases, detection might not be possible until now what you are dealing with is
basically just a sneak attack, or detection might be unreliable, or unavailable. In other cases, it might be that
detection can’t rule out well enough whether another country is actually intending to attack – in which case, acting
without having received a declaration of war, might result in attacking a country that actually had no intention of
violent action.
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impressive to win with warning than with a sneak attack, or perhaps doing so is more in line with
one’s values. Other options are possible.) But then if this account is right, this warning signal
has a sort of dual purpose, to warn opponents and to signal something like chivalry (or what it
entails) to others.
That’s enough of the possible functions of declarations of war. Are there any cases of
actual declarations of war that fit the model? In the case of the United States, the US has only
formally declared war eleven times – although, it has obviously engaged in many more major
armed conflicts than that. Perhaps the most famous declaration of war is the declaration of war
on Japan (and other Axis nations) during the Second World War. Although President Roosevelt
asked Congress to declare war on Japan in his famous Infamy Speech, the actual call for war was
only formalized after Congress voted to declare it, and there was in fact one dissenting vote.57
But the case is not perfect. We all know too well that the American political process then, as it is
now, was influenced by outside forces it wasn’t supposed to be influenced by - by corporate and
foreign interests, for example - not just by the people. The voting system in America then was
also far from equal and accessible to all - whereas today it is arguably better, although still not
ideal. In any case, back then there was, like today, gerrymandering and pay-for-play politics;
they also had Jim Crow laws in effect, disenfranchising people of color from the political
process; most Native Americans could still not vote; citizens in territories didn’t have the right to
vote or to representation; and the voting age then hadn’t yet been lowered to 18.58 On this kind
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The sole dissenting vote was cast by Montana Representative Jeannette Pickering Rankin, the first woman elected
to the U.S. House of Representatives and an ardent pacifist.
58
Racial disenfranchisement in the political process still exists today in various forms but an explicit prohibition on
racial discrimination in voting was put on place by Congress with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 – (though, see
discussions of Section 5 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder. The VRA also ensured the
right to vote to Native Americans. The age limit on voting wouldn’t be lowered until the passage of the Twentysixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1971.
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of set-up, the shape America takes as a group is more like that of a not quite democratically
elected committee of some members of the group leading or dragging along the other members,
and one where the democratic nature of that committee is itself to some extent compromised by
how it was formed and by how the decisions of members are improperly influenced. On the
receiver side of the WWII case, Japan doesn’t fare much better as a group. Given the way the
Japanese government was set up at the time – as a one-party totalitarian military dictatorship
under Emperor Hirohito – the case seems much closer to the sovereign version of a group setup.
A similar story, it seems, would apply to another party the US declared war on in 1941: Germany
under the rule of Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s word, then was the final world. But in addition to all
this, the US’s declarations on Japan and Germany were in response to those two countries having
declared war on (and in the former’s case, attacked) the US already. So, the US’s declaration in
that case was really more of a response, a sort of acknowledgement that they would act in kind
rather than surrender or try to negotiate some other solution. Either way, what we have here – in
the case of the US - does seem to be to some extent an example of a group signal, from a group
sender, albeit definitely not a clean and perfect paradigm example. It also seems to be a signal
sent to collective entities – Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – who, however, do not appear to
meet the requirements of being group communicators.
Is there a case involving the US where the receiver side is closer to our notion of a group
than to the sovereign version? It’s hard to tell. In the war of 1812, for example, the US fought
not only Britain but also the Native American tribes with whom Britain was allied. Some of
these tribes were organized into a confederacy under the Shawnee warrior chief Tecumseh
(1768-1813). The confederacy worked through a system of representatives from the various
tribal villages. This system seems closer to our version of a group than the Imperial Japanese or
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Nazi Germany cases do, but it’s still not perfect. It’s not clear in every instance how the various
representatives were chosen by the disparate tribes and subgroups, how they settled their votes,
what influences there might have been. Tecumseh seems to have had a lot of latitude and sway
in the confederacy and been the leader, so how democratic the confederacy was at that level is
questionable too. Tecumseh even appears to have gotten some of the tribes in his confederacy to
back him at least partly through threats of violence.59
Other tribes allied with Britain and not a part of Tecumseh’s Confederacy had their own
unique political structures, some closer to the sovereign version of a group, some not. A council
of chiefs, for example, led the Sauk people. In that council, a number of members were chosen
based on their skills or talents, but the civil chiefs – those who were looked to for guidance on
political concerns - were chosen through heredity. This seems to be an example of a sort of mix,
an in between group case.
The 1812 case is further muddied by the formal text of the US’s declaration of war for
the War of 1812, which doesn’t explicitly mention the Native American tribes:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That war be and is hereby declared to exist
between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies
thereof... (Act of June 18, 1812, Ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755)
This makes it unclear whether the tribes count as one of the parties the US declared war against
with that particular signal, especially since the US had already been fighting with Tecumseh and
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See, for example, Tecumseh’s “Speech to Governor Harrison, 20 August 1810” [Manuscript]. Indiana Historical
Society. https://images.indianahistory.org/digital/collection/dc007/id/19/
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his warriors for some time. Another plausible explanation for the wording of the declaration is
that the United States government at the time simply regarded the tribes involved as subordinate
to the British in some way and not really the primary party they were dealing with in this
conflict.60
Let’s take a look at Britain then. Here the candidate is not perfect either. During this
time, the United Kingdom was a peculiar political entity with partly constitutional rule and partly
Royal direction. Parliament’s composition was partly determined by hereditary right. Universal
suffrage was still decades away, and in act only a small percentage of land-owning men could
vote in any manner. Declarations of war, under this system, were formally the right of the
monarch, not the people or Parliament. The case seems, although perhaps not as far toward a
sovereign group as Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany, closer to a sovereign one than a paradigm
group example.
Other cases are similar. Consider the declaration of war by the US against the United
States of Mexico, igniting the Mexican-American War (1846-48). Mexico was, according to the
Constitution of 1824, a federal republic. And yet, the political situation in Mexico at the time of
the war was extremely unstable – there were four presidents in 1846 alone. So, whether it’s safe
to say that there was really a unified and consistent receiver is difficult. In both these cases, too
the United States’ status as a paradigm democracy was worse off than in the WWII example.
Consider that both the War of 1812 case and the Mexican-American War case take place before
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How the Americans and British regarded the various Native American tribes involved in the conflict is a rather
interesting and complicated issue. For example, John Quincy Adams argued against including the various tribes in
the peace treaty process and even seems to have argued for US sovereignty over them. See Hatter (2017), for a good
overview.
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women had the right to vote in the US, before white men without land or people of color
(including Native Americans) could vote, and that during this time slavery was still legal.
As I said, the US has engaged in armed conflict with other political entities, but these
other cases have not involved official declarations of war. The American Civil War is an
example, where the Confederacy was instead considered a “belligerent power”. This denied the
Confederacy recognition as a sovereign state but allowed the US to consider the Confederates
insurrectionists against the US government and to engage the Confederates within the rules of
war at the time anyway (Finkelman, 1992).
The American Indian Wars - the conflicts with the Apache, Iroquois, and other
indigenous tribes – aren’t considered official wars by the United States government either.
So, is there an example of a declaration of war by one group against another in the sense
that we’re interested in here? In the case of the US, as we have seen, there does not seem to be
an excellent, paradigm example of a formal or official declaration. Some cases are somewhat
closer than others, but nothing is perfect. Unfortunately, I am unable to find any good historical
accounts outside the American context that get close to fitting the model either.
I take another conspicuous possible example of signaling between states to be the public
condemnation by one state of another state’s actions, for example, the US publicly condemning
Russia over Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine. First, again, what plays the role here of the
signal is conventional. It could be done by open letter, by public speech, etc. What does the
signal stand for or what is its purpose? Why condemn the actions of another country? One
possibility seems to be that it allows the sender-country to express its preferences, to say that it
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would prefer the aggressor state discontinued or not repeat whatever it’s doing or has done.
However, it might also serve to express a warning. It might say in effect, “If you don’t shape up,
we might do something about it”, at the same time leaving room for the sender to avoid direct
conflict. The signal is in a sense cooperative, just as it appears the rattle of the rattlesnake might
be cooperative.61 The rattlesnake wants to warn the predator and avoid taking direct action –
biting and envenoming – if it doesn’t have to. The rattlesnake would prefer the predator leave
than the rattlesnake having to waste its energy and venom. The predator, on the other hand,
would rather be warned and avoid the wrath of the rattlesnake than have the rattlesnake skip the
warning and attack right away. Just as a coyote might notice that a rattlesnake always attacks
after it has rattled and the coyote continued to bug it, a receiver-state might notice that a senderstate always or usually acts a certain way after sending one of these public condemnations, and
so then use that information to guide its actions. Likewise, a sender-state might notice this
pattern, and so send that signal each time it wants that sort of reaction.
In many cases like these, I think what we have won’t simply be reducible to the group
leader model, the sovereign model. Suppose it’s 2010 and Obama is the one talking on the
phone to Putin and making the final decisions. It’s not like what we have is a paradigm
sovereign zombies or enslaved persons case. Obama was elected by the people to serve as their
representative, their decision-maker and voice, in such situations. Although, having Congress
make the decisions and send the message instead of Obama in this scenario would bring us closer
to a paradigm case of a group sender, this case is still at least somewhere between a group sender
case and a paradigm sovereign case. It gets a little farther away from the group case (and a little
bit closer to the sovereign case), of course, however, when we think about how imperfect
61
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political representation currently is in the United States.62 On the Russian side, Putin was even
less democratically appointed than Obama. To say that the Russian case provides a good
example of a group receiver seems less fair. Perhaps one could make a case that the Russian
people not rising up against Putin counts as some form of consent to his serving as their
representative and voice, but if this is true, it is surely one of the lowest levels of consent, putting
the case very close to that of a sovereign situation. Suffice to say, neither group – the US nor
Russia – is a paradigm group agent. Both groups are to the right of the ideal group case and to
the left of the paradigm sovereign case, the US arguably being a bit farther left on the spectrum
than Russia.63

Group Agent
Total democracy

Hobbes
US

Russia

Nazi Germany

Figure 2.1. The group agent-Hobbesian agent spectrum of group signaling.64

I’d like to take a second here now to address a finer detail. Someone might ask: why fix on
democracy as the mark of group agency? For example, why not focus on shared beliefs and
values? Why can’t Democrats and Catholics count as groups in my more technical sense of the
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Again, just consider how wide-spread pay-to-play politics, gerrymandering, and voter suppression are; the Section
5 issue of the Voting Rights Act; representation in territories; and so on.
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In the US case, it might be more accurate to think of the voice of the US as coming from different mouths of one
multi-mouthed creature at different times. Not only is the Congress empowered in certain situations to act as the
voice of the US, but in other situations so is the President, and maybe in further situations others still. For example,
the Congress might function as the appropriate elected decision-maker and mouth for the US when it comes to
declaring war, but it was FDR who made the decisions and acted as the mouth of the US when meeting with
Churchill or other leaders to discuss certain war plans. This would put the US on a different place on the spectrum
than if it were a group using just one of these strategies for making decisions and communicating – for example, if
the US had only an elected president and no elected Congress to make official decisions and communications.
64
Here, I’m taking a group that functions by total democracy – that is, a group where every member is engaged and
votes rather than just a committee made up of some members – and that decides inconsistencies in a non-mechanical
way, as a paradigm group.
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term? Why doesn’t something like Catholics signaling disapproval of the Vatican council by
declining church attendance or donations count? I’ll make two remarks here. The first is that I
think cases like these – the Catholic case – don’t count because what is really happening is that
although the members share beliefs and values, they are not acting as a group. What is really
going on is that individuals with similar beliefs and values are acting on their own, making the
decision to attend or not on their own and all of them happening to make the individual choice at
roughly the same time results in something that, at a step back, looks like a coordinated group
behavior – that is, a large portion of them not attending or donating all at roughly the same time.
This could have been a group behavior, however, if instead of each Catholic making this choice
on their own in the privacy of their own homes, so to speak, without consultation of others, they
all got together and discussed this and voted on it before hand and that that – the group vote – is
why each of them ended up not attending or donating at roughly the same time. Then we do
have a group action in the sense I’m concerned with here. So, it’s not impossible for these cases
to be group actions, but I think many cases that appear to be group actions will, for the reasons I
just mentioned, end up not being so.
The second point I want to make is a more general one that I hinted at in a footnote
earlier. People who work on the topic of group agency often talk about “joint actions”.65 For
example, it’s thought that two people can work together to rescue someone, say, a drowning
child in an overturned raft, without having talked about it before hand and without any explicit
verbal agreement to do so and how to do so. They both just see the child drowning, rush out
there to help the child, and then during the process end up coordinating their behavior to do
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See, for example, Gilbert (1990), (2008); Searle (1990); Bratman (1987), (1992), (1993), (1997), (1997); Pettit
(2001), (2003), (2009), (2014); Pettit & Schweikard (2006); and Rachar (2018).
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things like get the child out from under the raft, drag the child out of the water together, and do
chest compressions while one does rescue breathing or goes for help. How does my analysis
handle cases such as these? My answer is this. As I’ve already suggested, I think group
behavior comes in degrees or on a sort of spectrum.66 I’m inclined to think that the straw-vote
style group is a paradigm case of a group agent. But notice that this paradigm can be altered in
many ways. Maybe some members vote for representatives who then vote in the straw-vote
session. Maybe some members choose not to vote in the straw-vote (or not vote for
representatives who do) but still go along with the outcomes. Maybe sometimes the group is led
by the straw-vote committee and sometimes in certain situations by a leader who was voted in.
Maybe the votes are influenced sometimes by outside sources (money, special interests). And
then consider, for lack of better words, less “explicit” or less “intentional” cases. For example,
consider the famous rowboat case written about by Scottish philosopher David Hume (17111776) in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740). There two rowers with the same
preferences and same goal of rowing forward eventually synchronize through reinforcement
learning of a sort to row together in a certain direction despite neither of them talking to each
other or explicitly agreeing on how and when to row before hand.67 There’s no voting or talking
in this sort of case and yet a group or joint action is being performed. It seems to me a lot of
group cases involve something like this, some sort of “implicit” agreement that comes about
through shared values and beliefs and some sort of back and forth (working as a replacement for
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This seems contrary to many accounts of joint action and group agency. Gilbert (1993, 1999), for example,
argues that agents engage in a sort of commitment, promise, or obligation that cannot be unilaterally abandoned.
My view would leave wiggle room here.
67
Christopher Kutz (2000) worries about what he calls “on the fly” cases of joint action, cases where there is no
prior planning; Gilbert’s account doesn’t seem to allow for these. I’m talking about roughly the same thing Kutz is
here, but my worry seems to be broader in scope, taking his “on the fly” cases as a subset of a broader category of
non-explicit or implicit joint actions. Kutz also appears to be wedded to the idea that intentions of a human sort
must be involved, whereas I am not.
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explicit voting).68 As suggested earlier, this, I think, can apply to the choice of decision
procedure being used too. And it seems like such an analysis might even be extended to animal
cases – which I’ll discuss later in this chapter. Even evolution through natural selection on a
larger time scale might provide the necessary implicit mechanism for joint behavior. On this
take, “groupness” and “joint action” come on at least two sorts of scales or spectrums, with some
case being more paradigm and some less, and some cases being brought about by more “explicit”
mechanisms and some by less explicit ones.
Most philosophers of action will probably disagree with this sort of analysis. Canadian
philosopher Matthew Rachar (personal communication, February 26, 2020), for example, takes
intentions to be key to the possibility of group behavior. This requirement – that intentions be
involved - is extremely common in the group agency and joint action literature, and the idea has
been defended in many different forms.69 Rachar in particular thinks that probably most animals
do not have the requisite intentions, and so he thinks that most apparent cases of animal groups
and joint action in animals will not really count in the sense being discussed in this chapter.
However, as Tollefsen (2014) points out, there are many cases of what prima facia appear to be
joint action in animals – consider the complex cooperative hunting techniques of Orcas,
cooperative hunting in lions and wolves, and the complex cooperative work of ants. There
seems to be no reason to rule these cases out as joint action aside from the apparent lack of
complex intentions in their subjects, and yet, to rule them out based on this seems to beg the
question about what’s important for joint action. In Chapter 1, on the other hand, I took a
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Bratman (2004, 2006) introduces a similar idea regarding the role of shared values in joint action. It’s also worth
noting that most accounts of joint action do not provide an explanation of how joint actions come about over time
and how agents keep track of their own actions and the joint action in order to follow through with the joint goal.
My account does this to some extent, suggesting that this occurs through a continuous back and forth.
69
See, for example, Gilbert 1989, 1996, 2003; Bratman 1993, 2004, 2006; Velleman 1997; Searle 1990, 1995.
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deflationary stance toward intentions, hence my position here. The result seems to be that my
disagreement with philosophers like Rachar is due to a difference in certain background
assumptions about intentions. Perhaps it’s worth noting that my view seems to allow for the
prima facia animal cases to fit in whereas Rachar’s and the views of other authors do not.
That’s it for the finer details. The cases of communication I’ve discussed so far involve
somewhat settled international conventions.70 How about more creative one-off incidents? A
case here might be found in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. We see this idea expressed in the
2000 film Thirteen Days by Robert McNamara’s character, who in response to a stubborn
general’s complaint about the American blockade of Cuba retorts, “This is not a blockade. This
is language. A new vocabulary, the likes of which the world has never seen!” What
McNamara’s character meant was that each move the parties made during the Crisis was taken to
mean something more than the action itself, to be sending a message to the other side. This was
because each party knew what possible moves were available to them and how they’d have to act
given certain ways the other player played. Kennedy’s team knew this and Khrushchev’s team
knew this and they both knew that they both knew this and so on. And so, Kennedy’s team
chose to set up the blockade not just for physical purposes but because it was one out of a set of
available moves, and they knew that choosing that move communicated to the Russians that the
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One might ask: are these really international conventions here or are these pronouncements just derivative of
ordinary expressions of disapproval or something similar? My response is that they might be derivative to some
extent, but I think that’s okay. It could be that a duly elected leader or a committee decides that sending particular
kind of a warning – what they will call a “sanction” – is a good idea in some case. That can be derivative if this idea
came from the idea of enacting a somewhat similar warning to another person (rather than a group). But once the
idea is transformed into one that can be applied to a group (say, a country), that has consequences at the group level,
and whose appropriate responses are at the group level, it becomes a signaling behavior that is either repeated and
stabilized or not at the group level, not at the level of just two people warning each other (unless you have two
sovereign or very near sovereign cases).
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US was trying to diffuse the situation rather than escalate – that from the point of view of the
Russians that would be the best explanation for the US acting that way.
Again, despite Kennedy and Khrushchev being center stage in this story, I don’t think the
case is reducible to just the group leader model, the sovereign model. Kennedy was the one
talking on the phone to Khrushchev and making the final decisions, but he was elected by the
people to serve as their representative and voice and he was sensitive to their preferences to some
extent. Again, as earlier, having the Congress serve as the voice in this situation would have
brought us closer to a paradigm case of a group sender, but the case is still somewhere between a
group sender case and a paradigm sovereign case as in the case with the sanctions. And, again, it
gets a little farther away from the ideal group case (and closer to the sovereign case), when we
take into account how problematic political representation was back then – President Kennedy
and the Congress of that time were elected before the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the
Twenty-sixth Amendment for example, among other issues. On the Russian side, things were,
once again, not ideal. Like Putin, Khrushchev was also less democratically appointed than his
American counterpart was. Perhaps one could, again, make a case that the Soviet people not
rising up against him and the Soviet government counts as some form of consent to his serving
as their representative and voice, but, again, it would be one of the lowest levels of consent and
put the case very close to that of a sovereign situation.71
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One might wonder: why fix on democracy as the mark of “groupness”/group agency? Why not shared beliefs and
values? For example, why not count Catholics signaling disapproval of the Vatican council by declining church
attendance or donations as a case of group signaling? I don’t count “group” cases such as these since these are
really just cases of individuals making independent choices which just happen to be similar due to their having
similar beliefs. Presumably there was no attempt to come to a decision to make this move as a group. There was no
voting in some sense, and the decision is not binding to the rest of the members – plenty of Catholics still attend. If,
however, all Catholics or a large group of Catholics came together and voted on this move and agreed to be bound
by the result of that decision process, that would be a different story, then we might actually get something like a
group signal.
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So far, we’ve looked at cases of signaling between two groups. Might there also be cases
of signaling between groups and individuals? This also seems possible. For a simple example of
the first case, consider a lone terrorist sending a video message to the United States, warning of a
terrorist attack unless the US changes certain policies. How the state acts will depend on, other
things aside, how elected officials act and how these officials act is going to depend (ideally) on
how their constituents would prefer they react to the message. They’ll also have to judge
whether the threat is credible, whether there is perhaps a history of it being used this way. On
the other side, what message the US sends to the terrorist is going to depend on how the US
thinks the terrorist will interpret it, and how the terrorist interprets it will depend in part on how
they think the US wants them to interpret it, perhaps basing this judgment off of the
consequences of past similar interactions they’ve had or observed involving the US. This could
even be done obliquely too. The terrorist side could broadcast a call to jihad against the US that
is meant to be seen on TV by potential recruits as well as the US administration. Similarly, the
US could announce a war on terror in region X meant for everyone, including the terrorists, to
see.
These are examples of an individual who is not a member of the group communicating
with the group and vice versa. We might distinguish a third category of group to individual
signaling: signaling from a group to one of its members or from a member of the group to the
group. A simple example here, where the same basic idea applies, might be when Congress
sends a letter to an American citizen. A case in the reverse would be a US citizen writing to
Congress.
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What about seemingly more complicated cases of group signaling such as singing in a
choir or co-authoring a speech? Do these count as instances of group communication? I think
these can. The relevant signals here are not as one might expect, namely the individual parts of
the song (Paul’s singing or John’s guitar playing) or the individually written parts of the speech,
but rather the entire song and the entire speech. In a genuine paradigm case of group signaling,
how the entire song or speech ends up depends on more than just what one member of the group
thinks – there will be voting in some sense and settling of inconsistencies - otherwise we just get
the sovereign case. Indeed, some cases in this area may fit the sovereign scenario better – if, for
example, one member of the band calls all the shots and just tells the other members what to play
- but let’s set those cases aside for the moment. How do the preferences work here? The
speechwriters (or singers) might be members of a political party (or band) and have the party (or
band) as their main source of income. Then the success of the party (or band) is important to
each of the members and they have an incentive to come up with a speech (or song) that will
help ensure the party’s (or band’s) success. Or maybe there is a cause they want their work to
further, and preferences are attached to the successful furthering of that cause. Of course, this
means they will have to be sensitive to feedback from the receiver side. But why should the
receiver care? Perhaps a good speech (or good music) makes them feel good or helps change
their behavior in some beneficial way. It could be that they learn something from the message
that helps them better navigate their lives or cooperate with others for some collective goal. The
possibilities seem endless. I’ll discuss cases of group communication like these, cases in the
artistic realm, in more detail in the next chapter.
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2.4 Non-Human Groups
Humans aren’t the only creatures that form groups. Could it be that there are non-human cases
of group communication? It seems at least possible. Everything that’s been said about the
possibility of human groups in Section 2.2 applies to animal groups in theory. But are there any
real-world cases of non-human group communication?
One seemingly conspicuous case is the chorus howling of wolves. The wolves will howl
together but at different pitches, often starting with a high-ranking member whose howl is lower
and shorter. One purpose of these choral howls seems to be marking territory or maintaining
spacing from other wolf packs (Harrington, 1987; Joslin, 1967; Mech, 1974, Harrington & Mech,
1979, 1983). Could these be group signals rather than just a bunch of individuals joining in on a
leader doing something or being forced by a leader to do something? It seems plausible to me
that this is a case somewhere more toward the group end of the spectrum of individual and group
signaling.
There is a lot going for the thesis. Wolf packs tend to be composed mostly of family
members (Mech, 1999).72 They engage in other cooperative behaviors such as hunting. And
there’s even some evidence they pass down certain knowledge in some way to their offspring
(Haber & Holleman, 2013). During a chorus the wolves will howl at different pitches with
different tone modulations. It’s been shown that this gives the chorus the so-called Beau Geste
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Wolf packs will sometimes, of course, integrate outsiders, and the two main parents of the pack - sometimes more
than two - will not be siblings.
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Effect, making it seem like it was created by a group much larger (Harrington 1989).7374 On the
territory marking interpretation of the signal, this effect of the chorus is good for all the wolves
in the group – it dissuades invaders and prevents inter-pack conflict – and the effect couldn’t be
accomplished by just one wolf alone.75
It’s not hard to imagine that a wolf pack that learns this behavior might have an
advantage over packs that don’t. And this sort of thing could get off the ground pretty easily. A
pack happens to do this for one reason or another – maybe the pups in that pack are more prone
to copying elders, or the members of the pack do this for bonding purposes. Then because the
pack does this and does it in a way that creates a Beau Geste effect, the pack happens to be more
successful at preventing others from encroaching on their territory, and so, better at avoiding
violence and loss of resources. A pack could then, in a similar way to how they teach hunting
techniques, teach this howling technique to their offspring in order to maintain the signaling
system – probably through a combination of copying by the young and reinforcement or
correction by the elders. Pups, though they make many other vocalizations right from birth, only
howl sporadically (Coscia, 1995). But they begin to join the pack in howling around three weeks
old (Mech & Boitani, 2010; Mech, 1988). It’s also been observed that the pitch of a member’s
individual howl in the chorus will increase as the individual’s rank among the pack decreases
(and the visa versa), and there is even evidence of wolves correcting others or at least preventing
others from howling in a chorus, though not great evidence yet of correction in a more subtle
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The effect is named after the English novel of the same name by P.C. Wren in which French Foreign Legion
troops in North Africa are forced to prop up the dead bodies of their comrades to fool their enemies into thinking the
they have more men. It’s also the name of a 1939 film starring Gary Cooper.
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The Beau Geste hypothesis was introduced by English zoologist John Krebs (1977) to explain why some bird
species have such impressive song repertoires.
75
Another use for the howl might be the reassembling of separated members. See Mech (1966) and Theberge &
Falls (1967).
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“howl this way, rather than this way” sense, a more subtle teaching of technique sense (F.
Harrington, personal communication, February 1, 2020). This would be even stronger evidence.
Is there any sort of voting in the wolf case? A committee like structure or leader as in the
organization of human groups? How do the wolves actually make these decisions about
howling? That part of the story at present is still to be fully worked out. For a time, many
people believed there was a sort of alpha wolf structure to packs. In some cases, this seems to be
true and the parents play the primary deciding role, communicating their desires through eye
contact, body language, and physical intervention. In extreme cases of this, we might move
closer to a sovereign case with one parent wolf calling the shots. When two parents have to
work together to decide, we get closer to a case of a group led by a committee. Other studies
have shown that some packs are even more egalitarian (Mech, 1999; Dutcher et al., 2003).
A phenomenon that seems somewhat similar to choral howling is what biologists call
mobbing. This is where a group of animals, say, a heard of bison, gathers around a predator in a
group once another member spots it, and if the predator doesn’t back down, attacks. The animals
do this, of course, despite the same behavior being dangerous when done alone (and so, seldom
done alone) – imagine just one water buffalo standing up to a lion rather than the whole group of
them. In these group mobbing cases, the warning before the attack seems to be something like
“Back off or our gang will get you”. Is it a case of group signaling? It seems to be close. The
signal benefits all members, and is not just sent by one member or by each member on their own.
And it’s plausible for a behavior like this to be something that is reinforced or selected for at the
group level – the groups that do it survive and those that don’t do not. As with the wolves, what
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is the organization like? How are decisions like this made by the group? How is this behavior
passed on – copying by the younger generations and reinforcement by the old? It’s hard to tell.
I’ll end by considering one more example. Himalayan honey bees are known for
engaging in a behavior that from a distance makes it look like they are doing the wave – the
wave you see everybody stand up and do at baseball games. The bees simply raise their rears in
the air instead of their hands (which they don’t have). The behavior is known as “shimmering,”
and it’s thought to be defensive, to send a message to or to startle predators such as wasps
(Kastberger et al., 2008). Is this a signal? Is it a group signal? It seems plausible. Chinese
researcher Ken Tan and colleagues (2008) argue that the signal says roughly, “I see you”, though
I think “We see you and we’ll get you if you get too close” is probably a better rendering if it is
indeed a group signal. Either way on this rendering the signal is a sort of warning to the wasp
since the bees can in fact mob it and kill it if need be. Here there could have been an
evolutionary back and forth. Hives with bees that performed the coordinated behavior might
have fared better than those that did not. Wasps that learned the message and responded
appropriately survived. What does the work is the information carried by the signal, that the
bees see the wasp and are ready to go after it. That’s one story for what’s going on here. But it
could be instead that what is primarily doing the work is not information carried by the
shimmering but a propensity in the wasp to be frightened by that sort of stimuli. Here again
there could be a sort of evolution on the sender side, the bees could have, so to speak, hijacked
the propensity in the wasp for their benefit. But in this case, what we have isn’t a signal. The
rules followed by the wasp are unchanging. More research needs to be done on the wasp side of
the signaling equation, on why the wasp responds the way it does to the shimmering, whether it’s
due to the information it carries or due to some pre-existing propensity.
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Summary
Can groups engage in communication? Yes, they can. Not all talk of groups communicating
must be explained away as metaphor or shorthand or just talk of group leaders – though, some
cases still might fit that kind of picture better. There are interesting questions about how life fits
into the model, whether something must be a living thing to be a sender or receiver, but the
model seems to leave open the possibility that an ordinary biological make-up might not be
necessary. We saw how groups led by committees and elected officials fit into the model and
differ from groups led by individuals that are more tyrannical. And we saw how in paradigm
cases of group communication what’s going on can’t just be reduced to the inner workings.
So, groups can engage in communication. Do they? The answer to this is yes too.
Groups not only can but also do communicate. But what might seem like some of the more
obvious candidates for group communication turn out not to be such good examples in practice –
recall declarations of war. Other cases seem to provide better examples – sanctions. The animal
cases provide room for even further research.
I chose to examine the idea of group communication for a number of reasons. Among
those that, as I tried to show in the introduction to this chapter, people often talk about groups
communicating, even people doing high level academic, policy, and journalism work. What’s
more, people disagree about this way of describing what’s really going on, choosing instead to
look for other explanations, thinking that what’s going on can’t really be communication at the
group level. What’s even more than that, though, I wanted to look at group communication
because of its seemingly broad scope. In this chapter, I focused more on politics, but group
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communication seems to extend much farther. This brings me to the next chapter. There we will
look at art. Also often talked about as being involved in communication, and often created by
groups – movies, for example, or ballets - it’s a natural next topic. The only reason I didn’t
include an in-depth discussion of art in this chapter is that there is also so much art that is not
done by groups, that is, this done by single artists. I thought more appropriate to set the stage
first with our understanding of group communication generally and then look at art as a whole
later.
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Chapter 3. Art and Communication
3.1 The Universal Language
One thing often thought to distinguish humans from other animals is the creation and
consumption of art. Our lives are surrounded by and deeply influenced by art. What is it about
art that makes it so important? Often pointed to for an answer is art’s apparently symbolic
nature, its trafficking in things such as meaning and symbols. Indeed, many artists and thinkers
have expressed the view that art or some form of art is in some way a form of language. French
artist Jean Dubuffet (1901-1985) writes, “Art is a language, an instrument of knowledge, an
instrument of communication” (Roth & Roth, 1998, p. 14). American jazz pianist and composer
Herbie Hancock says of music that it “truly is the universal language” (Childs, 2010, para. 3).
Others, however, don’t see the strength similarity between art and language. British philosopher
Gregory Curry (1993), for example, worries that films simply don’t have the features that make
language the complex and interesting thing that it is. Movies carry meaning, he would say, but
not in the same way sentences of English do. Still others have noted the neglect of art in the
literature on communication generally. John Dewey is a notable exception to this. In his book
Art as Experience (1934), he writes about art that it is “the most universal and freest form of

111

communication” (p. 275). Some pages later he writes that art is “communication in its purest
form,” and, “the most effective mode of communication that exists” (p. 286). Other philosophers
have also seen art as a form of communication: David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Leo Tolstoy
to name a few. But to say that art is language has been another challenge. So, there is a two-part
challenge here. To show that art really can be considered communication (at least in some cases)
and how that works, and to show that art might sometimes be considered a form of language too.
Part of the problem in exploring these questions is that even what counts as art is a hotly
contested topic. A van Gogh is art but what about a Duchamp or a Pollack? Art critics now
agree on these latter cases, but it wasn’t always that way and plenty of everyday people still
disagree about them. How about the drawing I did when I was in 1st grade – was that art? This
question about what counts as art is an important worry. But rather than try to answer this
philosophically prior question, I’ll try to stick to the one about communication and focus
primarily on the generally accepted cases – though, I will make some speculations about a few of
the harder ones.
Is art a form of communication? If so, what does it communicate and how does it work?
Some cases are more obvious. Literature, for example, uses words and sentences. Here I’m
interested in the less obvious cases. Some art seems clearly communicative, but what about the
Duchamps and Pollacks? What about music without lyrics? What about art that doesn’t rely
primarily writing or speech? And is at least some art not just communication but language?
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3.2 A First Sketch
On the sender-receiver model, what is important is the co-evolution of sender and receiver
communicative behaviors, rules for sending and acting upon signals. So, when investigating
whether some form of art might count as communicative, we need to see whether we can’t find a
good analogue in there for these parts and processes.
I start with a simple case to show that it’s at least possible that some non-linguistic art is
communicative – note I do not take this case to be representative or paradigmatic of most art; it’s
just a simple example to get us started. Suppose I lose my cat and want help finding him but
don’t have any photographs of the little rascal to put on a missing cat sign. Instead, I might
choose to draw a picture of him, especially if he has some unique features (only three legs, a
unique fur pattern). How I draw the cat will take into consideration how I think people will
interpret what I put on paper – “will it be obvious that this is supposed to be a stripe in his fur
and not just a mistake in my rendering?” Receivers, people who see the sign, will have to
recognize what the artist is trying to convey. I might ask a friend before putting up the final
version whether he has any input on how to better convey my subject. If someone calls me and
brings me the wrong cat, I might edit my drawing, or they might adjust their interpretation.
As I said, I don’t mean to give the impression that this sort of case is paradigmatic of art.
I don’t mean to suggest here that I think the usual communicative purpose of art is simply to
carry information about some object or person. The cat drawing is not made to be appreciated
and assessed which seems to be a common feature of a lot of art and something I’ll get into in
more detail in a moment. The cat drawing, as I’ve imagined it, is purely informative. But art
that is intended to be purely or partly informative, particularly in terms of identification or
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description, is not rare. Consider, for example, what is known as expedition art. A good case is
the Easter Island painting done by English artist William Hodges (1744-1797), who was
employed as a draughtsman on Captain James Cook’s (1728-1779) second voyage to the South
Pacific.

Figure 3.1. Hodges, W. (1776). A View of the Monuments of Easter Island [Rapanui]
[Painting]. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, United Kingdom.
https://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/13275.html

These works were meant to act more like photographs (albeit, sometimes a bit embellished) more
than anything else. They were usually quite technical and meant to help those back home see
what a place was like. Portraits of people or animals could also serve this purpose. English
ornithologist John Gould’s (1804-1881) drawings of Darwin’s fiches seems a good case.
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Figure 3.2. Gould, J. & Gould, E. (1845). Darwin’s Finches [Lithograph]. From Journal
of researches into the natural history and geology of the countries visited during the
voyage of H.M.S. Beagle round the world, under the Command of Capt. Fitz Roy, R.N.
(pg. 379), by Charles Darwin, 1845, 2d edition. London: John Murray. http://darwinonline.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F14&viewtype=text

The point is to show what the finches look like, not so much to impress the viewer or any other
thing a work of art might do.
Now let’s get back to the drawing of the cat. Conventionality is important for
communication too. Is there room for conventionality in the cat drawing case? I think so, but it
will come in degrees. There are many ways – within certain bounds – to draw the same cat and
represent it through some sort of iconic relationship à la Peirce. Some ways of drawing the cat
might be more abstract than others. Some might involve odd uses of color. Some might be more
cartoonish than realistic. And yet, what exactly the “certain bounds” involved in such a case are
I find hard to say. How far can the picture be distorted until it’s no longer recognizable as being
of a cat? I’m not sure. Part of the boundary will be determined by the psychology of receivers,
but this almost certainly isn’t the full story. Cultural norms of depiction might play a role, for
example. I won’t try to make further guesses here.
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Figure 3.3. Portrait of Rene Descartes.

Figure 3.4. Portrait of Daniel-Henry

Hals, F. (1649). Portret van de Franse

Kahnweiler. Picasso, P. (1910). Daniel-

filosoof en wiskundige René Descartes

Henry Kahnweiler [Painting]. The Art

(1596-1650) [Painting]. Musée du Louvre,

Institute Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA.

Paris, France. Retrieved from Wikipedia

Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:

Commons:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Picasso_

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:F

Portrait_of_Daniel-

rans_Hals_-

Henry_Kahnweiler_1910.jpg

_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg

Godfrey-Smith (2016) points out that some art might not be so conventional. According
to American evolutionary ornithologist Richard Prum (2013) art has an evaluative aspect to it.
As I hinted at earlier, one aspect of art seems to be that receivers are meant to assess a piece at
least partly for its beauty. For Prum, beauty is the key evaluative property, and it’s something he
thinks is evaluated by humans and animals alike – consider the male Peacock’s tale and its
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evaluation by potential mates. In cases where something is made purely to be evaluated,
Godfrey-Smith thinks there is no possibility for replacement (as compared to the potted plants in
the Woodward case – something other than a potted plant could serve the communicative
purpose in that case, say, a lawn chair). What matters in instances of art meant to be evaluated
for beauty is something intrinsic to that piece itself, not just the information about the world the
piece might convey. I mostly follow Godfrey-Smith on this, but I think he and Prum have
missed something more basic. I think some art has this evaluative aspect, this concern with
beauty, but other evaluative properties are possible. Consider pieces such as 15th century Dutch
painter Hieronymus Bosch’s (1450-1516) Hell (1490-1510), 20th century American painter Ivan
Albright’s (1897-1983) The Picture of Dorian Grey (1943-4), and 20th century German artist
Otto Dix’s (1891-1969) Wounded Man (1924) (Figures 3.5., 3.6, and 3.7).
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Figure 3.5. Bosch, H. (1490-1510). Hell

Figure 3.6. Albright, I. (1943-4). The

[Painting]. Web Gallery of Art. Palazzo

Picture of Dorian Grey [Painting]. The Art

Ducale, Venice, Italy. Retrieved from The

Institute of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA.

Web Gallery of Art:

Retrieved from Wikiart:

https://www.wga.hu/frames-

https://www.wikiart.org/en/ivan-albright/the-

e.html?/html/b/bosch/

picture-of-dorian-gray-1944
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Figure 3.7. Dix, O. (1924) Wounded Man (Autumn 1916, Bapaume) [Etching]. Museum
of Modern Art, New York, NY, USA. Retrieved from Wikiart:
https://www.wikiart.org/en/otto-dix/wounded-soldier

These works seem to be made with the intention that they depict the ugly, that they be grotesque,
macabre, and disgusting – not beautiful. We can evaluate these paintings for the skill of the
artist in rendering something so gross. We can evaluate how beautifully they have rendered
something so ugly. Some art is beautifully ugly in this respect. But this does not seem to be the
same sort of evaluative beauty that Prum is considering – or at least it is not clear that it is or is
not. I take the evaluative aspect of art to include paintings of this sort too.76
Getting back to the cat case - the drawing of the cat - that case was just one simple case to
get us started, to see that it’s at least possible for something that might be considered art to play a
communicative role. Now let’s looks at a few particular examples.
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Prum also thinks that the beauty aspect of art comes coupled with a desire for continued association. I think
probably this is not always true either. Consider that some people become jealous of the beauty of others and as a
result do not want to associate with them and may even want to destroy that beauty (as might be the case in some
instances of mate competition).
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3.3 Paintings, Drawing, and the Like
People usually seem to think of paintings or drawings first when considering art. This form of
art seems to go back at least as far as 60-70k years go (Hoffmann et al., 2018). Might drawings
and paintings fit the sender-receiver model? We’ve already seen the cases of the cat drawing and
the expedition art and finch drawings. But there are other things paintings can be used to depict.
They can be used to depict certain events – for example, American artist Grant Wood’s (18911942) painting The Midnight Ride of Paul Revere (1931).

Figure 3.8. Wood, G. (1931). The Midnight Ride of Paul Revere [Painting]. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York City, NY, USA. Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Midnight_Ride_of_Paul_Revere.jpg

Paintings and drawings can also depict what we “see in our minds” to some extent - the things
we make up in our imagination or perhaps even hallucinatory experiences. Take, for example,
some of the psychedelic art of the 1960s or attempts by various artists to depict the visual
distortions caused by migraines. Here is an example of the migraine case. This piece is from
English physician Hubert Airy (1838-1903), who published the illustration in an 1870 article in
the Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society.
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Figure 3.9. A work depicting a Scintillating scotoma aura – a visual symptom commonly
experienced by some migraine patients - and how it grows in the visual field over time.
Hubert, A. (1870). Plate XIII. “On a distinct form of Transient Hemiopsia”. Phil. Trans.
R. Soc., 160. https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstl.1870.0013

And yet, there are many different renderings of Revere’s ride, many different ways people have
tried to depict hallucinations and migraines. The same thing can be drawn or painted in different
ways, with water color, oil paint, acrylic, India ink. Even a finch can be drawn in different styles
or poses and still get across the same subject. There is conventionality in depicting art, but,
again, there will be bounds. Go too abstract and although the painting may be – according to the
artist – of a dog, it won’t look anything – by most peoples’ standards – like one. Go too abstract
with a landscape, and before you know it, viewers won’t recognize it as such unless perhaps
given an appropriate title.
I mentioned style. Style is important here. While discussing artifacts, American
archeologist Philip G. Chase (1991) distinguishes between what he calls “active” and “passive”
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style. Passive style occurs when, for example, all the boats made by a certain group of people
look a certain way, are made out of certain materials, purely because that’s the way the tribe
members know how to make boats and those are the materials available. Active style happens
when the choice of materials or shape is deliberate in some sense, when these are not the only
materials or forms around and yet they are selected anyway. A shift from passive to active can
happen over time. A tribe might make a boat a certain way and this is noticed by members of
another group. That other group takes the passive style as a sort of cue of the identity or tribal
affiliation of the occupant of the boat. The boat builders of the original tribe might notice this
habit of interpretation, and so in turn produce boats that way – despite other materials or forms
being available – because of the role the style plays in identity.77
The same can happen with art – not that boats like the ones just mentioned might not be
art in some sense. We can usually recognize a van Gogh (1853-1890) or Monet (1840-1926) or
Klee (1879-1940) through their style. In some cases, this is active, in others passive. Artists of a
certain school might passively paint in similar ways simply because that is the only way they
were taught or the only way they saw their mentors doing it. Others might try to more actively
copy a certain style despite being aware of other options – van Gogh imitating Japanese art for a
while might be an example. Of course, one might also try to create one’s own style and continue
creating art that way for identity signaling purposes too. And then there are passive cases that
come around for other reasons. The bluish hues characteristic of later Monet paintings might be
an example of passive style. It’s been suggested that his painting this way later in life – painting
his white lilies with a blue tinge and so on - might simply have been due to his now seeing more
ultra-violet colors after having his lenses removed during cataract surgery (Zimmer, 2012). A
77

For a similar story involving hand-axes, see Godfrey-Smith (2014b).
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similar story might apply to van Gogh’s so-called “yellow period”. It’s been suggested that the
halos around the stars in Stary Night (1889) and the seeming yellow filter to Van Gogh’s other
works during this time might be the consequence of digoxin intoxication – a drug his doctor
might have been treating him with – which can result in symptoms of xanthopsia (yellowish
vision) and coronas (blurred rings around lights) (Lee, 1981).
That’s enough for style for the moment and basic depicting functions. Each of the cases
of art we’ve just discussed, and the functions those works play, fit somewhat well into Lewis’s
original model. Are there more abstract examples, though? How do they fit in? American neoexpressionist artist Louisa Chase (1951-2016), who paints semi-abstract, highly colorful pieces,
describes her work as “a constant search to hold a feeling tangible” (Anderson-Spivy, 1991).

Figure 3.10. Chase, L. (1991). Swimmer [Painting]. Honolulu Museum of Art,
Honolulu, HI, USA. Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisa_Chase

One plausible rendering of this idea might be that what is communicated in her pieces is an inner
state of the artist, a feeling. This is in the range of what is known as an expressivist view of art.
Russian author Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) famously held a view like this in his 1897 book What is
Art? For Tolstoy, art is a skillfully crafted embodiment of the emotions of the artist used to
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convey those emotions to an audience and get them to experience those emotions themselves.
John Dewey articulated a similar view in Art as Experience (1934). There Dewey set out the
view that roughly the point of art is to get the viewer to experience something, though unlike
Tolstoy, Dewey didn’t limit this experience to expressions or emotions. For Dewey, art
functions as a sort of focused experience generating machine, where the point of the experience
in art is basically the same as experience in the rest of life: to help us grow, to gain or learn
something that will help us deal with the practical world and each other. As I see it there are a
few things going in here: 1. Art as a product of expression. 2. Art as representing emotions (or in
Dewey’s case, possibly other things). And 3. Art as a thing that causes emotions in others (or in
Dewey’s case, other experiences). Here’s what seems like a possible story that combines these
elements – focusing on the part about emotions. A sender creates something as a response to an
emotion they are experiencing or experienced. Then that thing is a sort of natural sign of that
emotion – this is a primarily left-hand side sender set-up. But then receivers start to notice these
sorts of things, and senders notice that receivers react to it in such and such ways and so on.
Senders then might in turn start producing these things in more refined ways to better get across
that content. All the while it could be that receivers have a tendency on their side such that when
they see something, say, “sad”, that they feel sad, there is some sort of tendency to empathy or
something like that, and perhaps the more “sad” looking, the more they actually start to feel sad.
But it also seems plausible these things could occur separately. A sender might never refine the
products but just keep making them and with no intention of anyone receiving them and no
sensitivity to feedback – then, again, we have more of a cue. Someone might be trying to
represent an emotion but not make someone experience it – I might try to represent sadness
without making you sad. Or perhaps an artist might try to get you to experience something
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partly through, again, tendencies for fear, excitement, etc. on the receiver side rather than
through conveying any information. A similar story could be told for works that convey or bring
about other experiences, experiences without such a strict focus on the emotional sider of things.
The degree of conventionality in cases like these is not as clear as in others. Can the
same experience be created by different works? In some cases, changing one square millimeter
of color on a canvas might not matter for the overall generated experience, maybe not a square
inch, or foot, and so on. But in other cases, that square inch might be a big deal. Consider
Italian artist Leonardo da Vinci’s (1452-1519) Mona Lisa (1517). The painting is only 2′ 6″ x 1′
9″.

Figure 3.11. Da Vinci, L. (1517). Mona Lisa [Painting]. The Louvre, Paris, France.
Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mona_Lisa,_by_Leonardo_da_Vinci,_from_C
2RMF_retouched.jpg

If one square inch of the painting was replaced with a red square, I take it that would radically
alter the work. People would wonder about the red square - why it was there, what it meant.
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Change the direction of the subject’s gaze or alter the subtle smile, and you can radically alter the
work too.
Now consider Spanish artist Pablo Picasso’s (1881-1973) Guernica (1937), which is
supposedly about the bombing of the Spanish town of the same name in April 1937 by Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy at the request of the Spanish Nationalists. This painting is 11′ 6″ x 25′
6″. Here, one square inch might not matter much if at all.

Figure 3.12. Picasso, P. (1937). Guernica [Painting]. Museo Nacional Centro de Arte
Reina Sofía, Madrid, Spain. Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guernica_(Picasso)#/media/File:PicassoGuernica.jpg

There are other limits to conventionality here. Surely, another painting could be made depicting
the bombing of Guernica, but Picasso, with his style and color choice, seems to bring something
else to the piece. Now it’s not just a matter of making a new painting of the bombing; the
content of the painting includes more than that – though, what the entire content of the painting
is isn’t clear. I think in some cases, what a piece contains in terms of content won’t be
something we can fully capture in human language, at least not in a few sentences. Here, the
content seems to include, probably among other things, things like mood, an attitude toward the
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event (namely, that it was chaotic and bad), and of course, it also, through Picasso’s signature
style, has a mark of identity to it – Picasso’s identity as the work’s creator.
Another role a painting might play is captured in a quote from American illustrator
Norman Rockwell (1894-1978), who once said of his work “I paint life as I would like it to be”
(Rockwell, 1960/1979, p. 24).

Figure 3.13. Rockwell, N. (1943). Freedom from Want [Painting]. Story illustration for
The Saturday Evening Post, March 6, 1943. Norman Rockwell Museum Collections,
Indianapolis, IN, USA. https://www.nrm.org/2016/11/freedom-want-1943/

What we get here is a sort of “way of life” as part of the content of his paintings. He’s showing
us a way things could be and the way he would like them to be. What counts as the appropriate
receiver action in the Rockwell case might not be difficult to imagine – perhaps he is trying to
encourage his audience to help bring about the sort of world he’s depicted, which would involve
performing certain actions to bring about certain states. This wouldn’t fit into the original Lewis
model, however, as Lewis didn’t intend the way someone desired the world to be to count as one
of the states senders observed, but it can fit our more fleshed out extension of the model.
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Now how about the works of artists such as Kandinsky or Pollack or Duchamp? Are
more abstract and modern pieces such as these signals in some sense as well? Perhaps, but I’ll
admit that if so the content of some works and how receivers are supposed to respond is not
totally obvious. Duchamp (1887-1968), with his “readymade” pieces was supposedly trying to
make a statement about what counts as art. Perhaps it’s fair to say in his case then that the
appropriate response for receivers was a reconsidering of what art is and what sort of behavioral
outputs going forward will count as fair play in the art game. Perhaps something else could have
sufficed other than the urinal or the bicycle wheel – a cooking pot? It’s hard to say – hard for me
anyways.
Kandinsky (1866-1944) held quite explicit views about his art. Despite the abstractness
of his later work, he reportedly saw his paintings as actually being about certain things. His first
seven Compositions are supposedly about a coming apocalypse for example.

Figure 3.14. Kandinsky, W. (1913). Composition VII [Painting]. The State Tretyakov
Gallery, Moscow, Russia. https://www.wassilykandinsky.net/work-36.php

In this case, we have a sort of signal but what it is about is a certain predicted future state and
what it seems to suggest for an action on the receiver side is preparation. Kandinsky also
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described the artist as someone causing an experience in his audience – in that case, we’re back
to Dewey.
Jackson Pollock (1912-1959) was fairly silent on the meaning of his pieces. Some say
the paintings convey a sense of energy or athleticism with their paint splatters and slashes.

Figure. 3.15. Pollock, J. (1950). Autumn Rhythm (Number 30) [Painting]. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York, New York, USA. Retrieved from Wikipedia Commons:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fa/Autumn_Rhythm.jpg78

That sort of content is more along the lines of a cue, though – unless, of course, Pollack noticed
this connection and so purposely exploited it, but it’s not clear whether that’s the case. If he
exploited it in order to bring about an energetic feeling, we have a Dewey sort of situation.
What we get is that paintings and the like may have many different roles – some having
to do with communication, some not - and those roles might sometimes be intertwined. For a
final case of painting, consider Navajo (Diné) sand painting. The sand paintings may depict a
god, person, animal, etc. but the purpose of the painting is beyond depiction. These paintings are
sometimes said to be considered living beings themselves. Others describe them as gateways for
the spirits (Parezo, 1981). Suppose the purpose of the work is not so much to get a message
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This work originally appeared with the title “Number 30”. Later it appeared under the title “Autumn Rhythm”
with no explanation for the change. The piece is now exhibited under the combined title.
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across (even to the gods) as much as to function as a portal to the spirit world, or to conjure up
the spirits and harness their power - its purpose would still be fulfilled, presumably, even were
no-one, even the gods, observe it. In this case, what we’re dealing with is something fairly far
away from a standard case of communication.
Is there any sort of structure to paintings and drawings, any sort of organization as in
human language? Consider again the finch drawings. These seem to have a fairly obvious sort
of structure. There are parts and the parts (or some of them) map fairly systematically to parts of
the bird in the real world. Where the beak is drawn relative to the eyes matters, arrangement
matters. The shading of the ink corresponds systematically to the lighting of the bird. What we
seem to have is a combinatorial encoded signal. Move the parts around and the drawing seems
to be of something else, to have a different content, even though the parts might have the same
content and the same parts might be present. The case can even be embellished and made more
complex in a number of ways. As discussed, style might come into play. Other things might be
done to alter the mood – the color tone of the painting might be slightly altered. There are many
possibilities.
How do much more abstract cases work? That is harder to say. We discussed the
Picasso piece a bit. But a piece by, say, Pollack seems a bit trickier. Here the work seems to
have parts and the way those parts are combined and arranged and their color seems to matter to
the overall effect, but it doesn’t seem that the individual parts stand for something in the way the
shading of the finch’s beak or the beak itself does. I can imagine a case, however, where an
artist is trying to get a certain feeling or emotion across and exploits the tendencies in audiences
to react emotionally to certain colors, combinations, and arrangements of those colors to make an
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abstract painting that conveys that feeling. In that case, there is a sort of structure - the
arrangement of the colors, the combinations, and what colors are used matters - but what
mapping is being used isn’t so clear. Does the color map to something like mood? As in the
way dark paintings tend to have a dark mood and light paintings a levity to them (which is not
always true)? Or does red map to anger or passion? What about the shape of the parts? Do they
express something like the energy of the painting – as when jagged lines make a piece feel
frantic or long gentle wavy lines makes it feel mellower? And how does arrangement work
here? If Kandinsky pushed the majority of his shapes and lines into one corner of the canvas
would that give it less of an explosive feel? Would it give the painting a sense of being offbalance? I think the answer is that each piece will have to be determined on its own merits.
Some cases will feature parts where the arrangement of the parts matters, some will have parts
with systematic mappings, and some cases will simply be less complicated forms of
communication. It all depends on the drawing or painting. The lesson here regardless is that
some drawings and paintings indeed can be considered not only examples of communication but
also language – at least, if we consider a signal that is encoded and compositional or encoded
and combinatorial language – at the very least some art makes the mark of what we in Chapter 1
called syntax.
This discussion of structure and conventionality brings another point into focus and it’s
the last I’ll discuss before moving on to other art forms. Go back to Gould’s finches. These
pictures were drawn for science, to be descriptive, and part of what makes a description a good
description is accuracy. I see a few different ways accuracy of a sort might play a role in art.
One is descriptive. A painting or drawing might more or less accurately depict how something
looks by exploiting systematic mappings between features of the subject and things like what
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colors are used on the canvas and where (so red paint for a red feathered area). Another place
accuracy might play a role is in art involving emotions. I think this could work too, probably
with some sorts of systematic mappings, but as I admitted in the discussion about compositional
signals and emotions just a few paragraphs ago, how exactly that sort of thing might work is less
obvious in these cases. I’ll talk about two more ways accuracy can play a role in communicative
art. Consider the famous painting A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte (18841886) by French artist Georges Seurat (1859-1891), which now hangs in the Art Institute of
Chicago (Figure 3.16).

Figure 3.16. Seurat, G. (1884-1886). A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande
Jatte. [Painting]. Art Institute of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA.
https://www.artic.edu/artworks/27992/a-sunday-on-la-grande-jatte-1884

At first glance this seems to be a very detailed painting, and in some ways it is. But if we look
closer, we see that not all these people are so detailed as we might have first thought. Take a
closer look at the small child in white for instance (Figure 3.17).
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Figure 3.17. Close-up of A Sunday Afternoon. (Adapted from Figure 3.16).

The child isn’t even obviously a child anymore. Do they have eyes? A nose? Ears? In the case
of paintings and drawings, the resolution or level of detail will come in degrees.79 In different
works descriptive accuracy, emotive accuracy, and resolution might diverge. A picture might
have extremely high resolution but be a poor depiction of the event (for example, a doctored
digital photo). A work might be a great rendering of a certain feeling but a less accurate
depiction of what an event actually looked like (Picasso’s Guernica). A painting might lack
resolution but otherwise render a person fairly well as far as systematic mappings of colors and
other features go (think a blurred image).
Now I bring up resolution to highlight the last way I wanted to talk about accuracy
playing a role in things like paintings and drawings. Suppose I am tasked with producing a
depicting painting of a person and my painting is fairly accurate in terms of mappings from
colors of the subject to paints and the shape of the subject to brush strokes on the canvas but I
don’t include all the freckles on their face. On the one hand, this could be simply because I’m
not crafting a piece to that level of detail, then we have a resolution issue. But sometimes artists
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This example was inspired by a TED Talk given in 2003 by Dennett.

133

simply leave details like these out, not because they aren’t working to that level of detail, but
because for whatever reason they see that detail as one not needed for the purpose of that
drawing, or perhaps they simply don’t have the needed color on hand. Then the lack of some
feature is not a resolution issue, and what’s more, it seems the work can still be a work of the
same subject despite the lack of certain details. The same seems to be the case the other way
around. I might draw my grandmother’s house and put seven trees in the front yard instead of
six. I do this simply because I’m trying to show there are a decent number of trees in the yard
and I don’t know what the actual number is. The drawing is still of my grandmothers’ house
despite the extra tree. How this sort of thing works will depend on the work at hand. Some
works might involve sender and receiver rules that allow for these sorts of “less precise”
mappings, others might not. We’ll see these issues crop up again throughout this chapter and in
Chapter 4 when we talk about maps.

3.4 Song and Dance
Of course, painting and drawing are not the only forms of art. Song and dance play a significant
role in our lives as well, and often the two are combined in one performance – as is the case with
many Broadway musicals, ballets, and even the Hopi snake dance. Music and dance have been
considered forms of communication of their own for some time. 19th century American poet
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882) once wrote, “Music is the universal language of
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mankind” (Longfellow, 1835, p. 202). “Dance,” American modern dance choreographer Martha
Graham (1894-1991) states, “is the hidden language of the soul, of the body” (Graham, 1985).80
A bit of a preface before we go on: here I’ll focus primarily on works performed by one
sender or will for purposes of flow of explanation at this point make the idealized assumption of
one sender. I’ll focus on cases involving two or more individuals and the details that come with
that later.
Songs seem particularly well situated for an analysis in terms of signals, especially vocal
songs, or songs a cappella, that is, without musical accompaniment. These songs are, after all,
made up primarily or entirely of words and sentences with prior meaning. Some songs seem
pretty straightforward. Some tell a story – Peter La Farge’s (1931-1965) “The Ballad of Ira
Hayes” (1963) seems like a good example. The point of the song is to let people know what
happened to Ira. Each line of the piece adds to the story – though, there is repetition in the
chorus. Other songs might instead explicitly express how the singer feels – “I’m So Tired”
(1968) by John Lennon (1940-1980) seems like an instance. But the meaning of a song is often
more than just the meaning of each word or each verse. No single line, for example, of Bob
Dylan’s “Blowing in the Wind” (1963) or The Animals’ “Sky Pilot” (1968) or Pink Floyd’s “Us
and Them” (1973) may explicitly state that war is bad, but each of these songs as a whole are
taken to be anti-war pieces. What senders do in these cases is use arrangements of parts already
meaningful in other contexts and perhaps their connotations to craft a “bigger” signal with a
larger message - almost like moving images around on a collage. And yet, other things may be
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Graham goes on to say two more interesting things in this quote. 1. that she thinks dance might be able to express
some things words cannot, and 2. that she suspects dance might be the first art form, given that gesture (a relative of
dance, she says) is so primitive.
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added to amplify or modify the message. A sincere tone as opposed to a sarcastic one will
radically alter a song and how receivers react to it. There are obviously more details, but I think
to hope for a precise semantics of songs is a bit hopeful. Too many things can be added. Little
tricks and possible features – for example, falsetto – show up in songs every day. This is simply
to say that what role a song plays will be determined by more than just the function of the parts
or words of already existing signaling systems the song borrows from, it will also depend on how
those pieced together words are sung (sincerely vs sarcastic; fast vs slow; with emotional pain vs
pleasure), how they are pieced together (in normal sentences or more abstractly), and many other
things.
There are cases of vocal singing, however, that do not involve words – at least in the
usual sense. How do these work? One example is “lilting”, a traditional form of singing
performed in some Gaelic speaking parts of Ireland and Scotland. The “lyrics” are typically
what we would consider nonsensical. One verse in the classic Irish jig “The Queen of the
Rushes” is roughly “Lidle dee doodle dee, Lidle dee doodle dee, Lidle dee doodle dee, Lidle dee
dah”. This is repeated over and over again. The word-like sounds produced by mouth are used
more like notes on an instrument than the way words are used in a Johnny Cash song. And the
singing is usually done in a very rhythmic way, sometimes with many people joining in and
accompanied by dancing or foot stomping and knee slapping. Could this fit the model? I think
so, though the story will be fairly complicated. There are many things the lilting seems to be
doing. One function could be making a rhythm for dancing – as it is often accompanied by this.
Here we have a case like the one where the coxswain calls the stroke but doesn’t do any rowing
himself. Is there anything more to this case? Here, the rhythm is for dancing and entertainment,
not for completing an ordinary task like rowing, and it seems plausible replacing the lilting with
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a metronome wouldn’t really work in the usual context. It appears the melody or something else
in the lilting rather than the rhythm it creates is important here too. Perhaps the melody works to
bring about a good mood in listeners à la Dewey. But whether it does, and if so, how exactly,
I’m not sure. Perhaps the melody represents the mood and brings about the experience of a good
mood. Perhaps it brings about the experience through representing, or perhaps it does it through
a physical or psychological tendency in receivers.
But lilting is also sometimes done without dancing, albeit still in a group. Here it seems
one plausible option could be that lilting is a way for people to come together and share an
experience, knee slapping and all, a signal serving a sort of unifying function along with the rest
of the ritual (more on this sort of idea later). This use of lilting, it seems, would also be a kind of
act-to-act signal, but it would be a peculiar one: it seems it would be one where the signal itself,
or the creation of the signal, is part of the act performed by receivers, who in this case it turns out
will also be senders. Without more empirical research on lilting, it’s hard to say what’s actually
going on in these cases.
Scat singing in jazz is a case that is somewhat similar to lilting but probably better known
to those in modern society. According to American ethnomusicologist Paul Berliner (1994), scat
singing might have originated when jazz musicians attempted to sound out musical notes or
rhythms to themselves or their band mates before playing attempting to play them. In that case,
scat functions as a representation of the sounds of other instruments in an iconic sort of way.
This fits the Lewis model. But this intuitively is not the purpose of scat singing as we actually
see it in most modern jazz. Here’s what seems plausible. Musicians could have noticed that this
“scatting” (used originally to sound out musical notes) sounded cool in its own right, and so then
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incorporated it into their music, not because it sounded like a particular instrument or made do
for when the drummer wasn’t around, but because it was aesthetically interesting to them in its
own right. Then scat singing can function as more than a representation of the sounds of other
musical instruments. But then, in that case, what function does scat play? What does it signal? I
think in that case, scatting is like playing an instrument, and so it will have a similar range of
possible signaling functions just as other instrumental pieces might - say, expressing a feeling, or
bringing about a feeling in the audience, or, if part of a larger piece, then contributing to the
larger whole.
I’ll discuss two more forms of vocal singing that don’t obviously feature lyrics before I
move on to looking at the case of instruments. Yodeling, as it is usually recognized, is agreed by
researchers to have originated in the Central Alps. Supposedly, it was originally used as a way
to call in herds of animals or to communicate the yodeler’s location to other people in the remote
region.81 Why the characteristic modulation in pitch found in yodeling? Usually this was simply
to make the yodel easier to hear at great distances. But sometimes modulations came to be made
in certain ways so as to serve as a sign of the sender’s identity – this was common in forms of
yodeling known as “lailing” and “huving” found in Norway”.82 It’s easy to imagine a back and
forth here. A sender yodels a certain way to let someone know where they are. Others do the
same. With other yodelers out and about it’s hard to tell who the person sending a yodel is. One
sender happens to modulate his yodeling in a unique way, and this allows receivers to identify
the sender. The sender notices this and so makes sure going forward to yodel with the
appropriate modulations. These cases - communicating location and identity, or calling in a herd
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Other forms of yodeling exist elsewhere – for example, in Persia and Central Africa - suggesting the independent
emergence of yodeling of some form in different populations (Plantenga, 2012).
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– are fairly simple examples that fit the Lewis model. In the location case, however, the content
will be partly cue-like. Sending a yodel from a particular location is a natural sign of your (or
someone’s) physical location there.
The last vocal case I’ll look at is throat singing. Mongolian throat singing involves
producing multiple guttural sounding pitches simultaneously for long durations, sometimes with
modulations or even a sort of whistle produced in part by thrusting the jaw forward while
exhaling. Singers use circular breathing to maintain the singing. How could this be an instance
of communication? Despite originating in a remote landscape similar to the Alps, throat singing
is not thought to have been used for location or herding as yodeling was. Rather, Mongolian
throat singing in its different varieties is thought to have been intended to mimic the sounds of
nature, things like the songs of birds, the wailing of a winter storm, or the plaintive cry of an
animal (Levin & Edgerton, 1999). In this case, throat singing seems to have an iconic function.
But who is the receiver? What is the relevant action? It’s only very recently that throat singing
has started to be performed solo and on stages in big cities. The traditional animist worldview of
Mongolians is relevant here. They are said to believe that nature, animals, plants, all these
things, not only have spirits, but also express that spiritual power sonically. Humans can
assimilate this power, they think, by imitating those sounds (Levin & Edgerton, 1999). In this
case, the singing is not a signal and instead seems closer to a sort of tool for accessing certain
spiritual powers, a key for unlocking mystic doors – much like the case of the Diné sand
paintings.
The throat singing performed by the Mongolians is primarily practiced by the men,
supposedly due to beliefs about it causing infertility or miscarriages in women, though
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apparently the prevalence of that belief is changing.83 There is another kind of throat singing:
that of the Inuit, which instead happens to be performed mostly by the women. This form of
singing sounds to the untrained ear a bit like someone hyperventilating, but it is much more
complicated than that and in an eerie way quite beautiful. Singers stand face to face holding
hands and square off trying to match breathing and vocal rhythms until one of them misses a beat
or can go no longer. The singers take turns. When one goes silent, the other vocalizes both
through inhalation and exhalation. Back in the day, the singers used keep their lips very close
using the mouth of the other as a resonator. The practice originated as a game the women played
for entertainment while the men were away hunting, but over time the singing became more
stylized and regimented. Is this signaling? At the start, it seems odd to call it signaling. It
seems more like a game of skill that just happens to use vocals. But over time the vocals came to
be valued for, as with the Mongolian version, things like their similarity to the sounds of nature.
Now we have singers producing a sound a certain way, sometimes with an iconic relationship,
because they know that it will be evaluated by observers for these features. Unlike the
Mongolian case, however, the point of mimicry does not appear to be spiritual. One story that
seems possible is that the more similar to the sounds of nature or the more difficult to perform,
the more impressive to observers the singing is. This would be a sort of mix of roles, where one
of those – impressing by talent – gives the signal a sort of natural-sign like content. But nothing
here seems to make the singing count as signal, as actually communicating something in the
strict sender receiver sense.
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Despite my efforts, I have not been able to find any discussion of why the belief that a connection between throat
singing and infertility exists.

140

Vocal music, though, only makes up one form of music. There is also instrumental music
– music played on a piano or violin, for example. I think music of this sort can work as a signal
as well. A song can have a sort of mood – it’s a sad song, it’s a happy song it’s a trippy song.
Following Dewey, someone might express their mood through the music, and how they do it can
be calibrated by how receivers react. If receivers feel uplifted after a performance of what was
supposed to be a sad song, then the pianist might have to alter his playing – what matters is the
experience generated in receivers by the art piece. As I mentioned earlier, another similar but
different version of the view focuses on the song’s faithful representation of the emotions of the
sender and not so much on the experience the song produces in receivers. In the case of music,
this sort of view is represented by Deryck Cooke (1911-1976) in his 1959 book The Language of
Music – a very controversial book among aestheticians.84 This sort of situation – a song meant to
show how I feel but not necessarily make you feel as I feel - would seem to fit the Lewis model
too. Again, think of a painting of someone who looks sad as opposed to a painting that makes
you experience sadness. This doesn’t preclude the two from being combined in one piece or
from the former perhaps causing the later. But it does seem at least possible in some sense that
the two might be separated. In the case where a song simply makes a receiver experience
sadness but doesn’t do anything else, I don’t want to say that what we have is a signal - this is
more like the case of the wine discussed in the first chapter.
As with paintings and drawings, there seems to be room for conventionality in songs.
The same role might be played by different songs, or different instruments. Remember on the
sender-receiver model, conventionality is a key aspect of signals. “Over the Rainbow” (1939),
might have basically the same effect – at least to me - when played on ukulele as when played on
84

Mainly controversial because many aestheticians doubt that there is a language of music.
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piano. Both “The Unknown Soldier” (1968) and “Eve of Destruction” (1964) can express the
very rough message that “War is bad”. But, again, there will be limits too. Change the notes just
a bit too much, change the key of a song, and you can change the effect of the whole thing.
How about a few more complicated examples? Consider Russian composer Sergei
Prokofiev’s (1891-1953) symphony Peter and the Wolf (1936). Here music is used in at least
two interesting ways. Each character is represented by an instrument – Peter by the violin, the
wolf by the French horn. And each instrument is played in a way that represents the character’s
current situation in the story – if Peter is running, the violin playing is hurried, for example. In
the first case, we have music working as a marker of identity. In the latter, an iconic relationship
is being exploited - the resemblance between hurried instrument playing and hurried movement.
Combining the two gives us Peter running. What we get is an interesting sort of structure to the
song that adds to the larger message. Add on to that that the order, the sequence, in which things
happen in this song is important – as is the case with many other songs – and we seem to have an
example of a song that is encoded and compositional. We seem to have a case of a song that fits
many of the markers researchers care about when they talk about syntax and language.
Of course, in this case, the music had a more explicit structured signaling function. It
was intended to convey information in this systematic and organized way. But as we’ve seen
with other songs we’ve discussed so far, a sort of structure is present in many of these cases too.
Changes in key can change the meaning of a song, changes in pace, changes in how the parts are
played, the order in which the parts of the song are played usually matters. How loudly and
intensely some instrumental part is played may correspond in some systematic way to the
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intensity of some emotion, perhaps. Many different things can be combined to ultimately
determine a songs content.
For another example, consider Hungarian composer and pianist Franz Liszt’s (18111886) Hungarian Rhapsody No. 2 (1847). The order of the parts of the song seem to matter to
some extent. The song would sound weird and chopped up if its parts were moved around. Does
each instrument or note correspond to something? Not obviously. But the lassan of the song,
the first part, is generally agreed to have a dark and melancholic mood, and this seems to be due
to the pace of the instrumental playing and the use of C-sharp minor as the home key.85 The
friska part of the song on the other hand, the second part, is in C-sharp major and later F-sharp
major and is fast and often loud, and is generally thought to have a playful or happy and
energetic mood.86 In the friska the use of C-sharp major and F-sharp major seems to give it it’s
lighter mood and the fast playing seems to give it it’s feel of energy and playfulness. Here the
pace of the song seems to map systematically to feelings of energy and the keys seem to map to
something like mood. Liszt’s use of what’s known as the “gypsy scale” in the song also seems
to bring to the composition a connotation of Hungary – one of the places where such scales were
often heard in local music, especially the folk music. Here we get a song that seems to be
reminiscent of Hungary and represents the somberness and the playfulness of the place at that
time, an attempt to capture the ethos of 1800s Hungary. What we get is a song that seems to be a
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A lassan (Hungarian for "slowly") is the slow part of the Hungarian folk dance called the csárdás. Most of
Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsodies get their inspiration from this dance.
86
The friska is the fast part of the csárdás.
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case of an encoded compositional or at the very least an encoded combinatorial signal and not
one that is so, for lack of better words, explicit in its structuring as the Peter and the Wolf case.87
In short, a sort of syntax seems to be possible in music as in spoken and written language.
Some cases will be encoded and compositional like supposedly paradigm cases of language.
Many cases, however, I think, will probably fall closer to something like an organized
combinatorial signal, or an encoded combinatorial one.
Earlier we saw examples of signals with a sort of act-to-act character to them. Is there
anything like this in music? There seem to be a couple close fits. Going back to vocals for a
moment, one example here seems to be what are known as “work songs”, where these are not so
much songs about work – though sometimes they are – as much as they are songs used to help
facilitate work. These pieces are usually a cappella and provide a rhythm by which the task at
hand can be coordinated. Examples include marching songs, sea shanties, rowing songs, and
chain gang music. Here again roles are mixed. The songs typically have a larger message or
story but they primarily serve the function of keeping the beat, the rhythm. For an example
involving only instruments, consider drums. These are often used to keep a beat in various
songs, acting as a sort of act to act coordinator for the band members. Drums are also used for
beat making in dances and in rowing. Also consider war drums, the kind carried on the
battlefield by the British and Colonial Armies during the American Revolution – these were used
to keep marching pace and sometimes give orders. Or for an ancient example, take the taigu
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Another song that has sometimes been thought to describe a place in a similar manner is Italian composer Luigi
Boccerin’s Musica notturna delle strade di Madrid (1780). This song is thought by some to be reminiscent of the
night-time streets of Madrid, Spain.
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drum of the Chinese and Mongolian armies. These too were used primarily for keeping
marching pace (Norris, 2012).
I’ll take a look at a few more cases of music before moving on to dance. Conch shells
have been used as instruments of sorts since at least Neolithic times, and we see them appear in
many different cultures. In pre-colonial Tahiti, the conch was used for a variety of purposes,
though I’ll only discuss a few here. One appears to have been to announce or call Tahitians to
major ceremonies (Hedley, 1896).88 In the book The Sacred Chank of India (1914), English
ethnologist James Hornell writes of the conch being used this way in that country: "From the
earliest times the conch has also been used in India to call the people to their sacrifices and other
religious rites…” (p. 124). This sort of use fits the original Lewis model. The state is the
occurrence of a major ceremonial event, the sender is the organizer, the receiver is the other
members of the group, and the action is preparing for or attending the ceremony. A somewhat
similar and more western example might be the tolling of a church bell, used for much the same
purpose. Or, for a military example, the use of bugling for announcing various events and
rotations.
William Ellis (1794-1872), an English missionary visiting Tahiti in the early 1800s,
mentions the conch also being used, among other things, as a sort of battle cry: “The sound of
the trumpet, or shell, a species of murex, used in war to stimulate in action… was more horrific
than that of the drum” (Ellis, 1829, p. 283). The drum Ellis is speaking of here is the Tahitian
drum – but more (again) on drums in a moment. Ellis speculated that the haunting sound of the
conch was partly intentional. Pointing out that the larger shells seemed to make the most
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ominous sounds, he writes in his journal: “The largest shells were usually selected for this
purpose. (p. 283). Here we have a shell being chosen for the effect it has on listeners – in this
case, presumably fear on the side of enemies. A similar case from the mythology of ancient
China involves the army of the Yellow Emperor using drums of walrus skin to frighten the tribal
leader Chiyou’s soldiers and put his army in disarray (Filipiak, 2014). We have a sort of
feedback, a back and forth, and yet part of what is being taken advantage of is a psychological
tendency. In the case this is all that is going on, we don’t seem to have a signal – again, we have
more of a wine case. Calls like these, though, are sometimes used with dual purpose, with
members of one’s own group in mind as receivers too. Sometimes these calls also serve to
motivate and inspire one’s fellow group members – hence the “stimulate in action” part of the
earlier quote. The infamous rebel yell of the Confederates during the American Civil War is a
good vocal example. The point was to scare the enemy and to raise the moral of one’s fellow
soldiers. There could be a back and forth here as well. What we seem to get is a signal with
different possible roles which could occur combined or separately. But this “motivating” and
“stimulating” use is also not a signaling use. Again, it appears to be a wine case, a taking
advantage of a psychological tendency. We can get a communicative use, however, if those
signals – the conch, shell, or yells - were also used, say, to act as a declaration of violent action.
Then we get sender-receiver style signaling.
Let’s take a look again now at drums. Drums occur in many cultures and perform many
different jobs. We’ve already briefly looked at their use in coordinating playing instruments,
dancing, and marching, but for a more explicitly communicative use of drums, consider the
“talking drums” used in pre-European West Africa and Papua New Guinea. These fit the model
too. The most common kind are known as “slit gongs”, consisting of a long hollowed out log
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with a slit along its length upon the edges of which players hit their mallets. The sound can
travel for miles, even through the thick jungles. In the case of the Kele people of the Congo,
their spoken language is tonal and rhythmic, and what they apparently did is mimic the tones and
rhythms of their language with their drum playing (Finnegan, 2012). This is an interesting case
in that what the group in effect did was transfer a signaling system over to a new but similar
context, from one instrument (the vocal cords) to another one that sounded similar and had
similar available moves (the drums). They did this when they could have instead just come up
with a whole new convention when it came to communication with drums. Messages conveyed
by the signaling system could even apparently be as complicated as, for example, “The
missionary is coming up river to our village tomorrow. Bring water and firewood to his house”.
In the Kele case, the drum “words” corresponding to the spoken words, were in some cases
modified to reduce ambiguity in the message, such as by repetition. Eventually the drum
language became somewhat unique from the spoken version although still very similar
(Carrington, 1949). Here it seems we also find a case of an encoded compositional signal.
That’s a lot about music. Let’s turn now to dance. Dance is rather old. How old is
unclear, but rock art on some cave walls in India seems to suggest dance might go back as far as
30k years ago (Mathpal, 1984). And it comes in many forms. The primary “sign vehicle” here –
to use one of Peirce’s terms – is the movement of the body and its parts. Since there are so many
kinds of dance and no one kind of dance seems to be archetypal, I’ll just dive into a few
examples, some fairly common, others less often discussed.
Consider rain dances, performed all over the world but most famously by the indigenous
peoples of the southwestern United States. Here the point of the dance is to bring about rain –
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these performances are sometimes called “rainmaking” ceremonies. Are these dances instances
of communication? There seem to be a few options here. Suppose a dance is simply intended to
modify the weather, perhaps similar to a very elaborate turning of the knob on a thermostat. In
this case, it seems fair to say we don’t have an instance of dance as communication – there’s no
back and forth. What brings about the rain is the physical (or mystical) effects of the dance, not
some communicative aspect of it. But suppose that the case is more like that of the Hopi Snake
Dance. During the Snake Dance, performers wear traditional ceremonial clothing and sing and
chant while carrying live rattlesnakes. Hopi legend has it that the dance serves as a prayer for
rain, the message of which the snakes then carry to the gods who, like the snakes, live
underground (James, 1990). In this case, things are complicated. There is an attempt to
communicate – a dance is being performed for the snakes and in turn the gods (both intended
receivers) and there is an intention that a message get across. But is the attempt successful? Is
there some sort of feedback between senders and receivers – between dancers, snakes, and the
gods? It’s not clear. The Hopi might take the regular correspondence between their dance and
the subsequent occurrence of rain as evidence of their attempt at communication being
successful and this might reinforce the dancing behavior on their side (the sender side), but
whether this is actually good evidence of communicative success is doubtful. We’d need to see
evidence of reinforcement and the like on the receiver side.
Earlier we looked at music meant to strike fear in an opponent or to motivate one’s group
members. A case that is similar to this, and which combines movement and vocalizations, is the
War Haka (peruperu) of the Māori of New Zealand. This ritual, invoking stomping and loud
shouted vocals, was performed primarily to intimidate the enemy. But in this case, the signal
also takes advantage of natural sign or cue-like information coming from the sender side via the
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actual viewing of physically intimidating and well-coordinated warriors performing the dance.
An observer is intimidated not just by the sounds and movements but by seeing the muscles and
size of the warriors. So, it is not quite a paradigm case of signaling in the Lewis sense.
An additional cue-like content might be possible for the Hopi Snake Dance too. It takes
guts to hold a venomous snake such as a rattler, and so by performing the dance performers also
demonstrate their bravery. Other cue or natural sign-like options seem possible. Some dances
are highly sexualized and may partly serve to display sexual information, including information
about the dancer’s body. I’ll discuss cases in this area in more detail later in this chapter.
One thing that seems fairly common in other forms of art is iconic sign use. Is there
anything like this in dance? We often see masks used in plays, or elaborate costumes. One
example I think worth looking at is the Chinese Lion Dance. There are different variations of the
dance, and no one is really sure of the exact origins or original purpose, but the dance in present
day typically involves as its centerpiece a gorgeously constructed fake lion operated by two
dancers wearing it like a costume. In some sense the lion seems to have a sort of iconic function.
It is meant to look like a lion and is in fact described as such. But why make a lion costume and
dance in this way? Some have suggested that the purpose of the dance is to ward off or scare
away evil spirits (Wang, 1985; Schrempf, 2002). Assuming that this is achieved through the
dancers looking and acting aggressively like a lion and that similarity scaring the observing
(receiving) spirits, then it seems like we have something more like a psychological tendency
being taken advantage of than an actual case of signaling. There isn’t really any back and forth
here. It’s more like the wine case. There is a back and forth between human observers of the
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dance and the look of the lion, and yet, the human observers are, according to the legend, not the
main intended audience.
Other cases of dance with costumes seem to fit a little better and also seem to have some
similarity to the Peter and the Wolf case. Consider something like a narrative ballet such as the
Snow Queen (1844) or the Nutcracker (1892). Here dancers are dressed to represent characters
and the dancers act out the actions of the characters, in effect creating a representation of the
event before receivers’ eyes. This is somewhat similar to Peter being represented by the violin
and his actions being represented systematically by the violin’s playing. There are many ways to
convey information about an event, but dances and songs such as these seem to take advantage
of tendencies in us to use iconic similarities and to try to make sense of things in narrative form.
There’s a sort of structure here: the combination of masks or costumes identifying characters, the
manner in which the characters dance, and the order in which parts are played out. In most cases
there will be more to the mix than this. And there could have been and probably was back and
forth here too. Does that dancer look enough like a queen that the audience will recognize her as
such? Does Hercules killing the lion in scene one and coming out wearing a lion skin in scene
two get across that the lion skin is from the lion he killed earlier? Do people interpret my
dancing this way as representing the character as ecstatic? Either way, what we appear to get
here is not just a case of a dance being communicative, but of dancing having an encoded
compositional structure. We appear to have a case of dance that hits the key marks of language
too.
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Narrative ballets and dances are very much like standard plays and films. A lot of the
same principles will apply. Since we’ll be talking about films explicitly later, I’ll hold back on
mentioning more in this area until we get to films specifically.
Some dances that appear to be communicative are harder to explain. Yvonne Rainer, an
American post-modern dancer, has a dance called Trio A (1978) that involves no sound from the
dancers and no musical accompaniments whatsoever – a completely (or nearly completely) silent
dance. About the dance, she has said, “[It] would be about a kind of pacing where a pose is
never struck,” and “There would be no dramatic changes, like leaps. There was a kind of folksy
step that had a rhythm to it, and I worked a long time to get the syncopation out of it.” (Rainer,
1999, p. 64). There is a sender here and an audience, but what exactly the response in receivers
is supposed to be or what function the dance plays is unclear – at least to me, that is. Perhaps it
is more similar to the Duchamp case, where maybe the point or at least one point of the work is
to disrupt contemporary artistic conventions or to say something in a sort of meta way about
dance itself.
A final way we might think about dance being communicative comes to us from ScottPhillips (2012). He considers “partnered dancing”, dancing where there is a lead and a follow.
This sort of dance he thinks fits the ostensive-inferential model of communication:
But a better way to think about lead and follow is in terms of the inferential
model. The lead provides evidence for what they have in mind for a section of
music (different moves, or movements), and they might do this in a number of
different ways (for example, a longer stretch, or a delayed movement). These
differences can be of various sizes, and if they are sufficiently large then fluent
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users of the language would identify the two different forms as distinct things.
Just as the same word can have two different meanings, even in the same context,
if it is produced with two sufficiently different tones of voice, the same movement
can communicate different things to a follow if it is produced in two different
ways. For their part, followers must take the evidence the lead has provided, and
choose how to interpret it. Certainly, there is scope for creative interpretation, just
as there is in language. Some followers are rather literal in their following, but the
very best play a more active role: there is almost always more than one way to
interpret a lead, and the best following involves making those choices as best to
fit the moment. (Phillips, 2012, Part 2)
This is an attractive story. But Scott-Phillips also mentions that he doesn’t think the code model
can cover the case, and yet he doesn’t give an actual argument for why he thinks the code model
– or for our purposes, the sender-receiver model, a form of the code model – doesn’t work in this
instance. I think he is wrong and that the sender-receiver model can cover it. Read his passage
again and then recall our discussion from Chapter 1 on the code model, context, and things like
sarcasm. The sender-receiver model will allow for the sort of moves Scott-Phillips is describing
here. In dancing, a “longer stretch” or a “delayed movement” can work as a signal and can have
associations with certain desired moves in certain contexts. There could be feedback. A sender
might notice receivers react to certain moves in certain contexts in certain ways, and so take
advantage of that. A receiver might notice that a sender follows up certain moves in certain
contexts a certain way and try to adapt to that, and so on. The sender-receiver model seems to
fit.
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When we talked about drawing and painting, we also talked about accuracy. Does
anything like that make sense in song and dance? I think in the case of songs there are a few
ways this can work. The first obvious way is storytelling music. Songs that tell stories can tell
more or less accurate stories. This is similar to our depicting case of accuracy in the drawing and
painting case. And this kind of accuracy in music need not be in vocal form either. A song
structured like Peter and the Wolf could potentially be used to describe real events and would
depict things simply instrumentally via systematic mappings. Accuracy involving the depiction
of emotions seems to have a place in song too, potentially using systematic mappings to things
like those discussed just a moment earlier in the Liszt case – minor chords, tempo, etc. Is there
room for the sort of imprecision we saw in drawing and painting? Definitely. A guitar player
might accidently play an extra note or leave one out; the note’s presence or absence need not
have great significance and need not be a result of something like poor acoustics, audio quality,
or fidelity.
How about dance? A narrative dance like a ballet seems like an obvious case where
something like an event can be more or less accurately depicted. And this could involve the use
of systematic mappings – mappings of dancers to subjects, movements of dancers to movements
of people, etc. In the emotive accuracy case, mappings might be possible in dance too – slow
movements to sadness, and so on. Imprecision is just as possible here. In some cases, for
example, the Hopi rain dance, if certain moves aren’t made, then the dance has been performed
incorrectly, it’s not the snake dance. But in many other cases of dance, missing a step, an arm
movement, simply won’t matter or won’t be features that should be taken to have some
significance, it will still count as the same dance.
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3.4.b. Scores
Go back to music for just a moment. We looked at some of the ways songs, the combination of
sounds, can work as signals, forms of communication. But what about things like music scores
or sheet music? Or the very basic sequence of chords I write down on a notepad for the little
song I’ve just started coming up with? Do things like these count as signals or communication?
Two people who have looked at this issue are American philosophers Nelson Goodman
(1906-1998) and Daniel Miller. Goodman’s view, expressed in his 1968 book Languages of Art,
is that music scores identify particular musical works. Goodman writes:
“A score, whether or not ever used as a guide for a performance, has as a primary
function the authoritative identification of a work from performance to
performance.” (p. 128)
So, a music score, on Goodman’s view, primarily lets you know whether this song you just heard
was an instance of Bach’s Preludium in E Major or not or some other song or not. How does it
do this? Goodman’s account is somewhat complicated, but the short and simple version appears
to be that what’s important is conventional notation and symbol combination. There are atomic
symbols - individual symbols such as the eighth note symbol (Figure 3.18. ) and staff lines
(Figure 3.19.) that can stand for individual things: how long to play a note and at what pitch.

Figure 3.18. A traditional

Figure 3.19. Staff lines.

eighth note symbol.
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And then there are compounds of these atomic symbols. Scores, on Goodman’s view, are one
large compound symbol. Conventionally mapping these atomic symbols together, we can get a
musical score that picks out a particular song (Figure 3.20).

Figure 3.20. An example of a music score. Based on Herbie Hancock’s “Watermelon
Man” (1962).

A number of philosophers have been critical of Goodman’s view. The first trouble is the lack of
detail. How is it that combinations of atomic symbols work in this case? How does order or
arrangement play a role? Do systematic or sequential mappings matter? What kind of
conventionality is important? Goodman doesn’t really give an in-depth analysis of these
features. Another problem with Goodman’s view is how strictly he requires a performance to
adhere to a score to count as an instance of it. Goodman writes:
“Since complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine
instance of a work, the most miserable performance without any actual mistakes
does count as such an instance, while the most brilliant performance with a single
wrong note does not.” (p. 168)
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He seems to require perfection when it comes to following what is written down. Perhaps in a
very strict sense this conception of what counts as an instance of a song might be right, and in
some cases strict adherence to performance might matter (for example, in certain ritual
ceremonies or music school exams), but it also seems common not to lean so heavily on rigidity
of performance. Jimi Hendrix’s performance of the “Star Spangled Banner” (1969), despite its
extreme deviations from the traditional score, is still, I think, worth considering a performance of
the “Star Spangled Banner” (1814) - just an altered one.
There have been other criticisms of Goodman’s take on scores. Ziff (1971) and Webster
(1971) argue that Goodman’s account fails to reflect the meaning and actual usage of scores.
Elkins (1999) argues against Goodman’s requirement that symbols be “indifferent” – that is,
that an atomic symbol not play two communicative roles at once. Virginia Anderson (2014)
notes that Goodman’s account doesn’t seem to adequately handle graphic scores, scores
representing music using symbols and methods outside standard music notation. Here is an
example of a graphic score due to American composer John Cage (1912-1992).

Figure 3.21. A section of the score for Water Walk (1959). Cage, J. (1959) Water Walk
[Score]. New York Public Library, John Cage Unbound a Living Archive.
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/johncage/node/22
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More simply, though, I think Goodman’s view is problematic just from its big picture
idea. Identifying a performance of a song really just doesn’t seem to be the “primary”
purpose of some piece of musical notation, or at least that doesn’t feel like the best or
most accurate way of talking about things.
Miller (2017) discusses music scores in the context of discussing maps. I don’t want to
get into an analysis of maps yet, since we’ll do that in detail in Chapter 4 as well as discuss more
of Miller and Goodman’s ideas about maps there. But I think it’s worth taking a look at what
Miller thinks musical scores do – as far as communication goes - and how he thinks they do it,
returning to the map side of things later. Here are some examples of what Miller says:
… the notational symbols of scores constitute just one of multiple modes of
representation and depiction harnessed by this framework. (p. 1)
…scores represent an array of highly structured acoustic morphologies and
performative actions through two-dimensional, visual conventions. (p. 4)
There are other quotes that give a bit of further insight into Miller’s view, but I’m afraid
ultimately his take on things is not very thoroughly worked out. He isn’t clear on exactly what
the purpose of a musical score is, whether it’s primarily descriptive or tells the reader to do
something or both. I should mention he readily admits this in the article, that he isn’t going to
have space to work this all out. What he does say about “depiction” and “performative actions”,
however – as seen in the quotes above - suggests that maybe he thinks a combination of these
things is what matters, or that maybe one matters sometimes and the other in other situations.
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My take is that things like scores and even the notes on the notepad are signals and that
they usually primarily communicate instructions, that is, that they generally are used for guiding
action. A quarter note placed on this line here in this place means roughly something like “Press
down on this key of the piano like this”. When I write down a G major chord on my notepad,
I’m telling myself that this is what comes next in my playing pattern when I want to play this
song on guitar again later. They are instructions I can write for myself or for others. Depending
on the way some score is used, I can even see how there might be a sense in which a score can
work as a sort of external form of memory. I write a score to be used by myself at a later time,
since I know I won’t remember how to play the song all the way through. Or I can write a score
on a more durable sheet of something or try to preserve it in some other way so that future
generations might use it to learn to play the same music.
This last example seems to offer something that gets somewhat close to a “depicting” use
of scores. How might something like that work? One way a score might be depicting in a sense
is if there is some state it is about. One way I could maybe see that working is if a work in some
way communicates what I “have in my head”. I have a song going on in my head, I want to
write down some notes for it so I can try and play it on the piano later. A similar case is a
musician attending a concert and writing down on his notepad a score for one of the new songs
he just heard. If the musician then turned around and used that written score to help him play
that song later, then I think we’d have a case with the scale leaning more toward the action side
than the description side as far as content goes. But suppose the musician wrote the score down,
not because he had any intention of ever using it later to play something, but because he had
made a bet with the composer that he could figure out the composer’s song and he wrote it down
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to show the composer after the concert. Then we seem to have a case with a balance more
toward the descriptive side.
Another case closer to the descriptive side is seen in the graphic scores of German
designer Rainer Wehinger. In the 1970s, Wehinger created a graphic score – she called it a
"Hörpartitur" or "audio score" – to accompany the electronic composition Artikulation (1958) by
Hungarian composer György Ligeti (Figure 3.22).

Figure 3.22. Audio score for Artikulation. Wehinger, R. (1970). Ligeti - Artikulation:
Elektronische Musik - Eine Hörpartitur von Rainer Wehinger [Score]. Mainz: B. Schott's
Söhne.

This score seems to have been made primarily with a descriptive role rather than a prescriptive
one. It seems to be more suited to and intended for “following along” while listening to a song
and making sense of what you’re hearing than it does for being used to play a piece (Service,
2009). It’s also rather aesthetically pleasing. And indeed, it seems some scores, especially
graphic scores, are made with an evaluative purpose as one of, if not their primary, roles. So,
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scores seem to be capable of being more or less descriptive or prescriptive. They also seem to be
able to be made to be evaluated.
But how is it that Wehinger’s score is a score of Ligeti’s song and not something else?
How does that work? There’s another way scores might be interpreted to be descriptive in some
sense. Sheet music, tabs, even graphic scores contain some interesting features related to our
discussion of syntax in the first chapter. Consider this example of a guitar tab.

Figure 3.23. A section of a guitar tab.

In this example, we have a column on the left starting with a lower case ‘e’ at the top and ending
with an upper case ‘E’ at the bottom. Each row in the column corresponds to a string on the
guitar. The bottom most row is the thickest string, the second row to the bottom corresponds to
the second thickest string, and so on. We have a systematic mapping. The letters, correspond to
the tunings of each string. Another systematic mapping. The ‘0’ near the bottom left represents
playing the largest string of a standard 6 string guitar open (that is, plucking that string without
putting your finger down on any of the frets). Each number corresponds to the fret on which the
guitar player should press their finger on that string. Another sequence. And then we have the
numbers arranged in order of when they are supposed to be played relative to the other notes.
Another (temporal) sequence. We have a signal that tells a receiver what string to play, tuned to
what, when, and on what fret (if any). The ‘/’ between some of the numbers tells the player to
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“slide” their finger from the fret before the ‘/’ to the one after it. Even more features can be
added.
This example gives us an idea of the complex nature of something like this, how it can fit
into the sender-receiver model and how it all seems to work. But it also shows us how these
mappings and how they are arranged can in a way play a sort of depicting or descriptive role.
They seem to capture something about their target domain, bear some sort of similarity. If you
look at the tab, it is almost shaped like the neck of a guitar with how the strings are lined out.
This story is roughly the same for sheet music. Take a look at the sheet music for the
Beatles song “Hey Jude” (1968).

Figure 3.24. Sheet music section. Based on “Hey Jude” (1968) by the Beatles.

The symbol near the bottom left that looks like two fours represents the time measure, or how
many beats are in each bar of the song and how long a beat is. The top number represents how
many beats per measure while the bottom number communicates, in this case, that each of those
beats is a quarter note in length. A note having white in the middle rather than being all black
represents a half note (in other words, half of a whole note, in the case of 4/4 time, the duration
of 4 beats). A black note without the tail of the eighth note represents a quarter duration. The
upward curved line stretching from “Jude” to right before “don’t” is called a “tie” and is used to
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communicate that the two connected notes (of the same pitch) should be played as a single note
lasting as long as the duration of the two notes put together. The little dot to the right of the
hollow note indicates to add a duration of half the notes original length to its total duration. Each
line and space on the sheet – in Western music typically 5 lines and 4 spaces - represents a
different musical pitch, and it does this in a mapped and sequential order - a note’s placement on
the lines represents in effect which key on the piano should be played, keys that also happen to
be organized in a sequential ABCDEFG order. The top set of lines in the score is for the right
hand and the bottom line is for the left hand. The order in which the notes appear is mapped to
the order in which they should be played. A receiver combines all these things to narrow down
the right actions. Again, we seem to get examples of signals that are compositional and encoded
and that seem to take advantage of some similarity between the way things are arranged in the
signal and how they are arranged in the target domain, some part of the world.
Perhaps it’s not surprising that this sort of thing can work in graphic scores too. In the
case of Wehinger’s design, there was even a key explaining the mappings.

Figure 3.25. The key to Wehinger’s graphic score. Wehinger, R. (1970). Ligeti Artikulation: Elektronische Musik - Eine Hörpartitur von Rainer Wehinger [Score].
Mainz: B. Schott's Söhne.
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In the John Cage (1912-1992) piece from Figure 3.21, there was a sequential systematic mapping
of numbers to time and from drawn instruments to instruments to be played. The flexibility in
designing scores is a rather incredible thing. There’s even a score out there now in video form
due to Welsh musician Rhys Edwards (2020). In the case of Rhys’s score, the similarity
captured seems to be that between the rows of the amphitheater filmed and the lines of a stave
and the location of the people walking up and down the rows of the amphitheater and the notes to
be played.
Miller (2017) notices all this, how there is flexibility in score design and how there tends
to be this use of certain similarities between scores and their songs, but he doesn’t say much
about it. He notes that American philosopher Elizabeth Camp (2007) talks about something like
this in some of her work on maps, arguing that certain semantic objects, namely maps, mirror
within themselves certain relations between parts of what they’re about. She calls this feature of
a signal “isomorphism”. What is isomorphism exactly? This is a big clunky conversation and
I’m going to hold off on that for now. Camp brings it up when talking about maps. So does
Miller. Given this and that Chapter 4 is dedicated to maps, I want to wait on discussing this
issue until then, until we talk about maps in more detail. Until then, I’d like to discuss one more
thing about scores and then move on to the art form of film.
How does sheet music differ from the actual song played? I think scores differ from the
music that is actually produced in that scores are a set of instructions for how to produce the
music – it’s not the other way around (at least, not usually).89 The music that is played is what
carries some additional communicative purpose or function. Take, for example, the use of
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I’m assuming it would be possible to make a song that tells the listener how to write itself down to be played later.
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trumpet flourishes, sometimes called “fanfare”, to notify guests of an event of the arrival of a
particular guest of honor such as a Queen. The fanfare might communicate the overall message
that the Queen has arrived. It might have the function of announcing this kind of event. But the
sheet music does not seem to do that or have that function, and it seems it wouldn’t be enough on
its own to do that or be the right kind of thing to use for that purpose. And that seems to be how
things typically will be. I think the distinction is further seen when we consider that it seems
extremely rare (if it ever even happens at all) for someone to write a score down and consider the
job done as far as adequately expressing themselves. There is, I wager, usually an expectation
that what is written down will eventually be used to play the song. Though, I suppose I can
imagine someone who can no longer play for some reason but who wishes to express themselves
musically and feels able to do that through writing scores. But I think this would be a rare case
and an odd one. Moreover, there are other considerations for the separation between written
music and played music. Sheet music need not be written at all for some song with a certain
meaning to be played. The fanfare can go on even without the sheet music being used – one
simply need remember how to play the song; in other cases, a new song with no sheet music yet
might be used instead. Sheet music is really a kind of middle man and side case when it comes
to music. Important in some cases, but not the same thing. A similar story will apply, I think, to
the relationship between things like scripts and plays and written choreography and actual
dancing.
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3.5 Statues and Monuments
One salient form of art is the statue, monument, or sculpture. These go back at least 30,000
years. Statues are interesting because they are often public and also often of someone or
something. Consider the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. or the statue of Duke
Kahanamoku in Honolulu. Could statues of at least some form be communication?
I think the answer to that question is yes. There is a sender (the sculptor) and a receiver
(the private audience or the public). What is being communicated? In the case of something like
the Duke or Lincoln statues, one thing that seems to be communicated is what the person the
statue is of looked like. In this case, as with the finches, the location of parts relative to others
will matter, their arrangement will matter, and the parts of the statue correspond to parts of the
real person. Similarly, the lengths and widths of the body parts might map systematically to the
lengths and widths of the real Duke’s body parts. We get an encoded compositional structure,
and, more than that, a three-dimensional one.
As with the other art forms we’ve already looked at, accuracy has a place in some statues
and monuments too. Systematic mappings, such as that from the real arm length of a subject to
the arm length of a statue’s arm, can be exploited for the purpose of depictional accuracy.
Emotive accuracy is trickier, but one way that might work is by mapping the facial expressions
and positional body language of real subjects to statues. In the case of statues that are more
abstract, I find it harder to speculate how this might work but don’t rule it out – it could be
something similar to the abstract painting cases, with certain shapes suggesting energy, etc.
Regarding imprecision, there is room for that in statues and monuments too. Consider the
monument of Martin Luther King Junior in Washington D.C. (Figure 3.26).
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Figure 3.26. Dr. MLK Jr. Memorial in Washington, D.C. Shugarts, B. (n.d.). Stone of
Hope 2 [Photograph]. National Park Service. https://www.nps.gov/media/photo/galleryitem.htm?pg=0&id=2D0217CA-1DD8-B71C-0772A0C13C24BBB1&gid=313AF6501DD8-B71C-07476509DBD56534

In some respects, this work is extremely detailed. You can even see the individual lines on his
knuckles and some of the veins in his hands (Figure 3.27).
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Figure 3.27. Close-up of Dr. King memorial. Shugarts, B. (n.d.). Stone of Hope 1
[Photograph]. National Park Service. https://www.nps.gov/media/photo/galleryitem.htm?pg=0&id=2CF47D2F-1DD8-B71C-079F463EAF89C187&gid=313AF6501DD8-B71C-07476509DBD56534

And yet, no matter how close you look, you will never see any of Dr. King’s arm hair, freckles
or moles, or the actual color of his skin. And this is not a resolution issue of the sort we talked
about earlier. In Figure 3.26, he’s also missing the rest of his legs. This is still a statue of Dr.
King. Not every work is such that every detail need be included and not every addition or
omission of some detail need have some significant representational purpose. In other works,
this may be how things work, but the lesson again is that doesn’t always have to be the case.
So, many depicting statues are not perfect copies of their subjects. But one salient and
common way statues are often not perfect copies of their subjects is in terms of size or scale.
The Lincoln statue, for example, is much bigger than the real Abe Lincoln. Same goes with the
MLK Jr. memorial. Why might depicting statues deviate in this way from their counterparts in
real life? Arguably, there is more to many statues that depict a person than just depicting them.
Recent debates in the U.S. over Confederate statues offer some insight. There complaints were
sometimes over how the statues “honored” or “glorified” those who enslaved others and those
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who fought to maintain that system of oppression.90 It was sometimes suggested that by having
statues of these people in public, on such a grand scale, sometimes endorsed or funded by public
institutions, we were putting them out there as role models, people whose values citizens should
adopt and thereby whose actions they should emulate. In this case, we have something like a
signal but the content is a mix of description and prescription – it tells viewers both what a
person looked like and suggests to them what their values should be or what the values of the
state are. Paintings, of course, can play this role too – the portrait of Moa Zedong that hangs in
Tiananmen Square might be a good example or German-American artist Emanuel Leutze’s 1851
painting Washington Crossing the Delaware. These cases, especially the statue cases, can fit the
model, but they take us into group communication territory, and so, I’d rather hold off on talking
about them more until I talk about other instances of group communication later in this chapter.
It’s worth noting that this way of looking at statues and other “honoring” art is not new.
American philosopher of art Noël Carroll has defended such an interpretation of some statues in
his 2005 essay “Art and Recollection” extending the lesson to instances of just about every other
kind of art too (poetry, film, novels, paintings, music) – the Liszt piece discussed earlier might be
a good music example. “Memorial art,” Carroll writes, “transmits the ethos of a culture. It
celebrates the honored dead, underscoring their virtues, and calls upon the living to emulate
them. The praise it lavishes on the deceased is intended to encourage later generations to be like
them.” (p. 8). Carroll points out this sort of art has often been neglected in the study of aesthetics
and even considered non-art due to its memorializing function. I won’t go into Carroll’s
arguments for this point – I encourage readers to take a look at his essay – but I follow Carroll in
considering such art actual art too. Art can have many functions, and just because it was created
90
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for a certain purpose doesn’t mean it isn’t art in the sense that most of us use when we talk about
it. Carroll goes further with his analysis, however. He thinks not only is honoring art art and
that art can play this honoring role, he thinks that perhaps art is one of the best tools we have for
doing this. He writes, “It is not obvious that any other practice transmits the ethos of a culture as
well as art does.” (p. 9). He also believes that perhaps this is one of the best explanations for the
continued creation of such art which is often expensive and requires great resources. I follow
Carroll on this, and will address this latter issue in more depth later in this chapter.
Carroll also mentions a few other functions memorializing art might play. One of those
is the intimidation of enemies and the building of confidence in group members. Carroll writes,
“Many ancient war memorials celebrate strength, functioning both to terrify prospective enemies
with the power of the ruler and to reassure the native populace that he has what it takes to defend
them.” (p. 13). This might be similar in some respect to the Haka case. Here there could be a
sort of natural meaning coming from the piece. If a ruler or country is able to expend such great
resources, command the creation and coordination needed to create such art, and has the skill to
accomplish it, that gives off natural meaning regarding those things. But if the intimidation of
enemies and the confidence building in the group members is done through the depicting that is
going on in the piece, say of a strong looking ruler or of members of the group engaging in
heroic or brave feats, then we get something more like a signal, something that is intimidating
and confidence building through what it depicts rather than through what we can infer from it in
terms of mutual information.
I’ll consider one more of Carroll’s suggestions regarding the function of memorial art.
He says that some memorial art can function to “promote consolation and healing”. He
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considers war memorials in this case. “The memorial consoles the bereaved—both his
immediate loved ones and fellow citizens who share their sense of loss—by reminding them that
the fallen did not die in vain and that the living remain connected to them in the sense of owing
them a genuine debt.” Is this a communicative function? Here’s how this might work. What
these memorials might communicate is that this tragedy has happened, that these people have
died and that the state recognizes this, remembers it, and will do what it must to make good on
that debt. In that case, I can see how these pieces might console the bereaved - such a message
delivered in simply the form of a sincere spoken statement from a leader of the state might help
console the bereaved. But if these pieces console the bereaved and promote healing primarily
through some other means, for example, suppose it is the process of constructing the pieces that
consoles and helps heal, then we’re not dealing with a signal – at least not in respect to that
aspect of the piece. Some memorializing pieces might have a combination of these features. I
might for example, gain some closure in part through the process of writing a eulogy for my
grandmother while my family (the receivers) might gain some consolation through hearing the
eulogy when I read it out loud at her funeral ceremony.
Another role honoring statues or other art might play, and one not discussed by Carroll, is
a sort of territory marking. Consider again the Confederate monuments. A recent publication by
the Southern Poverty Law Center (2019) reveals that most of these statues were put up in two
specific time periods: in the 1910s and 1920s (the Jim Crow era) and later in the 1950s and
1960s, during the Civil Rights Movement. Their data also shows an increase in the construction
of Confederate monuments on courthouse grounds after the landmark Plessy v. Ferguson case in
1896, which maintained state segregation laws, and an increase in the construction of
monuments outside of schools after the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling, in which the
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Supreme Court decided state laws segregating public schools were unconstitutional. There are
less complicates examples of statues that function to mark territory, but the Confederate statues
seem plausible candidates for this function and I think are a very interesting case, especially
given the recent protests over them. Many Confederate statues seem to have been erected at
least in part to tell non-white members of the public that these places and these institutions were
white and Southern. Other scholars have expressed this view. Writing about Confederate
monuments in a 2017 article for Politico Magazine, American historian Adam Goodheart agrees.
He writes, “Monuments mark public spaces like dogs mark trees: This place is ours, they say.”
(para. 16). Director of Hunter College's Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute Harold Holzer
has expressed similar views, as have others.91 Having the power to put those statues up in these
places and to prevent others from taking them down revealed who was really in control and who
wasn’t in those areas, who these places served and recognized as citizens and who they in
practice didn’t. On this interpretation and the honoring one it’s not surprising why former
Soviet-controlled countries tore down the statues put up by the Soviets of Stalin and Lenin and
why Germans took down Nazi monuments; and conversely why Confederate monuments have
had such staying power in the South – the South is still largely controlled by white Southerners.
A similar story can be told for other instances of memorialization. For example, the
naming of some U.S. military forts for Confederate Generals (for example, Fort Lee in Virginia),
the naming of certain streets and highways (the Jefferson Davis Memorial Highway), and the
redesigning of some Southern state flags to commemorate the Confederacy (see for example, the
state flag of Mississippi). Then consider Mount Rushmore being built in the Black Hills of
South Dakota, a place currently controlled by the U.S. Government but still claimed by the
91
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Lakota tribe and still legally disputed to this day. Or look at the widespread renaming of
mountains and other places in North America for white Americans (from Tumanguya to Mount
Whitney; Tahoma to Mount Rainier). Or the statue of Christopher Columbus in New York City.
The territory marking function can even be combined with the intimidation and in-group
confidence building functions, which seems plausibly to have been the case with some
Confederate monuments.
There’s another sort of “honoring” way some statues seem to function. Many statues are
made primarily for the purpose of honoring ancestors or gods. Are these communicative? In the
case the ancestor is dead and there are no spirits or there is no god, then these would appear to be
failed attempts at communication – a letter in a bottle with no one across the sea. There would
have to be feedback, and I’m not seeing where that feedback might come from. There are other
possible uses that wouldn’t count as communication. Suppose the ancestors are alive or the
relevant gods do exist but instead that what matters to receivers is simply that the statue was
constructed and exists and not some information or content the statue might convey. Then the
statue isn’t being used as a signal – what is important mainly is the completion of some task by
senders, like completing some chore to get a reward. Another possible non-communicative use
can be found in the Moai of Easter Island and the Tiki of Polynesia. These are sometimes said to
contain a power called “mana” when their construction is completed (Van Tilburg & Lee, 1987).
Suppose someone created a Tiki solely for that purpose, to have an object containing mana, and
that it having mana depended solely on the sculptor arranging the material in the appropriate
way, not on some god or someone else observing that it looked right. Then, even if the Tiki
happens to look like something or someone else, we have something that looks pretty far
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removed from communication - the similarity in resemblance plays no communicative role in the
process.
A familiar form of monument, especially to those in the North Pacific region of the US
and Canada is the totem pole. Totem poles play many different roles in the lives of various
indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest, but I’ll point out one in particular that seems to fit
the model fairly well. Some totem poles are called “shame poles”. These are carved to look like
the individual being shamed and placed near their home or a public place (Barbeau, 1990). Until
the person shamed pays their debt, the pole stays up. These are an interesting case in that the
audience is not just the person being shamed, and it seems that the person being shame is
supposed to act differently than other receivers: they are supposed to pay their debt whereas
perhaps others are meant to help the sender shame the debtor into straightening up. There could
have been a back and forth here. Poles that were more public and did a better job depicting the
debtor in a poor light might have done a better job of conveying identity to and getting the
attention of receivers. If receivers tended to react with laughter or ridicule more often to these
sorts of totems and debtors with hurrying up and paying, then senders will be reinforced to keep
producing totems this way, and eventually a convention will come about.
Since we still have much to discuss I don’t want to spend too much time on statues and
monuments. As I said, many statues are displayed in prominently public areas and so take us
into discussion of group communication which I’m holding off on until later in this chapter.
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3.6 Film
The newest of the art forms I’ll discuss here is film. Some philosophers have wondered whether
film might in some sense be a language. Since at least the 1920s it’s been somewhat popular to
talk about film this way. Silent films were thought to be particularly good cases for motivating
the view, since despite the lack of explicit dialogue from the actors on the screen, even without
subtitles, audience members were still able to understand the film’s overall message. Film, it
seemed, was a form of communication that transcended traditional barriers. Film functioned
something like a universal visual language, or as Noël Carroll once put it, a sort of “celluloid
Esperanto” (Carroll, 2005).92 Even famed American film-maker Frank Capra (1897-1991) once
called film one of the “universal languages” (Capra, 1971).93
Some contemporary writers aren’t so keen on the comparison and consider it more or less
obvious that there is no sort of language of film (Metz, 1974). Philosopher Gregory Currie is a
good example here. In his 1993 essay “The Long Goodbye: The Imaginary Language of Film”
Currie delivers what is perhaps the most comprehensive attack on the film as language
hypothesis yet. Language, according to Currie, is among other things, conventional and
syntactical, and, as he sees it, film just doesn’t measure up to those standards. Unfortunately, as
Currie himself admits, it is notoriously difficult to say what exactly language, syntax, and related
notions really amount to - he prefers the broader concept of a “symbolic system”. I too find it
hard to say exactly what these things are, though I have tried to explicate them to some extent in
the previous chapters. With that being said, I’ll instead try to see how well film fits into the
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sender-receiver model way of doing things, and I’ll see if it at least roughly matches what Currie
thinks matters in making something a symbolic system.
Perhaps the first question to ask when trying to get a grip on the communicative role of
something is to ask what its likely purpose is, why it is being made. There seem to be many
options. Of course, making money is a part of the equation with many modern films (and art
generally), and many films are created by more than one sender. But as with the case involving
the drawing of the cat, here, simply to start us off with the possibility of film as a form of
communication, I’ll idealize that money isn’t involved and that there is only one sender. I’ll
return to the issue of art with more than one sender later.
Many of the roles paintings can play a film seems to be able to play. A film, for example,
can depict what a person or place is like or what’s in my head. This has not been lost on other
film-makers. In a Rolling Stone interview, Jim Morrison (1943-1971) says about film, “it’s the
closest approximation in art that we have to the actual flow of consciousness, in both dreamlife
and in the everyday perception of the world.” (Hopkins, 1969, para. 47). Other films seem more
similar to something like a Rockwell illustration, showing what a filmmaker would like life to be
like. For example, Capra‘s 1939 film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, where Jimmy Stewart’s
character – the proverbial “little guy” of the story – wins out against the crooked politicians in
the end. Films can also be mutually beneficial. A film such as Schindler’s List (1993), a film
that details the horrors of the holocaust, could potentially have a significant effect on the
subsequent behavior of movie-goers, and this behavioral change can be good for both the creator
(in the sense that they care about these issues and maybe have to live with the audience-goers as
members of their society) and the audience in the sense that they hope to avoid the follies of
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previous generations, know what to look out for, and live up to the good values depicted. This is
in line with the memorializing function of art discussed earlier. Another role films might play is
to say that certain states of the world are possible in some sense, rather than that they have
actually happened. Think of the 1997 film Gattaca and its underlying story about genetic
discrimination. This film is interesting because it is partly a cautionary tale about the future. In
this sense a film can serve as a sort of warning signal.
Films might also try to show a receiver what the right thing to do in a certain situation
might be, or at least what the sender thinks the right thing to do is, where “right thing to do”
might be in a moral or practical sense. These films might include heroes or exemplars,
individuals whose behavior the film seeks to foster. Films like To Kill a Mockingbird (1962)
might be an example of a movie attempting the moral version of this but the character involved
need not be based on an actual person.94 A somewhat similar use that seems fairly easy to read
into film might be to communicate something like an “attitude toward life”, a concept discussed
by a number of philosophers in the 19th century, in particular Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), and
later sometimes by 20th century German philosopher Rudolf Carnap.95 A film might
communicate to an audience whether life is worth living (Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life (1946)),
whether the world is generally a rough place (think the old film noirs), or whether being
optimistic is a better way to live one’s life than cynical (think Private Witt vs. Sergeant Welsh in
The Thin Red Line (1998)). A film might function to communicate the filmmaker’s own or some
other person or peoples’ attitude toward life. And the purpose need not be to induce the same
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behavior in viewers but simply to inform the audience of their existence. This sort of function
seems possible with paintings and music too.
At broad glance it appears films can have many sorts of content. They seem plausible
candidates for communication. But what other features typically associated with language do
films have? Are films closer to language than Currie seems to think they are? In film, a degree
of conventionality is possible similar to our discussion of paintings. Different films can carry the
same general message. Changing the color of the clothes of the actors might matter to the
overall message or it might not, or making the film in black and white, or in Japanese. In early
films if you wanted to show a person arriving at someone’s apartment, you would first show
them walking to the lower entrance. Then opening the lower door. Then an interior cut to them
walking into the building and closing the door and walking up the stairs and then opening the
apartment door and another interior shot of the opening door, and so on. That’s a lot! But later
on, the way things like this were depicted in film started to change. Soon a person was just
shown walking up the lower entrance, opening the lower door and then an interior shot to them
walking into the apartment. Or they just did a dissolve from the entrance-level view of the
building to the interior of the apartment. In this respect, I think Currie is wrong to worry about
conventionality - in film, it is all over the place. Using close-ups and parallel action (going back
and forth between two events happening in different places at the same time) are other examples
of different options filmmakers have for storytelling. And filmmakers and movie-goers will
have to negotiate these sorts of moves, there will be a back and forth, with audiences deciding
whether the way a film is cut makes sense or not (Apple & Staenberg, 2004). For an example of
this, consider American filmmaker Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 Apocalypse Now. In its original
form, Coppola had the film end with a shot of Willard piloting his patrol boat away from Kurtz’s
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compound superimposed over the face of a stone idol and then fading to black with no credits.
Later, in the 35mm general release version, Coppola changed the ending so that after the shot of
Willard and the idol, audiences were shown the credits superimposed over shots of the jungle
exploding into flames. After this new version of the ending was screened, Coppola started
hearing that audiences were interpreting it as an air strike called in by Willard onto Kurtz’s
compound, and so Coppola changed the ending again and simply put the credits on a black
screen.
Now for a moment go back to the example of how filmmakers toyed around with how to
show a person walking up to an apartment. Think back to Grice’s conventions. Films tend to
go, at least nowadays, generally with the short and direct route of expression. They do the
dissolve transition or the quick cut rather than the long walk. They in doing this tend to show
merely what is relevant. If the hallway of the apartment building and the walk don’t matter, they
aren’t included. Superfluous characters and other objects tend to be excluded or not focused on
by the camera. This is similar to the theatric principle of Chekhov’s gun. On one rendering of
the principle every part of a story should contribute to the whole and anything that doesn’t
should be left out. This principle is due to Russian playwright and storyteller Anton Chekhov
(1860-1904) who, about storytelling, once stated: "If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the
wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don't put it there." (Gurlyand, 1905,
p. 521). This principle can sometimes be played with for effect, such as when something that
later turns out to be a dead end is used to throw viewers off the track in a murder mystery.96
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The hallway case is interesting because it seems to show how even in film there is room
for relevance, but the case also brings something else up. Must the gun on the wall always
matter? Relevance and Chekhov would seem to suggest that, assuming a sender is following
those principles, that anytime we see a gun on a wall in a film we should suspect that it will
somehow come back later. And yet, I’m not sure seeing a gun on a wall in a film should always
raise our level of suspicion quite so high. It should depend on the film. It could be that the gun
just adds to the décor of the setting the characters are in; its presence need not foretell anything
sinister. Similarly, the lack of a gun on a wall need not tell us one won’t show up later and to big
effect seemingly out of nowhere.97 When we get to Chapter 4, we’ll see that there are similar
issues for maps.
As I said earlier, Currie also worries about whether film might approach anything like
syntax or some sort of combinatorial system. Unfortunately, he doesn’t spell out what exactly he
takes these things to involve. I think, however, that films seem to have at least some sort of
structure. The combination of images matters. And the ordering of those images gives the
combination a meaning or content beyond that of the images themselves – which may in turn
have systematic mappings in the same way depicting pictures do (with shading corresponding to
lighting and what not). The role combination and order play is even more obvious with cartoons
and comic books. Consider the combination of the images (in this order) of a ship exploding and
then a close-up of a cannon being fired. This combination might not make sense, whereas the
opposite – the close up of the cannon firing and then the ship exploding - does. The content of
the second combination seems to suggest the cannon ball is what caused the explosion of the
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ship, whereas with the first combination it’s less clear exactly what might be being conveyed.
Add to this that the images of the cannon being fired and the ship exploding do not standing
alone seem to convey the same content as their combination or their ordered combination and
that the parts have systematic mappings, and it seems that in film as in other cases of art and
communication, we can get encoded combinatorial signals or syntax.
Of course, most films, even most so-called silent films, have some sound or music. This
too can add to a film’s overall message. One kind of music during a certain scene might make it
very serious and ominous, whereas using something else might make the same scene, the same
combination and order of images, seem silly or a sort of mockery. Silence can be used
strategically too. Other elements aside from sound – style, color, pace, etc. - can be added (or
subtracted). What we get is the possibility of films with incredibly complex combinatorial
structures.
Not all things that people might consider films, though, are obviously going to be instances
of communication. Take video from trail cameras for example. Or suppose I simply filmed a
sunset for 10 minutes. The situation here seems to be similar to that of a typical photograph
where what we have is really just a very peculiar kind of natural sign, an instance of just the lefthand side of the sender-receiver model. There is no back and forth.
Recall that in our discussions of the other forms of art, we saw that accuracy had a place
in these forms. Is there a place for it in film too? I think so. Who among us isn’t familiar with
some Hollywood film about some historical event where the director has made up characters that
never existed or events that never took place? Films can be more or less accurate, and they can
be so in many ways – sound, events, characters, feel, etc. And they can also exhibit the
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imprecision or lack of detail we talked about earlier too. The example involving the character
walking up the stairs being shortened to them simply opening the door of the apartment
exemplifies this.

3.7 Collective Art
When discussing films, for simplicity I considered the case of a single auteur. These cases are
fairly rare. Usually films have hundreds of people involved and are less centrally controlled.
Other forms of art are similar: dance, song, theater. What are we to say about these cases? Are
these signals too? If they are signals, who is the author or sender?
In Chapter 2, I made the case for the possibility of group senders and receivers. The morals
there apply here as well. As long as a piece – a song, a dance – is made non-dictatorially and by
some non-mechanical procedure (not necessarily the straw-vote), the author or sender will be the
group as a whole and the signal will be the combination of individual sender voices into one
collective voice.
Is there anything like a group signal in the case of music? I do not know of any clear and
obvious cases in this realm, though I suspect there are a good number of actual real-world
examples. People are likely to want to point to orchestras and choruses as examples, but I think
most of these cases better fit a sort of sovereign analysis. In most orchestras, the conductor calls
pretty much all the shots. There is some room for creativity in the way individuals play their
parts, but even then, the playing of every member is usually constrained by the preferences of the
conductor to some degree. Conductors in effect use musicians as instruments themselves.
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Here is a musical case that I take to be somewhat close. The English rock band the
Beatles is one of the most famous musical groups of all time. Was the music produced by them a
song by the Beatles as a group or are their songs more accurately described in some other way?
For many of the songs it appears the group worked quite collaboratively – John came up with the
rhythm guitar and some lyrics, Paul some lyrics and the bass part – and they negotiated the lyrics
- George the lead guitar part, and Ringo the drumming. Moreover, they had common interest in
the songs working out. Yet how well their song-writing process sometimes fit something like
that described in Chapter 2 is hard to say. Some biographies point to John and Paul making the
majority of the artistic contribution in many of the songs and deciding the majority of the band’s
musical direction. I think in the case of the Beatles it is safe to say that some cases came closer
to the paradigm example of a group signal and others not. Sometimes Paul might write George’s
guitar part or Ringo’s part or both and George or Ringo simply play their part in the song without
any opinion or alteration. When things like that happen, we move closer to a sovereign case.
Indeed, a number of Beatles songs were written by one member with the others essentially
playing backup band. That’s about as close to the sovereign case as a musical example can get,
similar to the chorus and orchestra cases.
But another way we might look at the Beatles case is by focusing in on John and Paul.
John and Paul’s songwriting partnership is famous for their choice to always credit their songs to
the both of them, to “Lennon-McCartney”. They chose to do this in part because of the highly
collaborative nature of their work. In this case, I suspect it might more often be OK to describe
what is going on as group or joint signaling, that the songs were produced by Paul McCartneyJohn Lennon and not just Paul or John. But, again, how well their song-writing process fit
something like that described in Chapter 2 is hard to say and it probably varied from song to
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song with John being more artistically in control sometimes and Paul others. One take away
lesson from the Beatles case is that in many instances, authorship will come in degrees.
Sometimes one person in a band will have more say than the others. Sometimes two main
people will write the song and have the rest of the bad simply play their scripted parts. It won’t
always be a full-blown case of paradigm group communication.98
Another thing the Beatles case reveals is the difference between joint authorship and
joint action. Despite all the Beatles playing their instruments together and in a cooperative
fashion to get a song out for audiences to hear, it can be the case that at the same time the song is
primarily authored by John and Paul. Ringo and George are agreeing to act along with Paul and
John, to join them in performing, but they are not contributing to the decision-making process
involved in creating the song from an authorship point of view. This is not something I’ve seen
talked explicitly about by theorists who work on joint action. And I think it is worth taking note
of.
Another case of group communication in music might come in the form of jamming.
Sometimes members of a musical group will simply start playing with no real coordination. It’s
fairly chaotic until members start reacting to what other members are doing – until the guitarist
starts changing what he is playing and how in light of what the drummer is doing or vice versa. In
this sort of case, a song can sort of just emerge with no foreplaning or direction. Here we might
get a case of group communication that comes about without spoken agreement. And the case
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might come in degrees. The drummer, for example, might tend to be less flexible and less reactive
than the guitarist to what others in the group are doing. But then eventually the group settles on a
way of playing, settles on a song. We get a case of group communication in music that is closer
to Hume’s rowboat case.
Let’s turn now to the world of visual art – paintings, drawing, and the like? Are there
examples of group communication here too? Consider what is known as Tunisian collaborative
painting.

Figure 3.28. An example of a collaborative painting. Lawes, R., Love, G., Glover, B.,
Ferguson, B. (2018) Voracious paradise [Painting]. Collaborative Painting UK.
https://www.collaborativepainting.uk/news/tag/tunisian+collaborative+painting

This way of making art was created in the 1980s by Tunisian artist Hechmi Ghachem and later
popularized in America by American artist David Black (though, I’ve seen something like it
done by others without awareness of the Tunisian technique).99 These works involve three or
more artists usually with a limit of about ten. The group starts a painting without anything
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introduced me to this idea in undergrad. They had no knowledge of the Tunisian school.
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planned out – what it will be about, what it should look like. Artists can paint over what each
other have done on the canvas and generally paint whatever they like. In some versions, there is
a single chosen arbiter who says when the painting is finished. In other versions, when a
painting is finished is decided by majority vote. At the end, everyone signs their name. Is this a
case of group signaling in art? I think it is hard to tell. There are at least two issues. The first is
that it isn’t clear what the interests and incentives are here – is this mostly a cooperative
enterprise, a free for all, why are participants doing this? And who are the intended receivers?
What are they supposed to get from this? Second, it may not be a problem that there doesn’t
appear to be some joint message artists are aiming toward making when they start out, but it’s
not clear whether the procedure they use in making the painting really makes a coherent joint
signal at the end out of the disparate markings participants put on the canvas. Suppose the artists
make their marks in turns rather than all of them drawing at the same time. Then I’m inclined to
see the possibility of the piece working as a signal and in what capacity it works as a signal as
lying in the hands of the last person to mark on the canvas. In a sense, their position is like that
of someone buying a painting from a store and drawing on it. They could mark on the piece in
such a way that it produces a coherent signal, but they could also do something that disrupts any
possibility of that.
But what about if everyone draws or paints on the canvas simultaneously? This case is
harder for me to pin down, but I think this could be possible. It could be like the musicians
jamming. Sometimes it starts rough but sometimes eventually something meaningful comes out
of it through an unspoken back and forth. As I said, musicians jamming react to each other,
change what they are playing and how they are playing in light of how others are playing. I’ve
never seen this in painting, but I can vaguely imagine how it might be possible. Still, a project
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could be more overtly collaborative. A painting project could take on a decision structure very
similar to that described in Chapter 2. Artists could vote on what the subject should be and vote
on details – should it be a landscape painting? What if I put a big tree there? But, again, even
here there could be room for latitude on the part of participants. I could choose without input,
for example, what color the tree I paint might be. The lesson, again, is that how well a case fits
the paradigm model will come in degrees. I’ll call the differences between these two extreme
cases the difference between partnered and joint artist works. But, again, as we saw with the
Beatles case, some cases of joint art might not be so joint authored.
There are two more cases of collaborative visual art I’ll look at briefly. Consider the 17th
century paintings of Flemish artist Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) and Dutch artist John
Brueghel the Elder (1568-1625).

Figure 3.29. Brueghel, J. & Rubens, P. P. (1617). The Garden of Eden with the fall of
man [Painting]. Mauritshuis, Hague, Netherlands.
https://www.mauritshuis.nl/en/explore/the-collection/artworks/the-garden-of-eden-withthe-fall-of-man-253/
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Ruben would paint the figures and Brueghel would paint the landscapes. Are these works cases
of group communication? The answer to this one is difficult. First, early on Ruben and
Brueghel sometimes edited each other’s work, and although later on they seemed to come to
some way of agreeing on how to do things before getting started on a painting, it’s not clear they
followed a process like that in Chapter 2 (de Voogt & Hommes, 2007). Second, most of the
works they produced were under the auspices of the courts and the archdukes. So, it is likely that
even if Ruben and Brueghel did follow something like the decision procedure in Chapter 2
between themselves that this sort of procedure wasn’t in play between them and their bosses. In
fact, now we have to take into consideration issues concerning commissioned works, which I’ll
address in just a moment.
The last visual art example comes from Italian and British artists Gilbert Prousch and
George Passmore, better known simply as Gilbert & George.

Figure 3.30. Prousch, G. & Passmore, G. (1983). Blooded [Photo collage]. Musée de
Grenoble, Grenoble, France. https://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tatemodern/exhibition/gilbert-george/gilbert-george-major-exhibition-room-guide/gilbert-9
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They describe their work explicitly as being of one author: “Two people make one artist. We
think that we are an artist” (Galenson & Pope, 2017, para. 1). But how collaborative are they?
In a Q&A on The Guardian’s website, Gilbert & George give the following somewhat tongue in
cheek answer to the question of how they worked as a partnership, whether one of them was the
idea man or whether they share the creative process equally:
We call this the great heterosexual question. We are equal in our partnership
where most mixed couples are not. We don't cook, clean, shop or wash up. This
makes a lot of ladies jealous. See you soon G&G. (2014, 5:12, re. 1/2)
Being serious for a moment, assuming that their artistic partnership really is one of total equality.
Then if they follow a procedure roughly like that in Chapter 2, they may be an example of group
communication in visual art. Unfortunately, there aren’t many details on this specific aspect of
their artistic process. Add to that that it isn’t obvious what the reaction on the side of receivers is
supposed to be, and it becomes hard to tell if what is really going on is communication.
When discussing statues earlier, I talked about statues that depicted someone and that
might function in an honoring sort of way. In many cases, these public statues are commissioned
by a local or federal body – they are not just created by some sole artist or group of artists who
put them out there themselves. What are we to make of authorship in these cases? Here is what
I think is one plausible account. In these cases, what a governing body in effect does is choose a
signal to put in place. They look at various statues (or designs of statues) that might be created
and erected and they have an artist or group artist produce that signal for them. Imagine a sender
who can choose from a variety of colored balls in a bucket and hand a ball to a receiver as a
signal. That’s the sort of case I see this as being similar to, however, here the sender, if they
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tightly control design, is the governing body and the audience is the public. In this sense, the
piece is closer to a group signal than a standard individual-individual signal. There could be a
back and forth. If the hope is that the statue will inspire people to act a certain way, then if it
does, the governing body may tend to go with commissioning similar statues in the future; if not,
then the body might choose a different approach the next time around or tell the artist to alter the
current product. The Ruben and Brueghel paintings combine the feature of a commissioner with
two artists working collaboratively, resulting in an even more complicated case of group
communication. Again, here as with in other cases, there might be flexibility and things will
come in degrees. In some cases, artists might have more flexibility, in other cases less.
But this also highlights an important lesson. Consider again the Confederate monuments.
If these serve the purpose of honoring Confederates or as I suggested earlier influencing
behavior, then if they are also as I suggested group signals, the result is that these are examples
of the United States or the relevant local bodies – the states, counties, or cities - sending signals
that arguably have racist communicative purposes – which arguably is problematic on a civil
rights level. This might be easier to see with a related but different explanation of what is going
on in some of these cases. University of Virginia professor Jalane Schmidt describes
Confederate statues in public places as having "raced public spaces as white" (Holloway, 2018,
para. 13). Writing primarily about Confederate statues put up by the United Daughters of the
Confederacy near courthouses, Professor of history at the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte Karen Cox says of such public monuments: "The UDC put [its monuments] in places
where citizens have to work with their government. If you're an African-American person or a
person of color, you have to pass by that Confederate monument on your way into the
courthouse. It was a reminder that you're not likely to get a fair trial or fair treatment inside of
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that building. That, to me, was one of the UDC’s most overt signs to the local black community
that, “We're in charge here. This is a white man's government.”" (para. 15). As I said earlier, I
take it one fair interpretation of the role these monuments might be playing is that of a sort of
territory marker, and these appear to be, as I said, group signals – signals sent by, in some cases,
the US government, but more commonly some relevant local body. With this analysis in hand,
we can see why such statues are doubly problematic in a society that aims for inclusivity and
says so in their laws and in public declarations – that society is contradicting itself and sending
mixed signals.
Many war memorials might also fit a group sender interpretation. For Americans the
most prominent memorials are probably the Vietnam Wall and the WWII memorial in D.C.
These appear to function to honor, but these are different from earlier statues and monuments
we’ve discussed in that they don’t involve the use of similarity. The WWII memorial in DC
does not look like any person or like the war itself. Same with the Vietnam Wall. So how do we
make sense of these? I think this is a case where conventionality comes in to play in a more
obvious way. Just about anything could have worked as a monument for these events. It’s not
so much the look of the monument, although tactfulness and other things play a role in reigning
in design options. What matters more is just that there is something in physical existence that
serves as a sort of public reminder or memory device. I discussed this option earlier but didn’t
talk about it with respect to non-depicting monuments. Cases such as these are similar on one
level, I think, to putting a postcard on my shelf to remind me of my grandmother. Yet
monuments like the ones we’re talking about are often made of heavy lasting materials, not just a
piece of paper. I think the situation is similar to how sometimes people don’t just have post
cards but get tattoos of loved ones and important events. We want people - in the case of a
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tattoo, ourselves - to remember what happened, we want to be reminded and more often and for
longer. More permanent memory devices – stone and concrete monuments – do the same thing
but for a larger audience – even future generations (similar to future selves in the case of the
tattoo). These public monuments are memory devices on the local, national, sometimes even
global scale. And, again, as with the case of other public statues, the sender here will likely be
some governing body choosing from possible designs. I think this is a fair interpretation of the
US Vietnam Wall and WWII memorials. Of course, we’ve also already noted worries about the
status of the US and other countries as a group sender, and those worries would apply here too.
For sake of space I am going to skip talking about dance and look at films as our last
case. This is not to say I don’t think there are cases of dance that would fit the model of group
communication – in fact, I think there are (improvisational dance for example) – or that I don’t
find dance interesting – because I do. Just that I don’t want to spend time looking over every
possible case of group communication.
I’ll finish this section by looking at films. These seem like good plausible candidates for
group communication too. The number of people it takes to make a modern Hollywood film is
incredible, and so many people seem to contribute interesting subtle parts – the actors, the
editors, directors. Unfortunately, I do not know of any major films that take on a process very
close to that described in Chapter 2. In some cases, we have auteur films where almost if not
every little detail is under the direction of the auteur – the script is written by them, the acting
directed by them if not done by them, the editing done by them, the costumes made to their
specifications. Terrence Malick’s films and many so-called amateur films seem to be close to
this sort of set up. These cases are closer, I think, to the sovereign paradigm than to the group
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communication paradigm – not totally Hobbesian, but closer than most other Hollywood films
will be.
In a paradigm auteur case, one person plays all the roles – writer, producer, director,
actor, editor - but in most Hollywood films, these roles come apart. Usually the director is a
different person than the producer or editor or any of the actors. And usually in these cases
power isn’t divided evenly – the director might be able to deviate from the scrip a bit; the editor
might have final say in the editing room. What takes us closer to group signaling is the equal
sharing of decision-making power in the creative process. What takes us farther away in these
cases is the consolidation of it in fewer hands.
Of course, it is more complicated than that. Some cases might even carry a mix of group
communication and sovereign communication. If there are two co-writers for a film who stick to
some process like that in Chapter 2 and they pretty much get to call the shots much like a single
auteur, then you could have something like a group sender at the top and everyone else following
them more sovereign style. But, again, this sort of thing will have variations and degrees too.
The Ruben and Brueghel case reminds us of this – we could have two auteurs mostly in control
but who are also to some extent influenced by the preferences of some producer, or the write,
and so on. All this is to say that films will sometimes be instances of group communication, but
these instances will be somewhere on – usually near the middle of - a spectrum.
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3.8 Art and Evolution
Lately, discussions of art, like communication, have tended to consider the evolutionary side of
things. The focus has been on how art might have come about as some form of adaptation via
natural selection. Philosophers and biologists have been split on this topic. Some have argued
that art is not a fitness enhancing adaptation and others have argued that it is. Some writers have
even tried to focus the discussion more narrowly, suggesting that perhaps the scope of these
projects should be limited to specific arts. So, for example, the thought might go that the drive to
produce music evolved separately from the drive to produce paintings or statues. The idea being
that each of these arts might have its own distinctive contribution to evolutionary fitness. Others,
however, have strived to develop more general theories of art’s emergence or place in the
evolutionary story. Some like American scholar Ellen Dissanayake have argued that the key to
art’s place in evolution is its role in “making things special” (Dissanayake, 1988). Others like
Canadian-American psychologist Steven Pinker have tried to explain art away as a spandrel. In
evolutionary biology, a spandrel is a trait that is a by-product of some other trait selected for by
natural selection but not selected for itself. The spandrel trait stays around not because it is
advantageous but simply because it isn’t disadvantageous. Think about fur being advantageous
in a cold environment. It could be that a species evolves fur and that fur just happens to be grey.
If the grey coloring isn’t disadvantageous and it isn’t advantageous either, then the grey color of
the fur is a spandrel. When talking about art as a spandrel, Pinker explains art this way:
… art is a by-product of three other adaptations: the hunger for status, the
aesthetic pleasure of experiencing adaptive objects and environments, and the
ability to design artifacts to achieve desired ends. On this view art is a pleasure
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technology, like drugs, erotica, or fine cuisine – a way to create purified and
concentrated pleasurable stimuli and deliver them to our senses. (Pinker, 2002, p.
405)
Sometimes the view has been summed up by Pinker by saying, for example, that “music is
auditory cheesecake” (Pinker, 1997, p. 534). Already, this view seems off the mark, however,
when we think back to the works of Bosch and Dix. These pieces, for example, don’t seem to be
connected to aesthetic pleasure in the form of adaptive objects and environments. They hardly
seem to be cases of paintings serving as cheesecake but instead something like rotten and moldy
cheesecake. I can see, however, how some people might derive pleasure form these works. We
all know there are people out there who enjoy the macabre and other things usually deemed
unpleasant. But then this pleasure still doesn’t seem to be derived from the works depicting
adaptive objects or environments. Hell or a WWI battlefield, for example, don’t seem to be
adaptive environments.
Pinker later updated his view. Now art is supposedly the by-product of two traits: (1)
motivational systems that give us pleasure when we experience stimuli that correlate with our
evolutionary interests, and (2) the technological know-how to create purified and concentrated
doses of these stimuli. Again, however, it’s hard to see how the Bosch and Dix cases fit in here.
That’s enough for background. In this last part of Chapter 3, I’ll be taking a look at two
general theories of art. I won’t be focusing in on any of the theories that advocate an
independent evolutionary story for some particular art form. I’ve chosen to focus on these two
theories for one reason. They both see art as a form of communication and see its
communicative function as key to why it has evolved. Later on, in this section, I’ll also briefly
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take a look at the question of whether art might be found at the non-human level, whether it
might make sense in any regard to consider animals too as producing and consuming art.

3.8.1 Art as Fitness Signal
The first view is that art is really something more akin to the peacock’s tail. The idea is that art
is primarily a tool for mate attraction and sexual selection. Art broadcasts a sender’s fitness to
mates, and this is the reason art came about – or at least, why it has stuck around. American
evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller (2000, 2001) holds a view like this. Consider rock
stars, the thought goes, why else do they do what they do if not for fame and women?
Different bits of evidence have been put forward in support of the view. One is that,
according to Miller, the vast majority of artwork is created by men. This is certainly an
empirical question, but I tend to doubt Miller on this mark. Throughout much of history plenty
of art-making has been primarily the province of women – think of beadwork, jewelry making,
basket making, and blanket weaving. Depending on what one counts as art, Miller might very
plausibly be wrong here. And with respect to more men making art in modern times (if this is
even true), it seems plausible this could simply be an artifact of our modern social structure
rather than some ancient evolutionary origin. Men were simply the ones allowed and
encouraged by modern society to make art in recent times – note that for quite some time women
were not even allowed into art schools. Perhaps more women would have created art if simply
given the same opportunities. It’s worth noting that Miller also tends to focus on modern music
for his examples, on rock music and jazz. But there are plenty of female artist today. Plenty of
Madonnas, Lady Gagas, and Beyoncés.
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Another bit put forward is that men are active in competition for females because females
are choosy (due to the high investment involved on their side in child production and rearing),
and men who are promiscuous are able to make more babies than promiscuous women (this is
because on the female side, a baby take 9 months to produce whereas a male can produce many
more children by different women in that same time). One problem with this view is that the
data doesn’t seem to support it. New Zealand philosopher Stephen Davies points out in his
recent book The Artful Species (2012) that a study of 207 European male composers from the
fourteenth through twentieth centuries shows these composers produced significantly fewer
children than the general European population. (p. 126). One could instead insist that the fitness
advantage from art is to be found not in the form of production of more children but in the form
of artistic talent bringing in higher quality mates and that talent and attractiveness being reliably
passed down to the few offspring produced. But this too isn’t supported by the data. As Davies
puts it, “artistic talent of the highest order is only modestly inheritable” (p. 124). Think of how
few famous artists have children that have followed as successfully in their footsteps.
American anthropologist Kathryn Coe points out that the view doesn’t seem to cover
some of the cave art of the Upper Paleolithic, which appears, because of its placement in high up
and obscure parts of caves, to have been made with no intention of subsequent viewing (Davies,
2012, p. 125). I think this is a good plausible counter example to Miller’s view, but there does
also seem to be an explanation that would instead support it. One suggestion for the placement I
haven’t seen in the literature is that perhaps this was something akin to graffiti done in difficult
to reach places. The importance is in the placement due to the difficulty involved in making the
piece – compare putting graffiti on the side of a house to putting it on a town’s water tower. The
difficult placement is what (or part of what) makes it impressive and attractive to mates. But for
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this to be true, the piece would have to have been made with some intention of subsequent
viewing by others otherwise no-one could verify the accomplishment. If this interpretation were
correct, the art could fit the Miller model. But more work would need to be done to see what the
truth is here, why the art was really put in these places.
But there are other things going against the fitness view. It also doesn’t cover private art,
art made for one’s own eyes or ears only. Some argue that art must be public in some sense,
intended to be viewed by someone other than the creator, for it to count as true art at all. I doubt
this view of art. I myself have written songs on guitar that I intend never to share with anyone
else. And consider the case of fictional artist Declan Howell in the episode “Look, She Made a
Hat” from the American television series The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel (Sherman-Palladino &
Babbit, 2018). Howell is known as a master artist and a recluse. He never sells his paintings or
puts them in museums. And he has one piece in particular that he never shows to anyone, just
keeps it in a secret room (though, he does later show it to the main character of the show after
deciding that she is worthy). Would such a piece count as art – especially before Ms. Maisel’s
viewing of it? If the view of private art counting as art is wrong, then we don’t seem to have
another case against Miller’s view. But I tend to go with accepting private art as art too.
The missing cat case and expedition art also seem to provide examples of how possibly
something that at least looks like art – I’m willing to call it art - could come about for purposes
other than mate attraction. And then consider that children and adults often make art for loved
ones like siblings and grandparents. Davies points out mothers singing to their babies. This art
doesn’t seem to have anything to do with mate attraction, seems to run counter to Miller’s view.
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The view that art might sometimes play a role in sexual selection is not unrealistic,
though. A work of art can act as a sort of natural sign of cognitive ability, dexterity, leisure time,
attention to detail, personality, interests, resources. The list goes on. This allows it to have a
role in mate attraction since these attributes might be important to potential mates. But this is
like passive style - a passive mate attraction. The art is being used as a natural sign, index, or
cue. Senders could later, of course, notice this and so produce art or art of a certain sort for its
mate attracting qualities. Then we have active mate attraction via art. This sort of use would fit
the sender-receiver model, would count as a signal. But to say that most art generally functions
as active mate attraction or that it came about primarily due to its functioning this way, seems
overly hopefully. Moreover, information about things like cognitive ability, dexterity,
personality, and so on are easily gathered in a passive (or active) way from other behaviors and
products – things like athletic feats, technical accomplishments, and business, political, or social
success and wealth.

3.8.2 Art and Group Fitness
In a recent paper, Noël Carroll (2014) argues that perhaps art has a role in group level fitness.
Populations of humans who engaged in artistic behavior, suggests Carroll, tended to outperform
groups that didn’t.
Stephen Davies, is an example of someone who disagrees with this idea, seeing a group
level explanation instead as a rather weak one. Davies (2012) writes:
Many claim that aesthetic or art practices are evolutionarily significant because
they benefit the group. That is, these theories adopt a commitment to multilevel
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selection theory and depart from the classical Darwinian model of evolutionary
explanation that focuses on individuals or their genes. This . . . account is thereby
weakened in explanatory power. This is because genetic inheritance provides a
strong explanation of the faithful replication of beneficial traits over the long
term, assuming the environment is stable; whereas the preservation of group
benefits relies on cultural transmission, which is less accurate and reliable. (pp.
43-44)
As Godfrey-Smith (2013a) points out, however, there are many kinds of multilevel evolutionary
models. Some even involve a mixture of genetic and cultural transmission (Bowles & Gintis
2011). Godfrey-Smith (2013a) states further, and I follow him on this, “even if group-level
transmission processes are less "accurate" than genetic inheritance between individuals, this does
not show that those group-level processes are thereby "weakened in explanatory power" -- or, at
least, that they must be weak causal factors. The cultural inheritance of languages and norms can
be enormously important.”
Another problem with Davies’ view of art and group selection is that his discussion of
group selection and art focuses on versions that involve altruism – often defined as someone
helping others at their own expense or with no benefit to themselves. Godfrey-Smith rightly
points out that there are other options here. Mutualism is one of those. Godfrey-Smith goes on
to defend the possibility of group level selection of artistic behavior by focusing on the free-rider
version of the mutualism problem, but there is another way to look at it. Mutualism is
sometimes defined simply as behaviors that benefit both others and one’s self (West et al., 2007).
I think this way of looking at the group level selection of art is the most helpful.
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Consider art that tells a story – dances, songs, paintings, films. As we’ve seen, these
forms of art can serve to communicate historical or moral lessons, to communicate certain values
and enculture current and future generations. Again, Carroll (2005, 2014) thinks art perhaps
does this better than any other tool. Mexican painter Diego Rivera (1886-1957) once suggested
this too, pointing out that art can be understood by the illiterate in a community and across
cultures (1932, p. 53). If this is right, it seems possible that when artistic works are made
available or disseminated to the wider community - as many are – they might work partly to help
bring about a sort of informational and behavioral cohesion within the group, arguably
something that would help the group better cooperate and coordinate on a larger scale, something
that seems helpful for maintaining the group’s continuation and success as a whole, something
that would benefit both receivers and senders. Consider the famous Smokey Bear posters in the
US reading “Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires”. Even something like this can play this sort of
societal cohesion inducing role. If the members of the group adhere to the lesson of the poster, if
they all do a better job of tending to make sure that their campfires are out, then the group has a
better chance of protecting its forests, its resources, and so a better chance of survival. In this
case, everyone in the group wins. Examples of art that function this way and don’t involve
written language would be things like the monument art discussed earlier.
This brings up a good point. Some unifying art can also be divisive in a sense. Art that
glorifies the South and its old values or propagates false “Lost Cause” narratives, for example,
seems to lead to separation within the wider community of the United States despite unifying a
certain subgroup, namely white Southerners. Children raised in the South and exposed to art
glorifying the South – the Confederate flag, monuments to Confederate generals, songs
celebrating the “Old South” - will be raised in an environment promoting and normalizing
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different values and beliefs than children raised in the North. The result of this is not the
promotion of coordination and cooperation between peoples of the North and South, better social
cohesion in the US as a whole, but instead an us vs them mentality and the disintegration of
group togetherness on the broader scope. This is because both groups are being enculturated
with different beliefs and values despite at the national level being a part of the same country.
Mutualism of a sort can have a home here too. Perhaps the white Southern senders and
receivers, for example, gain benefit from the Confederate art in that it helps them maintain their
social and political power in their corner of the US, despite on a broader scale it actually
destabilizing the wider group, the national group, and so, also having a negative effect on the
sender and other white Southerners – a short-term mutual benefit to the subgroup and the sender
with a long-term mutual detriment to the whole (subgroup and sender included).100
Plato in Book 3 of his classic work The Republic (375 BCE.) worried that some works of
art might have a negative impact on society. Rivera (1932), who pointed out the good that art
could do for the working-class, also saw the pain it could cause when used for ulterior motives.
In the case we just saw, art was detrimental to the larger group due to the competing values and
beliefs being communicated. But there’s another way art can be divisive at the group level – by
dividing members individually. Certain values seem to be group fitness enhancing (perhaps in
conjunction with certain others) and others not, and art is a conduit for spreading these good or
bad values. If due to some piece of art introduced into a community everyone started abiding by
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It’s worth noting that even Confederate general Robert E. Lee argued against the construction of Confederate
monuments and for apparently similar reasons. See Lee (1866). There is also evidence Lee may have been against
the construction of any monuments to the war. See Lee (1869).
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a norm of lying, cheating, or stealing, I wager this would likely not be good for the survival of
the community.
What we’ve just seen is that public art doesn’t just provide a group level advantage no
matter what. It is possible for art to be detrimental. With this in mind, I think it’s worth it for
communities to consider what values their public art is promoting, for it may be promoting
values that engender division more than comity. And yet, I think cases of detriment to the
society as a whole, in a sense stronger than the Confederate statues are, will be rare. It’s hard for
me to imagine a case where works so divisive would get off the ground and be maintained - at
least, long term. It’s hard to maintain a signaling system when the senders and receivers stop
working together, which is what these sorts of works presumably would lead to. I can imagine
one-off examples of these sorts of signals. But it’s hard to see how mutualism would apply here.
There’s another way I can see communicative art playing a role at the group level.
Consider style. In battle and in contested territories, dress, costume, or makeup that helps mark
one’s affiliation can be a lifesaver. Those tribes that learned to mark identity would likely have
fewer cases of accidental killings of their members during battle and at the border and have an
easier time gaining help from other members during battle (since those who see them in trouble
will be able to more readily recognize them as one of their own – especially in larger groups) and
in other situations out in the field (say, I see a man being attacked by an animal – even if I don’t
know him, I can now know whether he is an enemy or a member of my group). A closely related
use to marking affiliation is marking territory – which we talked a bit about earlier. Groups that
mark their territory can plausibly prevent more accidental incursions and so expend less energy
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defending their own – and plausibly also give receivers the ability to prevent their own unneeded
waste of energy and risk of harm. Sort of a stationary snake rattle, though with more too it.
For a final example of communicative art playing a role at the group level, think back to
Carroll’s suggestion that monuments might play a role in bereavement. A community that
produces art that in effect helps members of the group heal and commits its self to making good
on their sacrifice might do better than groups that don’t do this. These groups might be better
able to heal and move on from tragedies more quickly and maintain their social bonds and keep
to their promise of making good on that sacrifice. Groups that don’t do this, on the other hand,
plausibly might have a harder time healing, which might increase the odds of unrest and the
disintegration of group cohesion.
All the views presented leave room for the possibility of a combination of functions in
the signals involved. Thinking about the mate attraction hypothesis, a piece of art might, for
example, benefit the public or some subgroup in one of the ways listed above and increase the
artist’s reproductive fitness. This would be a form of mutualism – different from just benefitting
indirectly or even directly perhaps in the form of cash. And this can take shape in a number of
forms. If the piece of art successfully helps the community, perhaps it draws attention to the
artist, including the attention of potential mates. Perhaps the piece is primarily intended to
attract mates (and does) but also inadvertently helps the wider community. Or perhaps the piece
just accomplishing both tasks independently. There are a number of ways things might go here.
Other roles could get mixed in too. A public artwork that works as a territory marker might
benefit me, my group, and, in some way, my potential enemies. A statue might help a
community grieve but might also promote problematic values.
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3.8.3 Non-human Art
Some authors have seen art as something created only by humans. Often writers take this line
because they take the production of art to involve intentions. Griceans will often say this when I
discuss art with them. Boardman (2016) develops a view in this vein: x is a work of art if and
only if: (a) x is presented to a public audience for the purpose of their appreciation or
contemplation of x and (b) a proper understanding of x requires recognition of (a)" (2016,
Abstract). But as we’ve seen, communication can arise even in agents without intentions or at
least agents without complicated mental states like those found in us.101
If art is sometimes communicative, is it sometimes produced at the non-human level?
Prum thinks some animals make art. Recall that on his view, art is to be evaluated and that for
him what is being evaluated in the animal cases is sexual fitness. Is this sort of art
communication? As we saw just a moment ago, this seems to be what is being evaluated in
certain human cases, the active mate attraction cases, and we still considered this
communication. If this is right, it seems hard to draw a line and say animals are not making
communicative art too. We’d have to rule out art made by humans primarily for active mate
attraction purposes, and that seems like something we shouldn’t do.
Two examples of art of this sort seen in animals are the structures built by Bower birds
(Ptilonorhynchidae), in particular the Satin Bowerbird (Ptilonorhynchus violaceus) of East
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Boardman’s view seems to have other potential problems. First, it seems to rule out private art. It also seems a
couple could decide to have a child for the purposes stated by Boardman, to show them to the public for
appreciation, etc. Another example involves producing a beautiful knife both for public appreciation of its beauty
but also to be used by its new owner. Must an object be made only with the purpose of public admiration, or is it
OK for the object to have an additional purpose?
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Australia (Figure 3.31) and the Vogelkop superb bird-of-paradise (Lophorina niedda) of Western
Papua (Figure 3.32), and the nests created by male pufferfish in the oceans around Japan (Figure
3.33).

Figure 3.31. Boone, J. (2016). Satin bowerbird at its bower [Photograph]. Wikipedia
Commons.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Satin_Bowerbird_at_his_bower_J
CB.jpg

Figure 3.32. Arnd, I. (2014, April). The bower of the Vogelkop gardener bowerbird.
[Photograph]. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/gallery/2014/apr/22/the-worlds-best-animalarchitecture-in-pictures
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Figure 3.33. Ito, K. (2012). Male pufferfish nest [Photograph]. In (Bates, 2013) “What’s
this mysterious circle on the seafloor?” National Geographic Blog.
https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2013/08/15/whats-this-mysterious-circle-on-theseafloor/

An interesting difference between the animal cases and human cases seems to be that the
Bower birds and puffer fish all make roughly the same art as their con-specifics – they all make
nests of roughly the same look and material. Humans, on the other hand, engage in many
different forms of art, though I could see how one might argue that the range for humans is also
somewhat more limited than it first appears. For example, cubist, expressionist, realist, and
surrealist paintings are all paintings, usually on canvas with oil or acrylic – just as the various
Bower bird nests are all nests and usually made of wood and grass.
Some animal architecture, despite being very elaborate, won’t count as art, however. A
spider web or a beehive won’t count, for example, despite their intricacy if the purpose of the
work is simply practical, which they appear to be (to catch insects in the case of spiders and to
protect the colony and raise offspring in the case of bees). What matters is that the work is also
created to be evaluated by a receiver or created with some sort of communicative function.
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Otherwise, we just don’t have art, no matter how beautiful to our eyes. This will even be the
case for the “log home” of the bagworm moth, which appears to serve primarily a protective role
(Figure 3.34).

Figure 3.34. Biswas, R. (2015). Bag worm log cabin [Photograph]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Case_built_by_Bagworm_moth.JPG

Aside from creating structures, there are other things animals do that seem to fit the art version of
the sender-receiver model. First, there are dances. Consider the dances of the Vogelkop, the
same bird that makes the elaborate structures in Figure 3.32 (Figure 3.36) and the Red-capped
Manakin (Ceratopipra mentalis) of South America (Figure 3.35). The Red-capped Manakin’s
dance is often being described as a sort of “moonwalk”, whereas the dance of the Vogelkop is
more of a jumping from side to side. The purpose of these dances is to court females. The
dances seem to be intended to be evaluated, not just signals that say “Mate with me”. I would
count these dances as art, despite their main motivation being a sexual one.
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Figure 3.35. Laman, T. (2018), A male red-

Figure 3.36. Laman, T. (2018), A Vogelkop

capped manakin performs his signature

superb bird of paradise performs a mating dance

‘moonwalk’ dance to a female [Photograph].

[Photograph]. In, Gibbens, S. (2018). “New Bird

National Geographic Image Collection.

of Paradise species has smooth dance moves”.

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2018/

National Geographic.

02/animals-birds-courtship-mating/#/01-bird-

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2018/

mating-rituals-NationalGeographic_1490006.jpg

04/new-species-birds-of-paradise-animals-spd/

Songs might fit the art version of the sender-receiver view too. Consider that many bird species
have elaborate songs or large song repertoires. The Common Nightingale (Luscinia
megarhynchos) is a good example. The only nightingales that sings are males without partners.
Researchers at Freie Universitat Berlin discovered that the better a nightingale was at singing,
the more complex the song and more ordered it was, the more support senders were likely to
offer their mates and offspring in the form of feeding and defending them from predators and the
better physical condition the senders were in (Bartsch et al., 2015). Here we seem to have a case
of a mating call that doesn’t just say “Mate with me” but instead is meant to be evaluated by
receivers. In that case, we get an instance of a song produced by an animal that fits the art
version of the sender-receiver model.102
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It’s noteworthy that the researchers claim in their article that the female receiver birds were not interested in the
beauty of the song, but instead in the song’s complexity and what information it carried about the quality of the
sender. They don’t give an explanation, however, for how they determined that beauty wasn’t involved. I can see,
though, how even in a human case what receivers care about is not how beautiful a work is but how detailed,
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What about displays such as the peacock’s tail? Are these cases of art in the animal
world? These are interesting because displays tend to be evolved traits rather than learned
behaviors – though, some animal dances, songs, and structure building might be primarily
evolved behaviors too. I think it’s hard to say. Suppose our instinct to dance or paint or sing
evolved. Would we not call it art anymore? I think probably we still would. But suppose beards
in men are for mate attraction as Darwin and others have suggested, much like the peacock’s tail
(Darwin, 1871).103 Would we feel comfortable calling a beard art? Probably not. Evolved
displays or physical attributes meant to be evaluated for quality, though they may be beautiful,
do not seem to count as art – at least, by the common use of the term. What seems to matter is
the creation of the piece either in some performative way or some other constructive way. Of
course, these things could become constructed to some extent – beard transplants are a thing
now, and some men specially groom or even braid their beards - then we have something more
like art, something created or altered with the intention of being evaluated. There are many
animals that “decorate” themselves or alter their appearance in some way. But most of this is
primarily for camouflage or protection and doesn’t seem to involve any sort of communicative or
evaluative aspect to it – the Sponge decorator crabs (Hyastenus elatus) seem to be an example of
this. Consider also that displays can be more permanent or less permanent. A peacock’s tail is
always colored, but it can choose to display its tail or not. Octopuses, cuttlefish, squid, and
chameleons engage in display behaviors by changing the color of their skin. This involves even
more flexibility. And then consider Bearded vultures (Gypaetus barbatus). These vultures will
rub their plumage in orange or reddish dirt or water in order to color their feathers (Jaubert &

complex, or difficult to make it was. Is something like that still art? I think so, what matters is that it was meant to
be evaluated. And as we’ve seen, beauty need not be the key aspect of all art. The missing cat drawing or the
expedition art is primarily supposed to be informative, not evaluated.
103
See pp. 192-267 of Darwin (1871) in particular.
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Barthelemy-Lappomeraye, 1859; Berthold, 1967; Brown & Bruton, 1991; Houston et al., 1993;
Frey & Roth-Callies, 1994; Margalida & Pelayo, 1999). Some research has suggested that this is
for dominance signaling and mate attraction purposes (Negro et al., 1999). Though, other
research has suggested it has a prophylactic function (Arlettaz, et al., 2002). Another option is
that it serves both purposes. But supposing the first case is true, then it seems we might have a
good example of decoration meant to be evaluated. This would bring us close to a case of
communicative art, but it is a very primitive version of it – the decoration is not at all
complicated or intricate. Another case talked about recently is that of a female chimpanzee
named Julie who began repeatedly stuffing a stiff blade of grass into her ear. (Van Leeuwen et
al., 2014). After Julie started doing it, other chimps in the group started doing it as well, started
copying her. What role the blade of grass plays is not clear. If it is a form of self-expression or a
way to attract mates, then we get something like communicative decoration, but unfortunately,
it’s just not clear what is going on here.
A final case I’ll look at is that of Elephants making paintings. There have been a few
cases of this. Elephants have even painted paintings that depict an elephant (Figure 3.37).

Figure 3.37. Avi, D. (2012). A trained elephant in Chiang Mai, Thailand. [Photograph].
Wikipedia Commons.
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https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Elephant_show_in_Chiang_Mai_P1110465.JP
G

Is this art in a communicative sense? I think this case is difficult. The paintings do seem to
depict an elephant. And the elephants are the ones painting the canvas. However, there doesn’t
seem to be a back and forth in the relevant sense. The elephant isn’t making the painting for an
elephant audience, it is for a human audience. This isn’t necessarily a mark against it being
communication on its own, but notice that the elephant is making these paintings this way for
reasons other than its own attempt to communicate something. The elephants are taught to do
this through reinforcement or punishment and draw the same painting, line for line, each time
(English et al., 2014). There is a back and forth here. When the elephant doesn’t paint the way
the trainer wants, it is punished or not positively reinforced and when it does paint the way the
trainer wants, it is positively reinforced, but the back and forth is not a communicative back and
forth. The trainer does not get a message from the painting. Perhaps the audience does, but then
in that case, I’m inclined to say that the message really is crafted by the trainer who is using the
elephant as a tool. There is no room for creativity on the side of the elephant – the trainer calls
all the shots. So, this, too me, does not seem to fit the art version of the sender-receiver model as
a case of non-human communication. Perhaps it’s an odd form of human communication where
an animal is used as a tool. But it is not animal art in the sense we’ve been interested in in this
chapter.

Summary
Art has been described by some philosophers as a form of communication, but what exactly it
was thought to communicate varied from thinker to thinker. Others thought perhaps art could be
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its own form of language, that it was communication but in a stronger sense, perhaps even
having features common with natural language, things like conventionality and syntax. This
latter view was fairly rare and often argued against. As we’ve seen, it turns out that art can
indeed function as a form of communication. And there are many things that art might
communicate. Moreover, communication in art is present in many different art forms – from
paintings and drawings, to music, to dance, and to monuments. Probably there are even more.
We’ve also seen that despite the doubts of prominent thinkers, art can indeed function in a way
similar to language. It can be conventional and it can have a sort of structure or syntax. Finally,
we took a look at the evolutionary side of the debate, why artistic behavior might be maintained,
have come about, and whether it is ever engaged in by animals. Sexual selection may be a good
explanation for art sometimes, but it doesn’t seem to be a good explanation for art’s origin and
maintenance, and it certainly won’t explain all instances of it. We also saw that there is a place
for art in group level theories of selection. Communities that use certain forms of art plausibly
stand a better chance at success than those that don’t, and there are a few ways it seems possible
this might happen. Finally, we took a look at whether non-human animals can be said to engage
in art. It seems that indeed they can and they do in a number of ways. Not all the examples out
there that people might point to in the animal kingdom turn out to be examples of art in the end,
but a good many do.
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Chapter 4. Maps, Blueprints, and Other Communicative Devices
4.1 Lines on Paper
Suppose you’re trying to get somewhere but you don’t know which way to go. One way to get
there is to ask for directions: “Howdy, do you know how to get to Escudilla Mountain?” You
might get a verbal response: “Yes, sir, just take US 191 south to Nutrioso, then go east on Forest
Road 56”. Another way someone might help you, though, is by drawing some lines on paper,
that is, by drawing you a map. In the first case, your partner is communicating with you. In the
case of a map, is something still being communicated?
Maps have a fairly long history, though apparently not as long as art. Maps appear to go
back at least 18,000 years. That’s how old the oldest known map candidate is. That map, found
on the walls of the Lascaux caves in France, is composed of dots and depictions of animals,
which some researchers have argued represent stars and constellations rather than some part of
the earth (Rappenglück, 1997).
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Figure 4.1. Left: a painting of what appears to be an auroch on a wall of the Lascaux
cave, France. Right: some researchers have argued that the cluster of dots in the top right
corner represents the Pleiades star cluster while the dots on the far left are part of Orion
and the dots on the auroch’s face and horns are part of Taurus. Adapted from
Whitehouse, D. (2000, 9 August). Ice age star map discovered. BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/871930.stm

On the face of it, maps seem like good candidates for communication. Like some art, they seem
to take advantage of similarities between the part of the world they’re concerned with and what
is on paper (or stone or whatever medium). And like sentences they seem to be complex and
composed of parts – symbols for roads and buildings, for example, placed in various
arrangements.
Blueprints, diagrams, and models are also seldom talked about in the literature on
communication, but these objects seem somewhat similar to maps and seem like plausible
candidates for communication too. Blueprints, diagrams, and models require interpretation on
the part of their users and are usually used to inform and guide some sort of future action. Like
maps and art, these objects also often seem to rely on some sort of resemblance to what they’re
about, and are passed from senders to others.
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How does something like a map or a diagram fit into the sender-receiver model? Does it
make sense to think of map-making and map use or the creation and use of blueprints and things
like diagrams as engaging in communication?

4.2 ‘X’ Marks the Spot
It’s easy to see how a map might fit a typical sender-receiver set-up. There is a producer (the
cartographer) and a receiver (the map user) who is sometimes the same person and sometimes
different. There is something the map-maker is observing that the map is about - broadly
speaking, the lay of the land or some other type of area at a certain time - and the person using
the map is using it to guide their actions. There could be shared interests, especially if the map is
for myself at a later date. Similarly, I could give you a map so that we can meet at a certain
camping spot for an enjoyable evening in the wilderness together. How I think the receiver or
even my future self will read the map, my marks, will be something I take into account when
making it. The receiver on the other end (who, again, could be me) will be trying to make sense
of my map, wondering what I might have meant by this mark or that. If things don’t go well,
then I can start making my maps differently or the receiver (possibly me) can start trying
different interpretations. Of course, many maps have keys on them now, but even in those cases,
there is often still a lot of interpretive legwork left for receivers, especially if that key is in
another language!
So, maps seem to pass the first stage of the test, they seem to have parts that fit into the
basic scaffolding of a typical sender-receiver set-up. Is there room for conventionality in maps?
I think the answer is a glaring yes. We might use red for the oceans instead of blue. If we don’t
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need the details of things like the borders of states, we can represent various locations simply as
dots on a grid, similar to these maps of locations in the former Soviet Union and Europe from the
American film Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)
(Figure 4.2):104

Figure 4.2. Still from the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove featuring grid maps (Kubrick 1964,
1:27:44).

The use of grids on maps even has a long history. Here is a map from Xian, China in 1136
(Figure 4.3):

104

Point maps appear to be somewhat popular examples among philosophers. See Carnap (1928, §14) and GodfreySmith (2015) for discussions involving point maps.
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Figure 4.3. The Yu Ji Tu or the “Map of the Tracks of Yu the Great”. Pettus, W. B.
(1935). The Yu Ji Tu (禹迹图) Map [Stone rubbing]. Retrieved from the Library of
Congress, Geography and Map Division, Special Collections:
https://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/guide/gm041001.jpg

This map is known as the Yu Ji Tu (Map of the Tracks of Yu the Great), and is carved into stone
in the Stele Forest. The map is at a scale of 100 li (Chinese mile) squared for every square in the
grid.
The symbols used on maps can be conventional too. We can, for example, use
“mountain” icons (/\) for ranger stations and “ranger station” icons (⌂) for mountains. And many
different kinds of things can serve as maps. Maps don’t have to be made of paper or drawn on
something flat. Consider the famous stick charts used by pre-colonial Marshall Islanders
(Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7).
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Figure 4.4. Marshall Islands stick chart,

Figure 4.5. Marshall Islands stick chart,

Mattang type [Majuro, Marshall Islands: s.n.,

Rebbelib type [Majuro, Marshall Islands: s.n.,

192-?] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of

192-?] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of

Congress,

Congress,

https://www.loc.gov/item/2010586180/

https://www.loc.gov/item/2010586182/

Figure 4.6. Marshall Islands stick chart,

Figure 4.7. Marshall Islands Sailing Chart

Meddo type [Majuro, Marshall Islands: s.n.,

made of sticks and shells, tied with palm fibre

192-?] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of

[Marshall Islands: s.n., n.d] [Map] Royal

Congress,

Commonwealth Society Collection,

https://www.loc.gov/item/2010586181/

Cambridge University Library, Cambridge,
UK. Retrieved from
https://www.lib.cam.ac.uk/collections/depart
ments/royal-commonwealthsociety/collections/marshall-island-sailingchartshttps://www.loc.gov/item/2010586181/

In these charts, what might look like nodes are actually physical shells from the beaches of the
Marshall Islands. The shells are used to represent various islands. Each straight stick represents
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currents or waves around the islands or atolls. The curved sticks represent ocean swells and their
directions - these are thought to be the first maps to do this, to chart ocean swells.105 In Figure
4.6, the herring bone design represents the influence of the northeast tradewinds on the swells
near Jaluit Atoll. How waves converged on or deflected from islands is also sometimes recorded
in these charts. A Marshallese navigator at sea would use their chart and the wave patterns they
observed or felt from their boat to figure out their relative location. Charts often represented
how much time it took to get from one island to another rather than physical distance. Unlike
with most maps, Islanders would usually memorize these charts before leaving rather than take
them along for further consultation (Spennemann, 1998).
Another interesting case is the wooden Ammassalik maps of the Greenlandic Inuits
depicting the Greenlandic coastlines (Figure 4.8).

105

Finney, Ben (1998). "13: Nautical Cartography and Traditional Navigation in Oceania". In Woodward, David;
Lewis, G. Malcolm. The History of Cartography. 2.3: Cartography in the Traditional African, American, Arctic,
Australian, and Pacific Societies. p. 444.
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Figure 4.8. Ammassalik maps and correpsonding coastline. In Jakobsen, B. H., Böcher,
J., et al., (Eds.) (2000). Topografisk Atlas Grønland. København: Det Kongelige Danske
Geografiske Selskab og Kort & Matrikelstyrelsen.. p. 171.

These were three-dimensional tactile maps, possibly helpful for navigation in the dark (Ross,
2003). The physical ridges represent the physical peninsulas, and the indents represent the bays
or inlets. The maps could be read up and down as is detailed in the text of the above image.
Then consider the use of globes and other maps that have three-dimensional detail – for
example, raised relief maps (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. A raised relief map of Iceland at City Hall in Reykjavik, Iceland. Kennerly,
D. H. (2014). Giant relief map of Iceland at Reykjavik City Hall [Photograph]. Retrieved
from http://kennerly.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/IcelandMap.jpg

Conventionality also comes in other forms. In many cases, the same thing – for example,
elevation – can be represented in different ways: three-dimensionally in the case of the raised
relief map and two-dimensionally through things like shading in the case of shaded relief maps
(standardized in the early 1900s by Swiss cartographer Eduard Imhof) and in the case of
topographical maps in the form of contour lines (or isohypses) and Hachures (introduced and
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standardized by the Austrian topographer Johann Georg Lehmann in 1799) (Figures 4.10, 4.11,
4.12).

Figure 4.10. Shaded relief map of Australia. [Map]. Earth Observatory, NASA.
Retrieved from https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/5100/australia-shaded-reliefand-colored-height
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Figure 4.11. A Hachure topographical map. Adapted from Cram, G. F. (1887). Railroad
and county map of Arizona [Map]. Retrieved from the Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g4330.rr001820/

Figure 4.12. A contour topographical map. Adapted from USGS (1956/74). Survey
Pass, AK, 1:250,000, [Map]. Retrieved from https://ngmdb.usgs.gov/htbin/tv_browse.pl?id=7dfbe37db3900378d604d2fdbc27a27a

And here’s one combining contours, color-coding, and directional shading (Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13. A mixed contour map. Peakbagger (n.d.). [Peakbagger map of Mount Fuji,
Japan]. JA: Basemap © 地理院地図(GSI Maps). Retrieved January 25, 2021,
https://peakbagger.com/map/BigMap.aspx?cy=35.360638&cx=138.727347&z=15&l=L_
JA|L_AG|L_OT|L_OS&hj=0&t=P&d=10882&c=0&a=0&sx=-999&sy=-999&cyn=0
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Some maps can even represent their subjects along the axis of time. We see this often with
weather maps on the news that show us how the cloud cover over our location will change
throughout the day (Figure 4.14).

Figure 4.14. A weather map with time. Weather.com (n.d.) [Weather.com map of New
Orleans, Louisiana, USA]. Retrieved Jan 25, 2021, from
https://weather.com/weather/radar/interactive/l/33fa2c8f1cf13812c5592c7d47572a4fbee6
bd2e370cf094c4373f2758bfe083

This reveals another conventional aspect of maps - they are now even on computers, smart
phones, and televisions. They’ve gone digital.
Getting back to time, time has also been represented in maps in another way aside from
what we’re familiar with on the morning news. American researchers Gail Langran (1992) and
Irina Vasiliev (1996) have documented various ways cartographers have depicted time. Daniel
Miller, whose work we discussed a bit in Chapter 3, provides the following example of a map
involving the temporal dimension (Figure 4.15).
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Figure 4.15. Charles Minard’s 1869 graphic representation of Napoleon’s Russian
campaign. Months are shown in Roman numerals and correlated with temperature and
spaced according to distance between landmarks. Minard, C. J. (1781-1870), Tableaux
graphiques et cartes figuratives, Bibliothèque numérique patrimoniale des ponts et
chaussées, accessed December 10, 2020,
https://patrimoine.enpc.fr/document/ENPC01_Fol_10975

As I said, Miller (2017) brought this case up in the context of arguing that music scores are like
maps. That particular topic is still a bit tangential to our immediate discussion, so I’m going to
put it off for one more moment, but I will discuss the similarity between maps and sheet music
before this chapter’s end.
There is also conventionality in maps in another form, in the choice of map projection,
especially when it comes to mapping the whole earth. A globe can be used as a map, either in a
spherical or an elliptical form, but oftentimes having a flat map makes things easier in a practical
sense – easier to handle, easier to store. And yet, in making a map of the earth, map-makers
must use some sort of “projection” which takes what’s on the surface of the somewhat spherical
earth and turns it into something that can be placed onto a flat surface. Developed by Flemish
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cartographer Gerardus Mercator (1512-1594) in 1569, the Mercator projection is probably the
most common way of doing this today (Figure 4.16).

Figure 4.16. Mercator projection map. Strebe, D. R. (2011), Mercator projection Square
[Map]. Wikipedia Commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mercator_projection_Square.JPG

The popularity of the Mercator projection compared to other projections is due to its ease of use
in maritime navigation. The Mercator projection has two properties in particular that make this
the case. One is that the projection results in any course of constant bearing to be represented on
the map as a straight line. This allows ships to sail in a constant compass direction for great
distances, whereas in the past more constant correction was required resulting in more room for
error. The other feature of the Mercator projection that makes it helpful for navigation is that it
meets the requirements of a “conformal” map projection, where this means roughly that the
projection preserves the angles and shapes of small objects – so, for example, if two trails cross
each other at a 45° angle, then their representations on the map will cross at a 45° angle. Here in
an example of a conformal mapping.
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Figure 4.17. Representation of a conformal mapping. Alexandrov, O. (2008). Conformal
map [Map]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Conformal_map.svg

The mapping f in this example, maps pairs of lines intersecting at 90° to pairs of curves still
intersecting at 90°. The making of a Mercator map in a way is a mapping in the other direction –
from a curved earth to a flat map surface. Here are some examples of other map projections that
are out there (Figures 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20).

Figure 4.18. Goode homolosine

Figure 4.19. Equidistant conic

Figure 4.20. Cahill Butterfly

projection. Strebe, D. R. (2011),

projection. Strebe, D. R. (2014), projection. Strebe, D. R. (2019),

Goode homolosine projection SW Equidistant conic projection SW Cahill butterfly conformal
[Map]. Wikipedia commons.

[Map]. Wikipedia commons.

projection SW [Map]. Wikipedia

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w https://commons.wikimedia.org/ commons.
iki/File:Goode_homolosine_proje wiki/File:Equidistant_conic_proj https://commons.wikimedia.org/
ction_SW.jpg

ection_SW.JPG

wiki/File:Cahill_butterfly_confor
mal_projection_SW.jpg_SW.jpg

In representing an elliptical object in two-dimensional form, the Mercader projection
brings with it some constraints. In 1828, German mathematician and physicist Carl Friedrich

226

Gauss (1777-1855) proved in his Theorema Egregium that a sphere's surface cannot be
represented on a plane (that is, a flat surface) without some sort of distortion. That is, no matter
how you do it, when you try to fit what you have on the surface of a globe onto a flat square or
rectangle or whatever, there will be some stretching or shrinking of parts of that surface in order
to make it fit. This moral applies to elliptical objects as well, such as the earth. What we get is
that any projection of the earth onto a flat surface, any two-dimensional map of the earth, will be
distorted in some way. The Mercator map does this by distorting the size of geographical objects
far from the equator. So, for example, Madagascar and the United Kingdom appear to be
roughly the same size according to the Mercator map, when in reality Madagascar is closer to
twice the size of the UK.

Figure 4.21. A Tissot indicatrix, first developed by French mathematician Nicolas
Auguste Tissot in 1859 to illustrate map projection distortion. Gaba, E. (2008). Tissot
indicatrix world map Mercator proj [Map]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tissot_indicatrix_world_map_Mercator_proj.s
vg

Another type of projection, the azimuthal equidistant projection, represents distances and
directions more accurately at the center point, and distorts shapes and sizes as one moves out.
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Figure 4.22. An azimuthal equidistant projection. Strebe, D. R. (2011). Azimuthal
equidistant projection SW [Map]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Azimuthal_equidistant_projection_SW.jpg

Figure 4.23. An azimuthal equidistant projection with Tissot's Indicatrices. Kunimune, J.
(2018). Azimuthal Equidistant with Tissot's Indicatrices of Distortion [Map]. Wikipedia
commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Azimuthal_equidistant_projection_SW.jpg

What we seem to get is that there are at least some constraints on the conventionality of maps
given what we want them to do – certain moves bring certain consequences. There are certain
limits to what can be done given what you want out of a map. I’d like to discuss a few more of
these.
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Consider things like the “Four Color Theorem”. In 1852, South African mathematician
Francis Guthrie (1831-1899) was trying to color a map of the counties of England, and noticed
that four colors were all that was needed. He asked his brother Frederick (1833-1886), who then
asked British mathematician Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871), if it was true that any map can
be colored using four colors such that adjacent regions (i.e. regions that share borders) receive
different colors. In 1976, the four-color theorem was proved by American mathematicians
Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken.

Figure 4.24. A four-color theorem map of Africa. MapChart. (n.d.). [MapChart map of
Africa]. November 23, 2020, https://mapchart.net/africa.html

A related question we might ask is what it takes minimally for something to work as a map as far
as color or some other distinguishing feature goes. I think the obvious answer is two – there
must be two different colors, or shades, or distinguishable features. As long as there is simply a
background color (for example, a piece of white paper), a map-maker, in many cases, will be fine
with nothing more than one other color that can be used for all the other purposes (for example,
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using a sharpie on a white sheet of paper to draw out rivers and trail locations). They could even
just emboss the paper, or cut marks into it. What about if just one color or distinguishable
feature is available? For example, a blank piece of paper that the author cannot write or emboss
or mark in any way? I think the answer is that a single colored sheet of paper could act as a
signal in some game, but it could not act as a map. It would be a signal that does not help the
receiver navigate. I’ll explain more about what I mean by this, how maps work, what it takes for
something to function as a map, in the next section, but before that I’d like to mention just one
more way in which maps can be conventional and yet be constrained. I’ll leave the rest to be
covered as we go along.
Consider the grid map example again. It raises a good question. How abstract can a map
go? In Chapter 3, I talked about musical scores and similarities a bit. I brought up Liz Camp
and the idea of “isomorphism”. Let’s talk about that idea now. Here’s a quote about
isomorphism from Camp (2007):
[A]lthough maps employ discrete syntactic constituents with a significantly
conventionalized semantics, there’s still a significant interaction between their
formal properties and mode of combination and what they represent.
Nonetheless, the only strong constraint on icons employed by cartographic
systems, and on their potential semantic values, is that the icons’ own physical
features can’t conflict with the principles of spatial isomorphism. Thus, one can’t
represent a street with a circle, not because it would be too arbitrary, but because
this would make it impossible to place the icon in a spatial configuration that
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reflects the spatial structure of the represented content: for instance, one couldn’t
depict two streets as parallel, or as intersecting. (p. 159)
I mostly agree with what Camp says in this passage, though I think the addition of the element of
time to certain maps would mean that this sort of thing should apply to the temporal realm too.
And given the three-dimensional character of some maps, it would seem the spatial sense Camp
talks about should include depth as well. In any case, the main thing Camp seems to be
suggesting is that some similarity between signals and their subjects is important in things like
maps, that it’s important maps somehow reflect certain relationships between certain elements of
the things they’re about.
Hold that thought. I’d like now to discuss how maps work. I’ll bring Camp’s idea back
into play as we go along, trying my best to make more sense of it along the way.

4.3 Fathoming It Out
If maps are communicative devices and they can be so varied, how do they work? In a 2013
essay discussing representation, British philosopher Simon Blackburn offers a suggestion
articulated in terms originally due to American philosopher Wilfred Sellars.106 Maps have entry
and exit rules. Here is Blackburn’s take:
I could put this in Sellarsian terms by saying that Captain Cook, for instance,
might literally have had an entry rule for an element of his chart. You do not
write a figure indicating a depth unless you have dropped a piece of lead to the
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Thank you to Peter Godfrey-Smith who discussed this case in his Pragmatism course at the Graduate Center,
CUNY.
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bottom and measured the number of marks on a line. Had he not followed many
such rules meticulously, his charts would not be revered, as they are, for their
representational accuracy. There are also exit rules or in other words, ways to use
his chart to navigate waters around the coast. The chart is useful, of course,
because there is a harmony between the entry rule, getting the chart to say that
there are two fathoms of water in a straight, say, and the exit rule or practice,
which gives you success in sailing a boat drawing anything less than two fathoms,
but no more, through the straight. But there is no useful contrast here between
coping and copying: the chart enables you to cope because it represents correctly
the amount of water in the straight. There is no other explanation of the successes
that attend sailors who use it. (p. 73)
As Godfrey-Smith points out, the entry and exit rules Blackburn writes about are very similar to
the sender and receiver rules in the Lewis model. Consider the Woodward case. Entry rule: if
you need to meet, place the pot on the left side of the balcony. Exit rule: if you see the potted
plant on the left side of the balcony, go to the meet up spot.
But Blackburn also talks about harmony. This is what he says explains the success of the
maps. Yet what exactly is this harmony Blackburn is speaking about and how is it achieved?
Blackburn doesn’t say. If we look at things from the sender-receiver point of view, however,
perhaps we can say that this harmony occurs when the combination of two sets of rules (sender
and receiver rules) provides a solution to a sender-receiver game. This harmony could come
about by any of the mechanisms we’ve discussed already: learning, copying, some form of
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selection. Whether this is the sort of thing Blackburn has in mind, however, or would approve
of, is hard to say, but it seems to fit the model.
Blackburn also mentions that maps tend to take advantage of certain similarities or
resemblances to what they represent – blue for water, green for trees. We as creators of maps
usually expect others to readily pick up on similarities, and receivers more or less typically
expect producers to take advantage of resemblances. We know this doesn’t have to be the case
given the room for conventionality, so why do we see this? Blackburn’s reply seems to be that
copying allows for the map to work, for users to cope. But his response isn’t filled out much
more than that. I’m not sure why this tendency for us to make maps that look so similar to their
target domains is there. There are many reasons this tendency could have come about. Perhaps
receivers were predisposed to interpret things iconically, senders took advantage of that, and a
signaling system got off the ground – similar to how much depicting communicative art probably
came about. But we know a map doesn’t have to be a perfect copy to help its users cope. So,
what else might Blackburn mean?
The general idea is that maps tend to capture what the world looks like in some sense and
that this is what helps receivers successfully negotiate their way through the world. But maps
are not just pictures and not all similarities seem to need to be used. Even if the colors of parts
on a map are different than those of real-world counterparts, or tall mountains are drawn as short,
they can still function as maps, as representations in some sense of some part of the world. What
seems to be important really is that – other details stripped away – there remains some particular
relationship between the relations between certain elements on the map and the relations between
certain bits of the world (or in the sky, or whatever). How at least some parts of a map are
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arranged and match up with counterparts in the real world is important. That this notch on the
wooden Inuit map is next to this one matters – whereas the color of the notches doesn’t. That the
shell on the Marshall Islander’s map is to the left of the herring bone design and not to the right
of it matters. That this mountain is to the left of that river and not in front of it. This seems to be
in the realm of Camp’s idea of isomorphism, but it’s hard to say if it’s the same thing –
unfortunately, there’s simply not enough to go off in the literature. Nonetheless, there’s another
sort of isomorphism that Camp’s view could be about, and I’ll discuss that in a just a moment.
But briefly, consider that with maps often if there’s not a mountain in one spot, there’s
something else, even just flat land.

Figure 4.25. Example of a purpose restrictive map. The map on the left is a detailed map
of a certain location. The map on the right is a map of the same area but with details
restricted to just one mountain range.

Italian philosophers Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi (1999) point out this sort of feature and
think that it has importance for representation in all maps, that the absence of a feature (no
mountain icon here) means the absence of a counterpart in the real world. For them, the removal
of a part of a map means you’re now dealing with a map of a different place. American
philosopher Michael Rescorla (2009) takes a similar view. But as Camp points out elsewhere,
non-authoritative or highly purpose restrictive maps might not include everything that could be
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represented despite there being symbols that could accommodate them (E. Camp, personal
communication, August 29, 2016). I might have a general symbol for mountains, but if I’m only
trying to show you in detail one part of an area, say, a particular range, then I might leave
mountains and other features in the outlying regions out – not because they aren’t there, but
because noting them isn’t necessary for our purposes. I think Camp is right on this and that this
is part of the story. But I might even leave out something on a map by mistake – maybe I forget
to draw one of the 1000s of miles of trails in the Sierra Nevada Mountains or I draw one of them
going in slightly the wrong direction - at least intuitively this is still a map of the same place. I
might even intentionally add something that isn’t there, say, a town or a street. Some mapmakers have done this in order to be able to capture plagiarizers – these features are sometimes
known as “trap streets”. Then consider that Google Earth and many historical maps seem to
have included for some time the non-existent Sandy Island of New Caledonia, a result simply of
repeated human error. I take it most people would agree that the Google Earth map was still a
map of the Earth. And so, it seems a map can still be of something even if it doesn’t include all
the details, or perhaps has too many, or perhaps even if there are other issues.
This discussion should seem familiar as it mirrors our discussion earlier in Chapter 3
about art, accuracy, and things like resolution. Coincidentally, in the Blackburn quote above, he
also talks about accuracy. We often don’t describe maps as true or false but as more or less
accurate.107 This is what we see going on in the case with the hiking trails. This is something a
bit different than what we find in the original Lewis model. And indeed, much of the history of
maps revolves around the introduction of new tools and new techniques in the search for greater
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Godfrey-Smith in lecture and (2015) also notes this feature of maps and provides a rough account of
isomorphism, including some of the problems with that rendering.
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accuracy of various forms in map production and interpretation. The use of compasses and
cardinal directions, sextants, and protractors.
But now recall our lesson from Chapter 1: there can be truth within a signaling system
even though the way that system carves up the world is conventional, and what’s more we need
not adopt any sort of strong realism when making this move.108 Maps, as signals, seem to work
the same way and be subject to the same arguments. Maps don’t need to reflect obvious ways of
carving up the world – lands masses and bodies of water. Maps don’t need to do this, can be
made in radically different ways, carve the world up in radically different ways, leave things out,
and yet we are still able to make true or false claims using them. As I said earlier, a map could
be made using just dots (representing locations) and a grid system. In such a case, if X is a
square on the grid and Vancouver is in it or not, we could say, for example, “Vancouver, British
Columbia is in square X”, and that statement would be true or false. Accuracy can play a role in
maps in this relative sense too.109
Standards of measurement are similar. We don’t have to use Fahrenheit for measuring
temperature - we can use Celsius, or Kelvin. None of the standards is the true or right way of
carving things up, of talking about temperature. It’s just that some ways of measuring it or
representing it are more useful or easier to use in certain contexts than others, and yet we can still
use the objects and using their rules for sending and receiving, make true or false, accurate or
less accurate, claims with them. That it’s 90 degrees Fahrenheit out rather than 95.
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And if Barrett is right, we seemingly have good reasons not to adopt a strong realism.
Godfrey-Smith in lecture and (2015) takes a similar stance regarding accuracy in maps, approaching the problem
from a different direction and also gesturing toward a version of anti-realism. However, it’s not clear how far
Godfrey-Smith’s version of anti-realism extends.
109
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Nelson Goodman expressed a similar take in his book Problems and Projects (1972). In
a discussion about what he calls “constructional systems”, he talks about maps. In this quote he
replies to those who worry about maps reflecting the “true” reality:110
Though a map is derived from observations of a territory, the map lacks the
contours, colors, sounds, smells, and life of the territory, and in size, shape,
weight, temperature and most other respects may be about as much unlike what it
maps as can well be imagined. It may even be very little like other equally good
maps of the same territory. A map is a schematic, selective, conventional,
condensed, and uniform. And these characteristics are virtues rather than defects.
The map not only summarizes, clarifies, and systematizes; it often discloses facts
we could hardly learn immediately from our explorations. We may make larger,
fuller, and more complicated maps or even three-dimensional models in order to
record more information; but this is not always to the good. For when our map
becomes as large and in all other respects the same as the territory mapped – and
indeed long before this stage is reached – the purposes of a map are no longer
served. There is no such thing as a completely unabridged map; for abridgement
is intrinsic to mapmaking. This, I think, suggests the answer not only to rampant
anti-intellectualism but to many another objection against the abstractness,
poverty, artificiality, and general unfaithfulness of constructional systems. Let no
one suppose that if a map made according to one scheme of projection is accurate
then maps made according to alternative schemes are wrong. And let no one
accuse the cartographer of merciless reductionism if his map fails to turn green in
110

Thank you to Richard Creath for pointing this quote out to me.
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the spring. The anti-intellectualist confronts us with a spurious dilemma. The
choice is not between misrepresentation and meticulous reproduction. The
relevant question about a system or a map is whether it is serviceable and accurate
in the way intended. (Goodman, 1972, p. 15)
As I said, organization – how parts of the map (the mountains, the lakes, etc.) are arranged seems to matter, seems to be very important. Notice too that in maps certain parts seem to tend
to map systematically to certain parts in the world – mountain icons map to mountains; lake
icons to lakes. But there’s also another sense of organization that is often playing a role here.
Consider again the entry and exit rules for Cook’s maps. Why does the ‘2’ on the map refer to x
distance as measured on the rope? That is, why doesn’t that distance x correspond to ‘3’ or ‘4’?
One answer could be that it’s arbitrary just as in classical signaling. But what really seems to be
going on is that the ordering of numbers is being mapped onto the various depths in a systematic
and sequential way.111 It’s possible Camp could have something like this in mind when she’s
talking about isomorphism – this stronger sequential form of it being involved. Think about the
blue on a map indicating the sea. Sometimes to indicate a greater depth the shading is made
darker on that part of the map. This is like the Woodward case where size of the potted plant
maps to how soon he needs to meet. We get this with the Marshall Islander and Inuit maps too.
In the first case, distance between shells represents distance between islands; curves the
deflection of waves. In the Inuit case, the length and shape of the wood curves and edges
correspond to the length and shape of the shorelines and coves. In more modern maps, we see
this in the systematic way contour lines are used.
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Godfrey-Smith notes this in his Pragmatism course.
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Now let’s take a step back and look at the big picture. What we get is rather interesting.
Recalling some of our other lessons from Chapter 1, maps, it seems, can be and often are
combinatorial, and not just that but compositional and encoded too – just like many other
signals. This seems to be part of how they work. Recall the color grid system example from our
discussion of syntax in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.7). Many maps seem to be just much more
complicated grid cases. And yet, maps need not always adhere strictly to any sort of “sequence”.
Again, the water can be red. The elevations reversed or mixed. The shading conventions
reversed or jumbled.112
Why might maps tend to make use of sequences as well as iconic representation and the
systematization of things like icons and their referents? As I suggested earlier, one answer or
part could be that senders were predisposed to make maps that way for whatever reason. But
another answer could be that these ways of making maps make interpretation easier for map
users (like us at least). Iconic interpretation can make things fairly obvious – this is why road
signs with just figures such as the silhouette of a deer are helpful. When it comes to sequential
mapping, it could be it makes it easier to predict, for example, that this darker blue region means
this part of the bay will be 15 feet deep given these other two slightly lighter shaded regions were
10 and 5 feet respectively in reality. It could be that having systematized icons allows a user to
predict that the next time they get to a place on the map with such and such an icon that there
will be a fresh water spring there too.
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One might wonder how wildly different a map can look from its domain before it doesn’t really function as a
map anymore. I return to that question in a later footnote.
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4.4. The Cartography of Power, Thematic Maps, and Other Odds and Ends
So, we’ve now seen that maps are a form of communication and that they can come in many
forms. We’ve also seen a bit of how they work. I’d like now to focus on a few other ways maps
play a communicative role. And I’d like to start with politics.
In a way, we make our world with our maps. There is an area of study in cartography
called critical cartography, which focuses on how maps are related to power – how they can
reflect it and maintain it. Perhaps the most commonly discussed example of this involves the
Mercator projection – there’s even an episode of the American television series The West Wing
that dedicates a segment to it (Redford & Sorkin, 2001).113 The idea is roughly this. The
Mercator map, as we’ve seen, distorts the sizes of various countries and continents. It shows
countries nearer the Equator, which happen to typically be non-Western countries, as much
smaller than those farther from it, which happen to include North America and Europe. Some
authors have suggested that this distortion in size and the widespread use of the Mercator
projection has caused people to consider those countries (and their peoples) nearer to the Equator
as less important (Rosenberg, 2019). As a result, some people have advocated for different
projections to be used more commonly – in the West Wing episode, the fictional advocacy group
Cartographers for Social Equality suggests the Peters projection, also known as the Gall-Peter’s
projection (Figure 4.26).
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See Season 2, Episode 16: “Somebody’s going to emergency, somebody’s going to jail”.
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Figure 4.26. Gall-Peter’s projection. Strebe, D. R. (2011). Gall-Peter’s projection SW
[Map]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gall%E2%80%93Peters_projection_SW.jpg

The Peter’s projection works by making all areas have the same size relative to each other, but it
does this at the expense of distorting shapes. We get continents that are better reflections of their
actual relative sizes but that look stretched out or squished.
I can even see how something as simple as turning a map upside down, or moving where
the center of the map is can plausibly have some sort of effect like the one being discussed with
the Mercator projection. Shifting what is in the center of the frame could plausibly shift a
viewer’s focus, shift how much they think that portion of the map must be important relative to
the others. In a way, putting some continent or country in the center of a map rather than some
other area can make that country or continent seem more like the “center of the world”.
There are other ways maps can play a role in communicating and perpetuating power
relations. One of the most common examples of this is the replacing of indigenous place and
object names with Western ones. Americans can find examples of this on just about every map
of their country. Canadians and Australians too. Humphreys Peak in Flagstaff, Arizona, for
example, was named in the late 1800s for General Andrew A. Humphreys, a Union general
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during the American Civil War. The peak, however, was known well before that by the Navajo
as Doko'o'osliid, and it’s not like the Navajo no longer live in Arizona – they’re still there.
Currently, the Western name is on most Arizona maps and what most people know the mountain
by. Then simply consider the names of the many states in the US. The area that is now the state
of Washington was not called that by the peoples that lived there. I see some of these cases as
having similarities to the territory marking case involving the Confederate statues. That the
names that have stuck and keep getting perpetuated on maps are the Western ones, reveals
something about the power dynamic there.114
Then consider recent debates surrounding maps of the South China Sea or of Gaza and
the West Bank. The American film Abominable (2019), had a scene that included a picture of a
map of the South China Sea donning what is known as the “nine-dash-line” (Figure 4.27).

Figure 4.27. Still from the film Abominable (Culton 2019, 0:10:14)
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This, of course, isn’t to suggest that this sort of thing happens only in the Western world.
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The nine-dash-line has a long history but in short is currently being used by China to make
territorial assertions against some of its neighbors. Officials from places such as Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines criticized the film because of that scene, because the depiction of
that map normalized that territory claim against them. Vietnam even eventually banned the
motion picture.
Maps can have a political communicative role, but they can have other communicative
roles outside politics or pure navigation too. Take a look at what are called thematic maps.
These are maps that reveal some sort of data about a subject according to region.
There are thematic maps that show things like the most common religion in an area, the
most common language, or which presidential candidate got the most votes (Figure 4.28).

Figure 4.28. A map showing electoral college vote winner by state in the 2008 U.S.
presidential election. Nolan, J. V. & Congressional Cartography Program. (2008) United
States presidential election, results by state, November 5. [Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Cartography Program] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/item/2008626935/.
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Another common example of a thematic map is a map of different environmental regions. Here’s
a map showing ecoregions of New Mexico (Figure 4.29).
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Figure 4.29. A map of New Mexico’s various ecoregions. Griffith, G. E. et al., (2006),
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Here is a thematic map showing historic Grizzly bear range in the Western United States.
Grizzly habitat circa 1850 is in light green. Known habitat circa 1920 is in dark green. The
dates on the map represent approximate local extirpations (Figure 4.30).115
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These extirpations were largely carried out by European colonists and their descendants, hunters, and the US
government. See Leopold (1949) for perhaps the most famous first-hand account of these practices written by a
former US Forest Service ranger. See Robinson (2005) for a more detailed historical policy discussion.
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Figure 4.30. Map of historic Grizzly bear range in the Western United States. Mattson,
D. (n.d.). Historic grizzly range [Map]. Bear Conservation.
http://www.bearconservation.org.uk/

In these maps, organization matters. And there are systematic mappings – from color to political
party, ecoregion, or habitat. Is there room for some sort of sequence? There’s room for that too.
For example, consider this map from 1881 showing the population density of administrative
divisions in France. (Figure 4.31).
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Figure 4.31. 1881 map of population density of France. France. Ministere de l'interieur.
Service de la carte de France et de la statistique graphique (1881). Densite de la
population. Carte No. 2 [Map]. David Rumsey Map Collection.
https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~311320~90081010:De
nsite-de-la-population--Carte-No?sort=pub_list_no_initialsort%2Cpub_date%2Cpub_list_no%2Cseries_no#

In this case, the darker a region is painted, the denser the population. In the contour map
examples, there’s a sequence in the way elevations are represented. In the shaded relief maps,
there’s a sequence in the shading. There are many ways sequences can have a role. In this map
from Austrian philosopher Otto Neurath (1882-1945), there’s a sequence from colors to
elevation and from number of boxes to population size (Figure 4.32).
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Figure 4.32. Population and elevation map. Neurath, O. (1930).
Altamerikanische Städte [Map]. David Rumsey Map Collection.
https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~325160~9009
4115:Altamerikanische-St%C3%A4dte---American?sort=pub_list_no_initialsort%2Cpub_date%2Cpub_list_no%2Cseries_no&qvq=
q:neurath;sort:pub_list_no_initialsort%2Cpub_date%2Cpub_list_no%2Cseries_n
o;lc:RUMSEY~8~1&mi=15&trs=132

Some readers might find some of these maps aesthetically pleasing. In Chapter three, we
discussed art. Many maps cross over into art too, also have a decorative or artistic function.
Plenty of map-makers don’t just care about how well a map helps someone navigate (or gain
some information or how accurate it is) but also how it looks. Some maps are created partly to
be assessed or evaluated for aesthetic reasons, similar to other forms of art we’ve talked about.
Pictorial maps and illustrated maps are prime examples of this. Many of these also have
cartoons in them and are meant to be humorous. Here is an example of an illustrated map of
England and Wales from about 1935 (Figure 4.33).
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Figure 4.33. A pictorial map of England and Wales. Geographia Limited (1935). The
new Pictorial map of England and Wales [Map]. David Rumsey Historical Map
Collection
https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~278948~90052007#

The map is crafted with more than navigation in mind, it’s also made to be assessed for its
aesthetic qualities and perhaps humor.
Maps like these can cross into the political realm very quickly. Depending on what
cartoons are drawn, how the peoples of the various regions are depicted, these maps can help
maintain or help subvert certain power dynamics, can humanize or de-humanize a people. For
example, an illustrated map of the UK containing demeaning depictions of the Irish would be a
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problem. Similarly, so would an illustrated map of the US containing problematic renderings of
Native Americans, African-Americans, and so on. Sadly, there are plenty of examples of these
of these out there.
Now let’s return to a problem that we left incomplete in Chapter 3. Recall Daniel
Miller’s idea that music scores are like maps. My hope is that by this point it is clear from our
discussions so far that maps and musical scores are indeed very similar. They are both signals.
They are combinatorial, often encoded, and they make use of similarities and sequences. But I
do not want to say that they are the same thing, or that one is the other. Most maps don’t show
time in the way a score seems to; most are “static”, a bit like a photograph of a place at a
particular time – not that maps can’t do this, though. Maps are also paradigmatically about
navigation – getting somewhere - whereas sheet music just doesn’t seem to be that sort of thing
and seems to be typically more about what to do with one’s hands or feet on a certain instrument
or what to do with one’s mouth or voice. Yes, a piano player might in a sense be using the sheet
music to help himself navigate their way around the keyboard – perhaps there’s some sense in
which that is a fair use of the English language. But even this seems different from navigation
with maps, where there is typically more than one route a person can take using the same map. I
can take the path to Beetle bug Lake or I can use the same map to get me to the lakes on the back
side of Kaiser Peak, for example, but a score typically doesn’t have this sort of possibility. And
yet, although I don’t know of any cases like this – a sort of “choose your own adventure” song
version – I can see how something like that might go, perhaps with reverse playing available too.
Maps also seem to differ from sheet music in that maps seem to, as I said, typically be about
getting somewhere whereas sheet music seems to be about how to play something so as to
produce a song, which itself might be a signal.
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And yet, these categories seem capable of being blurred. Some sheet music could encode
the directions for getting somewhere. This could be possible, for example, if North, South, East,
and West were represented by different notes, the duration each note is to be played is mapped to
how far one should travel in that direction (given a certain starting point), and the order of the
notes mapped to the order in which one should travel in which direction. I’m not aware of any
scores of this sort, but something like this is possible. Another way these categories get blurred
is if we imagine a case where a map not only tells a user where to go and how to get there and
certain spots along the way, but also tells the user which notes to play at the various instruments
at those locations along the way, in effect producing a song as the map-user-instrument-player
makes their way to the end of their jaunt. Another mixed case is found in the 1985 film The
Goonies. Not only does One-eyed Willy’s map give directions via what appear to be features of
terrain and some nautical information (Figure 4.34) as well as a few written clues, but there is a
point along the way where users must use a small piece of sheet music written on the back of the
map to play a booby trapped organ correctly in order to open the next door to move on (Figure
4.35).

Figure 4.34. One-eyed Willy’s map. (Donner 1985, 0:22:30).
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Figure 4.35. The back side of One-eyed Willy’s map. (Donner 1985, 1:19:31).

As if that isn’t enough, the Goonies map even requires users find the spot where the perforations
in an old doubloon line up with a certain set of rocks if they want to find the place where the map
begins (Figure 4.36).

Figure 4.36. The doubloon and rocks. (Donner 1985, 0:27:44).

So, maps can be used to make songs, songs can be used to give directions, both uses can occur at
the same time. And both maps and scores make use of composition and encoding and take
advantage of sequences and similarities. What does all this mean? What are we to think of the
distinction between maps and music scores? I think the answer is that it’s better to just see that
these two things – maps and music scores – are simply two somewhat similar, somewhat
different examples of the broader category that is communication. It’s not the case that maps are
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scores or scores are maps. One isn’t the other. Even signals of ordinary language can perform
the sort of communicative functions just listed. I can speak out all the possible directions you
might take rather than give you a map of all of them; I can simply tell you what keys to play and
when rather than hand you some piece of sheet music. It might be slower going or less
convenient, might not convey everything “all at once” as many maps and scores seem to do in
some sense, might not be something I can look back at repeatedly if I forget a part either. But
the point is that despite these things being blurred and the functions being capable of being
realized by different forms of communication, there are more and less ideal or more and less
paradigmatic cases of each of these concepts where the two are noticeably different enough from
each other for us to warrant distinguishing them as different kinds. I lean on that. But again,
they’re all just different forms of the broader category that is communication - in some instances
in the real-world more similar, in some instances less.116
Shift gears for a moment. One last thing on maps. All this talk about maps so far has
been assuming a case where someone is making a map and giving it to someone else. But
suppose I hand you a map that I didn’t make but bought at the store. I see you lost on the trail.
You say you’re looking for the trail to Silver Pass, and I hand you a map I bought at the ranger

116

Godfrey-Smith (2015) and in lectures seems to suggest that anything sufficiently complex can function as a map
of some domain as long as there is some receiver rule that allows it to be used by a receiver that way – this is a
rough sketch. But then this gets us into the situation of calling maps some objects that – let alone looking nothing
like maps – require extreme decoding efforts and that do not readily reveal, at least to the human eye, the relations
between objects in the domain that maps are typically created to help reveal. Decryption at the surface level of
translating a map from English to French is not so problematic. Some other encrypted maps might still seem to fit
fairly well. But how much decoding effort can a piece require before it is no longer really a map or being used as a
map rather than as a weird sort of encrypted data set? How readily must relations be revealed for something to
count as a map? One part of the answer is that it will be relative to the kind of agents involved. What looks like a
good obvious map of Toronto to some alien species might look like an indecipherable mess to us (if we can even use
something like it). But another part, I think, is that this is one of those categories without an obvious fine edge – just
more and less typical cases. The same worry can be applied to works of art. Is that really a painting of a dog rather
than just a weird, perhaps aesthetically pleasing, form of acrylic coding? Can an artist call a silver spoon a depiction
of a fox as long as they have a receiver rule that explains how its parts map to one? I think it depends on the
context, but even then, the best answer might only be a “Well, sort of”.
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station. Was my act of giving you the map a form of communication? This is a bit of an odd
case to think about in sender-receiver terms, but I think it could fit. One way that might work is
having a set up similar to that of the commissioning case. The map handed over was chosen (or
handed over rather than not) because of what it represented, because it was a map that did have
the trail to Silver Pass on it, not one that didn’t have it. Add to this that most people are already
trained up to some extent to be able to use a map and how to select maps, and it doesn’t seem
implausible that this sort of thing might happen often. I’d imagine places like Disneyland and
National Parks – which offer free maps to visitors and even often have visitors who don’t speak
English – see this sort of thing all the time.
I think another way to look at it is as not much different than if you asked me if this was
the way to Mexico and I handed you a card that had “Yes” written on it (and I hadn’t made that
card). The primary difference between this case and the map one seems to be the map receiver
having to do more interpretive legwork in the ways I mentioned earlier. But they are still
receiving a signal that has information on it and is a conventional way of communicating that
information. There could still be a back and forth. Hand me the wrong card and maybe I
complain and you try a different card next time – maybe you don’t speak English and when you
handed me that card that was your first attempt at a move in that weird signaling game.
Similarly, I hand you the wrong map, you don’t get to where you wanted to go, you complain,
and next time someone asks me for a map, I try to do a better job of giving them a helpful one.
In many cases, though, a sender will also try to do some other kind of helping. They’ll
try to use their fingers or hands to point out where the receiver is on the map and then where they
need to go and how to get there, tracing out the path with their finger and maybe pointing out
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where the cardinal directions are on the map and in the real world. They might use language if
the receiver speaks the same language or at least a little bit. What we get is that maps play an
interesting role in communication. Not only can they be created and sent as stand-alone signals,
they can even be mixed in certain instances with gesture and spoken language creating even
more complicated signaling interactions.
That’s all I have about maps for now. Now, I’d like to turn to some other candidate
communicative objects I mentioned at the begging of this chapter, things like blueprints, models,
and diagrams.

4.5 Below Deck: Visions of Home, Bones, and the Starry Sky
Mentioned even less often in discussions of communication are things like blueprints and
diagrams. By blueprints, I mean the kind you see used in construction and engineering. By
diagrams, I mean things such as charts of the human body. Dewey thought these might play a
communicative role. How might that work?
Blueprints seem to function sort of like maps. They are created by a sender as a guide for
a receiver. Both are used to guide action. In the case of maps, an action might be, “Walk east
here”. In the case of a blueprint, an action might be, “Place a 2x4 there”. Yet, whereas maps are
about the world, with blueprints that sort of interpretation is more challenging. The best I can
come up with is that blueprints show how the designer would like something to be and what
actions should be taken to make that happen. There could be a back and forth. The architect
sends off blueprints to the contractor. The contractor builds a structure according to their
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interpretation of the blueprints. If the contractor builds things the way the architect wants, then
that way of drawing up blueprints and of interpreting them will be reinforced for future
interactions; if the contractor builds something other than what the architect wanted, then they
may revise their ways of drawing or interpreting future building plans.
Go back to Blackburn’s entry and exit rules. We can think of things in these terms here
too. The entry rules are something like “If a door is supposed to be there, draw a double line on
the corresponding part of the blueprint”. An exit rule might be “If there is a double line on some
part of the blueprint, then leave a space for a door in the wall of the corresponding part of the
house”. Another set of rules might be (entry rule) “If this wall is supposed to be x feet tall, then
mark x feet on the print” and (exit rule) “If the print says x feet, then make it x feet”.
As with maps, how things are arranged on paper matters in blueprints. There will often
be some similarity between the parts on paper and the parts in the real world, not just in how they
look but in how they are related to each other. Organization in the systematic sense will be
important much as in the case of depth in maps – feet for height of a wall vs. depth of a channel.
Often sequences will be used.
Take a look at the ship plans for the HMS Bounty (Figure 4.37):
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Figure 4.37. Internal sheer and profile Admiralty draught plans for the HMS Bounty.
(s.n.) (1887). HMS Bounty, Lines & Profile [Ship plans]. Object ID ZAZ6665. Admiralty
Collection, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, UK.
https://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/86456.html

Here the arrangement of parts matters. There is a systematic mapping of parts on the page to
parts in the real world. And there is a use of mappings to sequences. From length of the ship
and its parts on paper to the length of the ship and its parts in reality – conventionally in ship
plans of this period to a scale of ¼ inch to 1 foot in length. The curvature is mapped too from
angles to angles. The half-breadth plan of the vessel illustrates the shape of the ship’s hull at
various waterlines (points where the hull of the ship meets the water). The Bounty plan even
includes color coding. In this example, breadfruit racks - important for this ship’s particular duty
- and companionways are marked in red.117 We even get an instance of certain parts being left
117

The Bounty is famous for the mutiny that occurred on it in 1789 led by Acting Lieutenant Fletcher Christian
(1764-1793). Under the command of Captain William Bligh (1754-1817), the ship was to sail to Tahiti to collect
breadfruit plants to bring to the Caribbean. The expedition was promoted by the Royal Society and organized by its
president at the time Sir Joseph Banks (1743-1820). Banks and others wagered breadfruit might grow well in the
Caribbean and could serve as an inexpensive food source for plantation owners there to provide the people they
enslaved.
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out yet this still pretty obviously counting as a set of plans of the Bounty - if you look at the
bowsprit, foremast, mainmast, and mizzenmast in the plans, you’ll notice they end – even seem
to be drawn broken - before you get to the sails.
As with maps, there is room for conventionality in blueprints. A blueprint can be on
paper or on a computer; a certain color line might represent a door and another color line
represent a window; I might even draw a simple blueprint for a small job in the sand. But again,
as with maps and art, there will be some limits. Camp’s remarks on dots and parallel lines would
seem to apply, the need for abstraction we talked about in maps, and so on.
Diagrams fit an analysis in terms of senders and receivers too. Like a map, a diagram of,
say, the circulatory system helps a receiver find their way around – in this case, in the human
body. There will be a sender – the diagram maker – and a receiver – the doctor or nurse using it.
What is being observed by the sender? Roughly the state of the body, the way its parts are
arranged. What are the receiver’s actions? Whatever procedures or operations need to be
performed. How could this sort of thing get off the ground? Doctors want to do the best job
they can of helping their patients. Sender doctors want this, receiver doctors want this, and
patients want this. Sender doctors then design diagrams to try to do that. If the diagrams help,
this is good for everyone and they make and distribute more diagrams like those; if they don’t
work, they try to do things differently.
As with maps and blueprints, the idea of entry and exit rules is applicable here too. An
entry rule for a circulatory system diagram might be something like “If there’s a vein there in
most people, draw a red line here on the diagram” and an exit rule might be “If there’s a red line
there on the diagram, then you can insert an IV needle here on the patient”.
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Like a map or blueprint, relations between parts will matter. It matters that the lungs are
represented as being behind the ribcage and the heart as roughly between them. Systematic
organization and sequencing might matter too – for example, in the circulatory system, bigger
veins or arteries might be drawn wider or in darker red. As with maps, the absence of a feature
on a diagram might represent an absence in the target, but it need not – for example, when a
diagram of the circulatory system doesn’t include all of the bones or the nervous system. And
importantly, conventionality – to some degree – has a place here too. Veins can be drawn red or
green or blue, for example, and so on.
Here is an example of a diagram of the right side of the neck from Gray’s Anatomy
(1858) (Figure 4.38).

Figure 4.38. Surgical Anatomy of the Arteries of the neck. Right side. [Illustration] In
Gray H., and Carter, H, V. (1858), Anatomy Descriptive and Surgical, London: John W.
Parker and Son, p. 316, plate 189. Wellcome Collection.
https://wellcomecollection.org/images?query=wkyuvavb
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The arteries are marked in red and the veins in blue (in this case just the jugular and subclavian).
The diameter of the arteries and veins and capillaries and so on in the diagram are drawn to map
fairy systematically to what we see in the real world. We also have the arrangement of parts and
organization mattering. And yet, there is still room in this diagram for leaving some things out –
there are no legs, no hands, there’s no torso. Depth is also represented through shading and the
placement of lines over others. A diagram like this could of course be made more systematic in
its mappings. Strict procedures could be put in place – entry and exit rules - for how wide to
draw a part of some vein given how wide that part is in the subject (or the average subject) for
example.
Similar to diagrams and blueprints, and sometimes maps even, are models. Architects
use models. So do scientists. A model of a building might be helpful for contractors. A model
of the solar system might be helpful for people working with satellites or on space travel.
Consider a three-dimensional model of our solar system (Figure 4.39).

Figure 4.39. A Three-dimensional digital solar system. The Sky Live (2020),
[Screenshot, 2020, Dec 11, 18:45, UTC]. [Digital model]. Retrieved from
https://theskylive.com/3dsolarsystem?date=2020-12-11&h=18&m=45&.
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There are parts. Each sphere in the model might map to a particular planet. In a model of the
solar system, arrangement can matter. It matters that the sphere representing Mercury is closer
to the sun than Neptune. There is also room for systematic mapping. The distance between the
planets in the model might correspond in a systematic way to the distance of the planets in the
real solar system. The size of the planets and the color of the planets in the model might
correspond in a systematic way to their size and color in the real world. How they revolve
around the model sun might correspond systematically to the way the real planets revolve around
the real sun. Accuracy can have a place in these cases too. Given the systematic mappings and
what rules they follow, someone might end up depicting Saturn as too close to Pluto. What we
get with models is that they aren’t just combinatorial signals. They’re compositional. And
they’re not just organized but also encoded.
One thing models seem great at is depicting, showing how things look and how they are
arranged. They can also be very similar to maps and can plausibly help with certain kinds of
navigation. Other kinds of models – architectural or engineering models (sometimes called
maquettes) – are in some ways also kind of like blueprints and are good at depicting what an
architect or engineer wants created, usually to strict scale. Here’s a model supposedly created by
Italian Renaissance architect Filippo Brunelleschi for guidance with the construction of the
Cattedrale di Santa Maria del Fiore (Figure 4.40).
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Figure 4.40. Model of the dome for the Cattedrale di Santa Maria del Fiore, Italy.
Brunelleschi, F. (1420-). [Model]. Museo dell'Opera del Duomo, Florence, Italy.
Retrieved from https://www.wga.hu/html_m/b/brunelle/dome_mod.html

But there’s another communicative role some models can play. Some models, thanks to their
systematic mappings and arrangements, can help show how certain things work, can help explain
or reveal things. A good model of the solar system, for example, thanks to the way the planets
are arranged and how they rotate and their size and so on, could be able upon inspection to show
how the moon passing in front of the sun causes a solar eclipse. And in fact, mechanical models
have been made for just this purpose for quite some time. Here is an example of what is known
as an orrey model, a type of mechanical planetarium. This one was made by Benjamin Martin
(1704-1782) in London in 1766 and used by John Winthrop (1714-1779) to teach astronomy at
Harvard (Figure 4.41).
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Figure 4.41. Benjamin Martin’s mechanical planetarium. Sage, R. (2009). Planetarium
in Putnam Gallery 2, 2009-11-24 [Photograph]. Wikipedia commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Planetarium_in_Putnam_Gallery_2,_2009-1124.jpg

4.6 Dead Men Tell No Tales? Or All Hands on Deck?
Plenty of people make maps. Make them for themselves, make them for friends. The same is
true of blueprints, diagrams, and models. Perhaps the most famous maps in human storytelling
are treasure maps, created by some captain and their crew to help them find their way back to
some buried treasure. It turns out there probably never were any real treasure maps like the kind
found in Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island (1883).118 But maps that appear to be made
by groups or collectives – like the captain and crew of a ship - do seem to be fairly common.
I think maps, blueprints, diagrams, and models, can all be seen to fit, in some cases, into
the group sender model discussed in Chapter 2 and expanded on in Chapter 3 when we looked at
group cases in art. Let’s look at the case of maps.
Many maps are created today by private companies. A lot of other maps are created by
governments – for example, through the US Geological Survey. In these cases, there is a
division of labor in map production. There are CEO’s who run the company. There are experts
who consult on how best to make maps. And there are the people on the ground doing the
survey work and the actual printing. I think many map cases like these will turn out similar to
things like large film productions. Who takes credit for how much authorship will be on a case
by case basis, but in these larger cases more often that authorship will be somewhat distributed

118

See Cordingly (1995), for discussion.
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with more of it falling at the top, with who is making most of the major decisions. But it’s also
plausible that some of these larger cases might involve collective entities that are closer to the
paradigm case of a group agent discussed in Chapter 2 – that is, it could be that the map-making
company itself counts as the sender (at least, more than it seems plausible to count the CEOs or
some other person). Just as with collective art and other group signals, map-making cases will
lie somewhere on a spectrum. There can even be map-making cases that are more dictatorial –
more like what we saw in Chapter 2 with the Hobbes cases.
One popular example of a form of collaborative mapping is the OpenStreetMap created
by Steve Coast in 2004 and inspired by Wikipedia (Figure 4.42).

Figure 4.42. OpenStreetMap view of Tempe, Arizona. OpenStreetMap. (n.d.).
[OpenStreetMap map of Tempe, Arizona]. Retrieved November 22, 2020, from
https://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=14/33.4219/-111.9384

The online OpenStreetMap program is similar to Google Maps in that it has streets and buildings
mapped out, but the program allows for a very wide array of editing by its users. Users can add
buildings, streets, riverbanks, edit coastlines. They can correct edits that other users have made.
It’s quite impressive, and it naturally makes one wonder: who is the “author” of this map?
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The answer to the authorship question, I think, is tricky in this case. There is the original
creator – Steve Coast. I think it was plausible to consider Coast the author at the beginning of
the project, but now he is far removed from much of the program’s current life and there have
since its launch been more than hundreds of thousands of contributors making edits. Another
option might be the non-profit that maintains the program, and yet they state they do not
determine how the program operates – they just support it. So, naturally the next plausible
candidates are the contributors.
But the way the contributors edit OpenStreetMaps is not very organized. Edits are done
on one’s own and not vetted. They can be corrected by later editors, but it’s up to users to notice
the defects and take the initiative to change them. Vandalism is also possible – editors can
simply go in and intentionally create a street that is not there in the real world or erase one that
is. This situation seems similar to the Tunisian collaborative painting case we discussed in
Chapter 3, where the “groupiness” of the work came in degrees and depended on how the artists
worked together or not. In the case of OpenStreetMaps, there is no explicit decision-making
process – users don’t talk to each other and agree on where to put a road on the map. But it
could be that users, like painters in some collaborative painting cases and musicians in some
jamming cases, sort of coalesce around something. How much that happens can come in degrees
too, of course. Something like this could be happening in the OpenStreetMaps case. It’s not
entirely clear how much it is, though. More empirical data would be needed on the map’s
development over time. But if something like this isn’t happening in the OpenStreetMaps case,
then, OpenStreetMaps, turns out not really to be a group signal and instead something else. It
could be a mish-mash of independent and perhaps some semi-collaborative signals. Or like the
analysis of one version of the Tunisian collaborative painting case, it could be more appropriate
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to say the person who last updated the work is really the primary author - like when someone
adds something to a painting they bought from a store and makes it their own. Either way, it
seems there are candidates out there worth looking into as instances of group communication in
this area. Some maps, like some works of art, seem plausibly to be made by more than just
individuals.

4.7 Land Ho!
In his work Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), John Dewey pointed out the lack of attention in
the literature on communication being paid to objects such diagrams, blueprints, and maps. For
some reason, many authors either ignored these objects when working out their semantic theories
or they considered them sort of special cases, things to be dealt with on the side but not as central
to communication or at least not similar enough to the central parts of it to warrant comparable
analysis.
In this chapter we saw that maps indeed can be communicative devices, and they can
communicate much more than just the way some bit of the world is. Maps can be compositional
and encoded - just as art can be and just as most paradigm human language is. It turns out maps
are highly conventional. They need not show the way the world really is in all respects, and yet
there are some limits on their conventionality. We also took a look at blueprints, diagrams, and
models. Many of these objects can be understood as instances of communication. They can be
compositional and encoded, make use of mappings and sequences. I’d wager an analysis could
be done of some real-world cases showing these objects are also produced at the group level. I
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leave that investigation for another time. We’ve reached our shores. It seems there is much
worth exploring when it comes to things like maps, blueprints and communication. There’s
plenty more worth exploring still.
***
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Postscript (Coda | Reprise)
One thing philosophers have hoped to do is better understand communication. Historically,
much of the focus has been on the human side of the problem, especially on things such as
sentences and words. Animal communication was often seen as something off to the side and a
different puzzle. Things such as works of art, which often seem to involve meaning of some
sort, and things like maps, were also often treated as special cases. With the benefit of Darwin,
researchers started to look at thing differently. Then came the tools of mathematics, including
the integration of information theory and game theory, and since then, progress on the topic of
communication has boomed.
In this dissertation, I took a step back from the individual problems of philosophy of
language and animal communication to look, first, at how communication itself works, to look at
the big picture questions, the foundational questions, the questions at the heart of this. Then I
took what we learned in the first part of the thesis and turned to some cases of communication on
the perimeter. We looked at cases that didn’t quite fit the traditional sender-receiver set-up, we
looked at works of art, maps, and communication between group agents. I tried to see how far
the model could go, what we might learn from testing its outer limits.
Here’s a short brief of what we learned minus all the fine details. Communication comes
in many forms. It comes in the form of simple signals. Even signaling systems with just two
signals, states, and acts, and with signalers as cognitively unsophisticated as fireflies might
evolve to communicate. Communication can be incredibly complicated and in different ways. It
can involve the combination of parts, it can involve arrangements and systematic mappings, the
use of sequences. It can involve groups, where a signal is sent not just by some individual but by
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more than one individual and in a way that isn’t just metaphorical or loose talk. We saw that this
seems plausibly to apply to some non-human agents too. We saw that art fits the sender-receiver
model, and that art’s many forms can function communicatively in many ways, serve many
different purposes. We saw that certain animals seem plausibly to engage in aesthetic
communication and that there is a story to tell about communicative art at the evolutionary and
the group level. Finally, we saw how maps fit into the model, how this form of communication
is similar to but different in certain important respects from other forms we encountered. We
saw how navigation played a key role in maps, and how blueprints, diagrams, and models fit into
the sender-receiver framework as well.
With all this talk of signals and communication, one might start to wonder: how should
we understand the relation of the model to the world? I imagine a dubious reader saying, “Look,
I get that according to this model we can say that signaling occurs in these various places and at
these various levels, but is what this model calls “signaling” really communication?”
We come to the table with certain folk concepts and we use words to express them.
Some of those folk concepts are expressed by words such as ‘sign’, ‘meaning’, and ‘symbol’.
There are two frameworks at play here or two different signaling systems. There is the folk
signaling system involving the old handed-down words and its way of using them, and there is
the sender-receiver signaling system which also happens to employ some of the same words –
‘sign’, ‘signal’ - but with different rules for their use. I take here the same stance I took with
respect to the question of meaning in Chapter 1. The two systems – the folk and the senderreceiver - are just two different ways of carving up our world - one more useful in certain
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circumstances, the other more useful in others. One isn’t reducible to the other, and there is no
unified pre-theoretic phenomenon for them both to be right or wrong about.
Think back to the distinction introduced in Chapter 1 between internal and external
questions. External questions were about a language. Internal questions were questions asked
in some language about the world. Using this distinction we can reinterpret questions about
whether something is really a signal as either an external question about whether we should use
the sender-receiver way of talking about things and using the word ‘signal’, or as an internal
question about whether something fits the description of a signal in whatever framework we’re
using.
There is still much to be done with the sender-receiver model. Despite all we’ve covered,
there are still plenty of important questions to be answered. Jian Shen, in his dissertation (2020),
for example, asks whether signaling might be better thought of as an instance of an even more
basic phenomenon, something that can apply even to what he calls “para-representational”
systems such as the Watt’s governor, which Shen argues seems not to have a clear separation
between the basic parts of the sender-receiver scaffold. There seems to be some good use to
thinking about things Shen’s way, but I leave it for readers to look into further. There are also
less foundational application questions that researchers can ask. I’ve said nothing of certain
forms of art – literature, poetry, clothing design, saddle making, architecture. There are simply
too many forms of art to tackle all in one project. I’ve also not looked into a multitude of other
real-world cases to which one might try to apply the model. Biology is ripe for investigation.
The communicative behavior of many non-human species is up for grabs. So is a lot of work in
archeology, work in cryptography and linguistics, possibly even work in the biology of plants. It
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would be nice to see more research on more topics, especially more field work, to see how much
more of our world the model can make sense of.
Then there is the classic question of logic. Many philosophers who worked on
conventional theories of meaning did so because they also thought a conventional theory of
meaning would somehow be connected to a conventional theory of logic. I’ve stayed away from
the logic question in this thesis. Whether logic is conventional is a big question. Surely in some
way logic and inference are involved in communication. If I’m hiking in the backcountry of
Montana and my horse and I hear some rustling behind some brush up ahead, depending on what
my horse does, what sound he makes (signal), for example, I might be able to infer that there’s
something big back there, that there’s a Grizzly or an elk back there. If a moment later my horse
gets another look at what’s behind the brush and does something else, makes some other noise
(another signal), then depending on what that signal was, I might be able to infer that the news is
bad - that there’s a Grizzly back there! - and act accordingly. Somehow these things seem to be
connected: logic, inference, communication. It would be nice to see an investigation work
through all that.119
When it comes to the updated sender-receiver model, I think it is simply a more fruitful
way of doing things, of communicating and coordinating, of talking about communication. It
seems to capture more, fit and make space for more, seems to be more useful than many previous
models and older versions, especially in more rigorous contexts. My hope is that this thesis will
have demonstrated the worth of the model for continued exploration, development, and

119

It’s worth noting that Skyrms talks briefly about logic and inference in a number of his works (2000, 2004, 2010,
2011). There is also some early-stage modelling work out there by Steinert-Threlkeld (2016, 2019) and Franke
(2014).
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application. Perhaps in the future we’ll find that the model has helped us understand
communication better, as well as the veritable carnival of signs and signals all around us. It’s
just one more step in understanding a little bit more of our world, including a little bit more of
each other.
***
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Creation seems to come out of imperfection. It seems to come out of a striving and a
frustration. This is where, I think, language came from. I mean, it came from our desire to
transcend our isolation and have some sort of connection with one another. It had to be
easy when it was just simple survival. “Water.” We came up with a sound for that.
“Sabretooth tiger right behind you!” We came up with a sound for that. But when it gets
really interesting, I think, is when we use that same system of symbols to communicate
all the abstract and intangible things that we’re experiencing. What is “frustration”? Or,
what is “anger” or “love”? When I say “love” - the sound comes out of my mouth and it
hits the other person’s ear, travels through this byzantine conduit in their brain, through
their memories of love or lack of love, and they register what I'm saying... and they say
yes they understand, but how do I know? Because words are inert. They’re just symbols.
They’re dead - you know? And so much of our experience is intangible. So much of what
we perceive cannot be expressed, it’s unspeakable. And yet, you know, when we
communicate with one another and we feel that we have connected - and we think we’re
understood, I think we have a feeling of almost spiritual communion... and that feeling
may be transient, but I think it’s what we live for.
-

Waking Life (Linklater 2001, 0:11:23)
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